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Abstract
Wireless Ad hoc Networks (WAHN) have become increasingly popular, provid­
ing the underlying communication network of nodes for deploying new tech­
nologies, such as Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) and Vehicular Ad hoc Net­
works (VANET). This demand requires appropriate intrusion detection measures. 
WAHN offer a challenging environment for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). 
In particular WAHN have a dynamic topology, intermittent connectivity and en­
ergy constrained nodes. Researchers have sought the use of multi-agent IDS to 
overcome these challenges. The overall efficiency of a multi-agent IDS is depen­
dent on the organisation and cooperation of the agents, which could influence 
the life expectancy of the network. It is therefore im portant th a t a balance is 
struck between the cost of operating the IDS and its benefits, whilst preserv­
ing the normal operation of the underlying network. This thesis proposes the 
novel use of techniques, tactics and procedures drawn from military doctrine to 
improve the efficiency of multi-agent IDS in resource constrained WAHN, such 
as WSN. As such the C2-IDS agent platform was designed to execute the com­
bat functions carried out in a tactical command post. The deployed agents are 
grouped into tactical teams with a modular structure and hierarchical chain of 
command, which allows for scalability of the proposed framework. The C2-IDS 
framework also implements a Command and Control (C2) process th a t factors 
in operational environment variables to  plan and determine the feasibility of an 
offensive mission to detect a malicious node. A simulation-based model of the 
solution under different network conditions was implemented to demonstrate how 
the agents behave, whilst detecting and recovering from multiple sinkhole attacks. 
The proof of concept was then evaluated in terms of processing (CPU) and radio 
energy consumed, agent communication and mobility overheads, the detection ac­
curacy, and data loss incurred from the attack. The results demonstrated th a t the 
C2-IDS achieved improved performance in the simulated conditions with energy 
savings of 100 Joules per agent. These results were computed from a comparative 
analysis of simulation-based models, under the same simulated conditions, of (1) 
a defenceless WSN, and (2) a WSN with a generic multi-agent IDS devoid of 
any military characteristics. This also provides a benchmark of performance for 
comparing results of other implementations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless Ad Hoc Networks (WAHN) have increasingly become a key underly­
ing technology in numerous application areas tha t demand economical commu­
nication facilities without a pre-existing infrastructure. This proliferation has 
required tha t proper security measures be in place, including the need for intru­
sion detection to provide defence-in-depth, in the eventuality tha t the intrusion 
preventive measures have been breached. However, conventional intrusion de­
tection systems (IDS) used in wired and infrastructure based networks were not 
suitable for the challenging, resource constrained environment posed by WAHN. 
Therefore, researchers have resorted to developing distributed and cooperative 
IDS using software agents, also known as a multi-agent IDS. This type of IDS 
provides a means to circumvent the challenges of WAHN, nonetheless the or­
ganisation and cooperation of the software agents impact on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the IDS. It is therefore imperative to adopt an organisation model 
of software agents tha t balances the efficiency and effectiveness of the IDS with 
respect to the variables and constraints of its operating environment, including 
energy sources and presence of potential threats.
Military operations are considered to be synonymous with efficiency and effec­
tiveness, primarily due to the existence of proven reference guides for operational 
conduct, training drills and practice rehearsals using available information col­
lected before a live mission. The outcome of every rehearsal is continuously 
assessed and fed back to readjust key parameters for the mission, ultimately 
achieving a specific objective. These are some of the characteristics tha t led to 
this researcher exploring the concept of applying military principles and tacti­
cal methods to the design and implementation of an organisational model for 
software agents in an IDS for WAHN.
The intention of this approach is to reduce the cost of operating the IDS, whilst 
maintaining an intruder detection effectiveness tha t is fit for purpose and even­
tually carrying out a measured response to neutralise the intruder. In essence,
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a WAHN can be viewed as a theatre of operations. Each legitimate device node 
in the network can be considered as an area of operations under the command 
and control of its IDS. The IDS is analogous to a military base having a team 
of agents, or operators, at its disposal. The stationary agents within the IDS, 
and its deployed mobile agents, follow specific principles and tactics drawn from 
military doctrine to conduct operations, with the objective of retaining an overall 
advantage over the intruder.
The rest of this chapter explores further the motivation behind this research, 
outlining the ultimate objectives.
1.1 The rise of W ireless Ad Hoc Networks
In December 2004 and August 2005, the world witnessed two of the most devas­
tating natural disasters. The aftermath of the tsunami in South East Asia and 
Hurricane K atrina in the southern states of America brought chaos and disrupted 
rescue operations, when the majority of the communication infrastructure was 
knocked out of service due to flooding and service congestion. The emergency 
responders on site found difficulty providing situation updates to their central 
command centres crucial to the coordination effort of the search and rescue oper­
ation. Moreover, the survivors could not call the emergency services or relatives 
to communicate their whereabouts [10, 48, 60]. Such historical events have led 
experts to advocate the use of WAHN as a readily available solution to supple­
ment communication channels to emergency responders and victims alike. The 
main motivation being the distinguishing characteristic of WAHN, tha t they do 
not require any pre-existing underlying infrastructure th a t could be compromised 
in the event of a natural disaster or a potential terrorist attack [10, 27, 34, 45, 89].
Frodigh [17] aptly describes Wireless Ad Hoc Networking as the art of networking 
without a network. In practical terms, this translates to a network of any de­
vice nodes capable of communicating over the wireless medium without the need 
for an underlying infrastructure of specialised nodes. This infrastructure usually 
provides centralised network management and data routing functionality, such 
as base stations or mobile switching centres. Instead with a WAHN, each device 
node acts autonomously as both a host and a router, interconnecting with each 
other on the fly (Figure 1.1). Therefore, communication between a source and 
destination node can be achieved through multi-hop routing over the intermediate 
nodes tha t are within range of each other. This makes WAHN relatively quicker 
and cheaper to deploy than its infrastructure-based counterpart. It is for these 
main qualities tha t WAHN have become increasingly popular over the past couple 
of decades taking up a key role as the underlying networking technology in var­
ious commercial and non-civilian applications, including emergency and disaster
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Figure 1.1: A typical Wireless Ad Hoc Network arrangement
recovery situations, health care use, conferencing and academic environments.
W ith the continuous advancement of mobile technology and the vision of ubiq­
uitous computing through the Internet of Things, WAHN are continuing to be 
developed further, and being rooted in our everyday lives. The presence of WAHN 
is manifested, for instance, through the use of minuscule, battery powered sen­
sor nodes found in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) that monitor atmospheric 
conditions in our environment, or information dissemination through consumer 
smart phones belonging to Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET) and even vehicles 
that can communicate with each other exchanging continuous real time traffic up­
dates with context aware information, thus forming Vehicular Ad hoc Networks 
(VANET) [2, 6, 21]. In the past couple of years, research papers and proto­
types have surfaced demonstrating how unmanned ground and aerial vehicles 
(UGAV), colloquially also knows as drones, can use wireless ad hoc communica­
tion to implement swarm behaviour inspired by collective animals, such as birds 
flocking together [5]. These drones act collectively to achieve a unified objective, 
whether it is a search and rescue operation or a concerted effort to transport 
heavy equipment. The opportunities involving WAHN are vast and, in the midst 
of all this, there is an imperative requirement tha t this technology is designed 
with the appropriate security measures guaranteeing the availability, integrity 
and confidentiality of the exchanged data. One has just to picture the critical 
amount of damage that can be imposed, if a swarm of drones is vulnerable to any 
form of attack, and instructed to carry out a destructive or fatal task. Table 1.1 
depicts extracts from online magazines tha t feature WAHN in various application 
domains.
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15th A u g u st 2014  - Harvard’s 1,000 Kilobot swarm demonstrates the future of robotics [68]
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/15/harvaxd-kilobot-swarm-future-of-robotics
“Swarms of small robots in their thousands that collectively complete complex tasks are now 
possible - and could be the future of robotics, according to researchers. The Kilobots are a 
team of 1,024 simple robots that operate as a collective, much like the Borg in Star Trek or 
termites in a termite mound, and been shown to demonstrate the ability to swarm together 
to form complex shapes like the letter K, or a starfish.”
3rd J u n e  2013 - How you and I  could become nodes in the internet of things [18]
http://gigaom.com/2013/06/03/how-you-and-i-could-become-nodes-in-the-internet-of-things/
“Some day our bodies - or at least the clothing or accessories that adorn them - could become 
key network nodes in the internet of things. European researchers think that sensors and 
transmitters on our bodies can be used to form cooperative ad hoc networks that could be 
used for group indoor navigation, crowd-motion capture, health monitoring on a massive 
scale and especially collaborative communications. Last week, French institute CEA-Leti 
and three French universities have launched the Cormoran project, which aims to explore the 
use of such cooperative interpersonal networks.”
24th M arch 2011 - Flying robots swarm to the task of disaster rescue [12]
http://edition.cim.com/2011/TECH/innovation/03/24/flying.robots.disaster.relief/
“(CNN) -  Establishing emergency communication networks in disaster-hit areas can often 
take time, hampering rescue teams in their efforts to save lives. But a new system of 
autonomous flying robots being developed at the Federal Institute of Technology in Lau­
sanne (EPFL) could make establishing emergency wireless networks faster, more reliable and 
more affordable. The Swarming Micro Air Vehicle Network (SMAVNET) research project 
at EPFL’s Laboratory of Intelligent Systems (LIS) was set up to study swarm intelligence 
-  the science of artificially mimicking the efficient collective behaviours of animal or insect 
colonies.”
Table 1.1: News feature on Wireless Ad hoc Networks
1.2 Defence-in-depth
Researchers have focused their efforts on developing intrusion prevention mech­
anisms suitable for WAHN tha t would stop an adversary in their tracks, thus 
preventing an infiltration of the network system. There are many papers in the 
literature discussing the different forms of known encryption-based preventive 
measures tha t have been adapted to WAHN [96]. However, the myth of the Tro­
jan Horse mentioned in Homer’s Odyssey provides an im portant lesson regarding 
the risk of defending resources with preventive measures only. Notwithstanding 
the strong Trojan fortifications, the cunning Greeks still managed to infiltrate the 
city of Troy through the use of subterfuge. Similarly, a determined adversary with 
the right resources will eventually circumvent any preventive measures protecting 
a network. Modern day cyber-attacks [24, 50] have demonstrated th a t intrusion
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prevention on its own is not enough, hence, the need for defence-in-depth with 
a second line of defence, also known as intrusion detection. Assuming tha t the 
adversary has now gained access and is working from within the network, the 
intrusion detection system (IDS) collects and analyses data to detect suspicions 
behaviour tha t could be construed as malicious, and subsequently carries out an 
appropriate response to neutralize, or delay, the damaging effect of the potential 
intruder.
1.2.1 Intrusion detection system  requirements
An intrusion detection system has two main non-functional requirements: effec­
tiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness is the ability of the IDS to classify correctly 
a node as an adversary in a timely manner, whilst efficiency is about operating 
the IDS in a cost effective way. These two qualities dictate the design and im­
plementation of the three main functional components required for an intrusion 
detection technique [8, 49, 50] and the following is a brief description of what 
each component entails:
• D ata collection
— The IDS needs to collect audit data tha t reveals information on the 
behaviour of a particular node or the network itself. The IDS can 
collect and store the data locally on each node in a distributed fashion 
or it could store it in a centralised location for further processing. 
There are different sources of data tha t can be used by the IDS, such 
as network traffic flow information, e.g. number of packets forwarded, 
or system log files in the host node. The data to be collected are usually 
dependent on the different kinds of attacks tha t the IDS is required to 
detect. For instance, a denial of service (DOS) attack on the routing 
functionality in a node, would at least collect data about the number 
and type of routing packets tha t are inbound to and outbound from a 
node.
• D ata analysis and detection
— The IDS processes the collected data through an analytical model of 
choice and evaluates the outcome according to a set of rules, declaring 
its verdict on whether the analysed behaviour is suspect or not. The 
IDS can immediately trigger an alert or hold on to its verdict until 
it receives further data as stronger evidence of an ongoing attack. 
There are various types of analytical models tha t can be used [8, 28, 
50, 51, 67], some of which might require a complex vector of inputs. 
Examples of analytical models are simple statistical models (mean,
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standard deviation, etc.) or more advanced ones, like Bayesian Theory, 
Game Theory or Neural Networks.
• Intrusion response
— Once the IDS has triggered an alert, it then proceeds to  initiate an 
intrusion response to disable the suspected intruder for a temporary 
time period or it permanently evicts the node from the network. An 
example of an eviction would be the reinitialisation of the encryption 
keys to every participant node in the network forcing a suspected node 
to be recognised as an illegitimate participant.
The performance of an IDS is usually based on a trade off between its efficiency 
and effectiveness, which factors in the amount of energy consumed due to the pro­
cessing, storage and communication activities required to detect and respond to 
intrusions. For instance, vast volumes of collected audit data could lead to precise 
detection; however the energy cost of propagating tha t large volume through the 
network might be unbearable for the nodes. A more complex analytical model 
could offer better confidence in detecting suspect behaviour, albeit the model 
would be processor intensive, thus consuming more energy. Mishra [49] explains 
th a t the ideal IDS should consume the least amount of energy to detect a sub­
stantial percentage of intruders, whilst maintaining a low rate of false alarms, 
which pertains to a genuine node incorrectly being classified as an intruder.
In addition to the above requirements, an IDS should not introduce any new 
weaknesses in the hosting node or the network as a whole, thereby causing it to 
be more vulnerable to a known attack, and it is also desirable tha t the IDS is 
fault tolerant, i.e. capable of recovering from faults, such as system crashes, in a 
seamless manner. This implies the need for self-diagnostics ability and persistent 
storage to capture the execution state of the IDS.
1.2.2 Design challenges
As highlighted in the earlier section, there is no doubt about the benefits tha t 
WAHN offer; however they do provide a challenging environment for hosting 
conventional IDS, which have been tried and tested on wired and infrastructure- 
based networks [22].
In particular, an infrastructure-based network has specialised nodes, such as ac­
cess points, routers and gateways, located at choke points in the network. A 
choke point is a location on the edge of a network domain where all the traffic 
flows through and it is also a single point of failure for an infrastructure-based 
network. However, it is an ideal location for positioning an IDS, since it can
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monitor all the traffic flow as it goes through. In contrast, the dynamic network 
topology and the lack of a pre-existing infrastructure in WAHN does not allow 
for key elements of the IDS to be positioned in known strategic locations within 
the network. Consequently, audit data are usually collected locally and then 
transferred when required to analyse the network globally.
Furthermore, the wireless channel is a shared medium tha t does not require tha t 
the participating devices are physically attached to the network. This makes it 
challenging to visualise the traditional physical network perimeter, in order to 
harden the security around it. In fact, WAHN do not have a network perimeter, 
due to their wireless ad hoc nature. In addition, each node is autonomous, which 
means it can join or leave a network on its own accord with, or without, warning. 
During this node churn, there is the eventuality tha t one might be physically 
captured and tampered by malicious adversaries. The captured node under the 
control of the adversaries can then rejoin the network legitimately to launch its 
attack from the inside. It is therefore, more difficult to establish a concrete 
boundary for the IDS to operate within a WAHN.
Lastly, the design and operations of the IDS are affected by the resource con­
straints of some of the wireless devices, specifically, limited communication band­
width, processing, storage and energy capacity. As mentioned earlier, the device 
nodes in a WAHN can have different specifications depending on their application 
use. For example, a wireless sensor network (WSN) - which is a particular in­
stance of WAHN - consists of an arbitrary number of small device nodes equipped 
with sensors and wireless capability. These can be deployed over large areas to 
collect data on particular parameters within an environment. The data  collected 
by a node are then transferred through multi-hop routing over other sensor nodes 
until they reach a designated destination or sink node. These sensor nodes are 
usually unattended and operate with limited processing and storage capabilities 
with finite battery power. There is no battery recharging period for these sensor 
nodes and hence, they will continue to operate until they eventually exhaust all 
their energy. Therefore, algorithms designed for use in sensor nodes need to  be 
adapted such tha t the life span of the nodes is prolonged as much as possible. 
Typical algorithms are those required by a node to carry out its primary function, 
and in addition there needs to be other supporting algorithms, such as routing, 
encryption and intrusion detection ones.
1.2.3 The quest for effectiveness and efficiency
In light of the above, intrusion detection systems (IDS) in Wireless Ad Hoc Net­
works (WAHN) have emerged as an im portant research topic with there being 
interest in producing intrusion detection schemes with the mentioned require­
ments, whilst also being suitable for the constrained WAHN environment. It is
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evident tha t alternate schemes have had to be sought to overcome the design 
challenges posed by WAHN. The literature is abundant with different designs on 
the quest for an effective and efficient IDS [8, 50, 95, 100].
Typically, a design identifies particular roles within each functional component 
of the IDS, where each role can either be responsible for collecting a specific type 
of data or for carrying out the analysis and detection function with respect to 
a particular attack. Other supporting roles are those of reacting to  a specific 
attack with an appropriate response. In a conventional setting, these roles can 
be taken up equally by all the nodes equipped with an IDS; however this is not 
the most efficient approach considering tha t each exercises a toll on the node’s 
resources. Alternatively, nodes can be assigned designated roles of an IDS com­
ponent, ultimately achieving the overall IDS operation through the distributed 
cooperation of those involved. This means th a t the cost of operating the IDS is 
spread amongst the nodes; however it does involve certain downsides such as the 
expensive need to transfer audit data amongst nodes. The demand to alleviate 
these downsides has piqued interest in the use of software agents to carry out 
the distributed function of an IDS in a WAHN [17, 49], which has led to a differ­
ent approach to the whole distribution lemma. For instance, instead of effecting 
costly transfers of audit data, the IDS could dispatch lightweight software agents 
loaded with the analysis and detection function to those nodes tha t collected the 
data and required servicing.
There are various design paradigms, either agent-based or not, which bear upon 
the organisation of the IDS distribution amongst the various nodes, each with 
their own set of advantages and disadvantages. Over the years, researchers have 
resorted to developing fascinating models inspired by nature, known for their ef­
ficiency and effectiveness, in order to organise the IDS distribution accordingly. 
For instance, Li et al [43] published work on replicating the biological immune sys­
tem  in humans, by organising and getting software agents to collect and analyse 
audit data in a similar manner, whilst others used behavioural models exhibited 
by certain animals [9, 58], such as, the way spiders weave a web to lure and trap 
their prey by detecting its presence through vibrations. In this case, Canovas et al 
[9] proposed the use of certain nodes taking up the role of honey pots (analogous 
to a spider’s web) to lure an intruder and then execute the full IDS operation 
within the confinement of those designated nodes, hence restricting the overall 
energy expenditure of the network.
1.2.4 The challenge in multi-agent intrusion detection
Various authors [8, 41, 49, 50, 99, 100] have published papers demonstrating 
tha t multi-agent intrusion detection schemes are a promising design paradigm 
tha t fits well with the constraints present in Wireless Ad hoc Networks. As
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briefly mentioned earlier, multi-agent IDS consist of different types of software 
agents. Jansen [26] defines a software agent as a program tha t acts on behalf 
of an entity, in this case the entity being the IDS. More specifically, each agent 
carries out a particular role with respect to the functional components of the IDS. 
It is possible to differentiate between two types of agents: static and mobile. 
A static or stationary agent, resides at a specific node and does not have the 
ability to relocate to another node. In contrast a mobile agent is able to suspend 
its execution on one node, migrate to another and resume its operation on the 
target node. The power of mobility exhibited by software agents is suitable for 
distributed systems, such as IDS for WAHN, thereby allowing for an efficient peer 
to peer collaborative relation amongst nodes. These qualities of a software agent 
provide additional benefits to the system, such as reduced network traffic load 
and latency, bandwidth conservation and adaptation to dynamic topologies and 
heterogeneous networks.
However, the performance of any system with finite resources generally boils down 
to a trade off between its objective and the expenditure of resources to  achieve 
tha t goal. This is also the case for multi-agent IDS, whereby a large number of 
agents deployed in a network might start to consume excessive resources to a point 
tha t the application supported by the underlying network will s tart to suffer. It is 
therefore crucial tha t the IDS implements an organisation and cooperation model 
for the software agents tha t is both efficient and effective, so as not to deny
the availability of resources to the main function of the network. The model
should ensure tha t the quantity of specific types of agents deployed and their 
rules of interaction are fit for purpose without incurring excessive overheads. The 
relevant literature presents different approaches being used for multi-agent IDS 
and the organisation model for the agents, with varying degree of performance
[8, 25, 29, 36, 41, 49, 50, 59, 64, 95, 100].
This work delves into the possibility of adapting tactics from military doctrine 
to an organisation and cooperation model for agents in multi-agent intrusion 
detection systems for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. From this point onwards, 
the use of the term  IDS  implicitly refers to a multi-agent IDS, unless indicated 
otherwise.
1.3 M ilitary doctrine: An inspiring solution
Military organisations around the world follow their own specific doctrine, which 
primarily provides a reference guide on how military operations are to be con­
ducted so as to achieve an overall strategic objective, and establishes the methods 
by which commanders should exercise their control over an area of operations. 
One of the most successful doctrines in military history was tha t of the Roman
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infantry, which evolved over the years to become known and feared for its efficient 
tactical organisation. It consisted of a modular structure tha t could organise it­
self as necessary to fight the enemy under various operational conditions, whether 
due to the constraints imposed by the location of the battlefield, like the narrow 
entrance to a mountain pass, or the magnitude of the threat they were facing, for 
instance, a large scale opposing force with multiple threats coming from different 
directions. The underlying tactics followed by the infantry allowed for efficient 
allocation of combat resources to incapacitate the enemy effectively.
Doctrines evolve through experience as the understanding of their effect on the 
operational environment continues to deepen through analysis, experimentation 
and practice. Most in existence today still retain fundamental concepts tha t 
have been described in some of the earlier narratives documented in military 
history, including The A rt of War by Sun Tzu [73] and On War by Carl von 
Clausewitz [11], whose authors are considered to be the fathers of eastern and 
western doctrinal approaches, respectively. These popular military treatises have 
been studied and applied to other areas such as business tactics, legal strategy and 
beyond. In a similar way, for this work it is recognised tha t there is potential for 
drawing on the principles and methods from the doctrine for conducting military 
operations and, applying them to the organisation and cooperation of agents in an 
IDS. The following sections provide the rationale for applying relevant principles 
and methods to the IDS.
1.3.1 Principles
A military doctrine mainly consists of fundamental principles and methods tha t 
are followed whilst conducting operations in a specific environment. This envi­
ronment is defined by certain variables and conditions, including those relevant 
to characteristics of present and potential future threats [82]. The principles lay 
down the foundations on which the doctrinal methods are built and developed. 
The following is a description of some of the core principles common to various 
military doctrines, where parallels can also be drawn with design characteristics 
underlying an efficient and effective IDS:
• Offensive: As a doctrinal principle, offensive is synonymous with initia­
tive. The proven way to achieve a goal is to seize, retain, and exploit this 
initiative. For instance, seizing the initiative will cause the enemy to react. 
In addition, commanders use initiatives to impose their will on an adversary 
or to control a situation. Similarly, an effective IDS should be able actively 
to carry out its operations with initiative in order to expose the malicious 
behaviour of an adversary as early as possible. It would be pointless if 
an IDS detects an attack only after the majority of the network has been
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compromised, for it would then be quite evident tha t an intruder is present 
and has now taken control over the network.
• M ass: Concentrate the effects of combat resources at the most advanta­
geous place and time to produce decisive results. An efficient IDS would 
attem pt to focus resources on operations tha t would significantly contribute 
towards the overall objective of detecting an intruder and eliminating its 
presence, as opposed to using resources blindly for any operation with disre­
gard to differentiating between a positive and negative outcome. Therefore, 
ideally an efficient IDS should keep track of the type of operations th a t are 
conducive to decisive results, in order to be able to focus resources more 
efficiently.
• M an o eu v re : Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the 
flexible application of combat resources. An effective IDS would attem pt 
to curb the effects of an on going attack by disrupting the adversary’s 
operation as early as possible. For instance, if an IDS detects th a t an 
adversary is falsifying routing packets, whilst a source node is discovering a 
route to the destination node, then it should with immediate effect exclude 
the attacking node from participating in the route discovery process so as 
to minimise the extent of the attack on the other nodes.
• E conom y o f force: Expend minimum essential combat resources on sec­
ondary efforts in order to allocate the maximum possible combat resources 
on primary efforts. One of the most im portant design considerations is tha t 
an efficient IDS should be responsible in the consumption of constrained 
resources for those operations tha t provide a significant contribution to 
achieving its goal. For instance, it could reduce the sampling rate during 
the data collection function to allow for more energy to be diverted towards 
the data analysis and detection function, or alternatively the intrusion re­
sponse one.
• S ecurity : Prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected advantage. An 
effective IDS should be designed in such a manner tha t its components 
cannot be exploited to amplify an ongoing attack thus giving the advantage 
to the adversary.
1.3.2 M ethods
Doctrinal methods consist of tactics, techniques and procedures th a t are used to 
achieve an end state in a military operation, which is aligned with a strategic 
objective. In order to gain a better understanding of these methods and their 
application to  IDS, it is im portant to distinguish between the three levels of war, 
as defined and explained by Clausewitz [11]: strategic, operational and tactical.
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Planning and objectives at the strategic level are related to the well-being and 
preservation of a nation through power and security, and are generally driven 
by politics. For instance, a strategic objective could be cultivating positive rela­
tionships with foreign host nations through security alliances and assistance. At 
the operational level, also known as Operational Art, the strategic objective is 
developed further into a collection of operations th a t contribute towards achiev­
ing tha t objective. Using the previous example, the strategic goal of developing 
security alliances can be achieved through a combination of offensive, defensive 
and stability operations conducted on behalf of the hosting nation. Each opera­
tion has its own goal, or end state, which is aligned with th a t strategic objective. 
Ultimately, the tactical level of war pertains to how an operation consists of a se­
quence of tactical actions tha t are employed to achieve the operational goal. This 
approach guarantees tha t any combat resources at all levels are used efficiently 
and effectively to achieve a common purpose.
Similarly in an IDS context, the hosting device node can be considered as the 
equivalent of the hosting nation in the mentioned example. Consequently, the 
installed IDS has a strategic objective to provide security assistance with optimal 
use of the hosting node’s resources. At an operational level, this translates to a 
combination of operations tha t is carried out from the IDS to detect and neutralise 
an adversary, whilst factoring in the rate of energy consumption by the hosting 
node. Through a situational understanding of the environment, an operation 
can be tailored accordingly and organised as a sequence of tactical actions to 
be employed. Hence, the execution of this sequence of actions determines the 
quantity of resources used, e.g mobile agents and messages, and the manner in 
which they detect the enemy, eventually translating to a degree of efficiency and 
effectiveness. This work focuses mainly on the operational level of war, with the 
objective of gaining an understanding of the military operations structure and 
procedures (including relevant tactics) employed to develop military operations, 
and apply them to the context of a multi-agent IDS.
The principles and methods referenced in this thesis are part of the military 
doctrine in use by the United States Army at the time of writing, for most 
of the relevant doctrinal publications [74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80] and field manuals 
[82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88] required for this work are described in detail and are 
available for public consumption. Albeit, the discussion of these principles and 
methods throughout this thesis is kept neutral.
1.4 Research aim
This thesis is aimed at designing and implementing an agent organisation and 
cooperation framework for multi-agent IDS, which is based on a military oper­
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ations structure and described in detail later in Section 2.3. The intention is 
to improve the efficiency of multi-agent intrusion detection in Wireless Ad Hoc 
Networks (WAHN), whilst ensuring an appropriate level of effectiveness tha t is 
fit for purpose, such tha t intrusions are detected correctly in a timely manner. 
This organisation and cooperation framework will determine (1) how the software 
agents are organised and (2) their interactions whilst carrying out the distributed 
and cooperative roles of the IDS functions within the challenging environment of 
WAHN. This developed framework has been codenamed C2-IDS, and will hope­
fully serve as a proof of concept and hence the starting point for further work in 
this area.
1.4.1 Scope
This research considers multi-agent intrusion detection in networks tha t exhibit 
wireless and ad hoc properties, with a specific focus on Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSN), introduced earlier in Section 1.2.2. This choice of network is mainly 
due to the resource constrained device nodes tha t are present within a WSN, 
since they provide the required challenging conditions to verify and validate the 
potential of the C2-IDS framework. Albeit, the framework is applicable to the 
general type of network tha t exhibits wireless and ad hoc properties.
Furthermore for the purpose of evaluating the framework, the IDS is designed 
to focus on detecting a single type of attack, namely the sinkhole attack, on the 
routing layer in a device node, which is chosen for the severe damaging effect it 
can have on a network.
1.4.2 Objectives
This work is intended to reach the stated aim by implementing an API to simulate 
a multi-agent IDS framework in a WSN environment. The API also provides 
reporting capabilities on the network performance, and the performance of the 
IDS. The efficiency and effectiveness of the C2-IDS framework is thus evaluated, 
using this API, against (1) the performance of a Generic multi-agent IDS tha t 
has also been implemented, and (2) the performance of the WSN without an 
IDS. These results demonstrate the impact of various network conditions and the 
presence of multiple threats on the performance of the C2-IDS framework.
In order to implement the API with reporting capabilities on the C2-IDS frame­
work and the Generic IDS frameworks, the following objectives have been set in 
line with regards to the research aim and scope:
• Investigate the qualities and functional requirements of IDS in WAHN
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•  Investigate the military principles and tactical methods tha t can be applied 
to IDS
• Investigate the workings of a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), in particular:
1. Communication behavioural patterns of the data flow
2. Physical specifications and functional requirements of a Sensor node
3. Type of routing algorithms employed
4. Types of attacks tha t are carried out
• Understand the implementation of the sinkhole attack in WSN
• Evaluate the existing multi-agent IDS in WAHN found in the literature, 
with particular focus on understanding the characteristics of the organisa­
tion and cooperation model tha t have contributed to better efficiency in a 
multi-agent IDS
• Design and implement a simulator API for a large scale Wireless Sensor 
Network with reporting capabilities
• Extend the simulator with a generic multi-agent IDS for a WSN
• Design the C2-IDS framework based on the military operations structure, 
and extend the simulator with this for WSN
• Evaluate and compare results between (1) WSN without an IDS, (2) WSN 
with a Generic IDS and (3) WSN with the C2-IDS
1.4.3 Contributions
This work makes the following contributions to the research area of organisation 
and cooperation model for multi-agent IDS in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks:
• Analysis of the military doctrine and application to the design of the multi­
agent IDS
• A survey and critical evaluation of the selected works on multi-agent IDS 
in WAHN highlighting contributing characteristics of an organisation and 
cooperation model for better efficiency in multi-agent IDS
• An API for simulating WSN and multi-agent IDS, which provides a tool 
for further work in this research area
• A generic multi-agent IDS algorithm tha t can be used as a reference point 
for comparison with other multi-agent IDS
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• The C2-IDS organisation and cooperation framework for software agents in 
a multi-agent IDS based on military operations structure, which allows for 
its resources to be tailored and organised according to the conditions of the 
operational environment
• A set of empirical results produced by the API th a t provides a benchmark 
on the performance of multi-agent IDS in WSN, which has been found to 
be lacking in the literature related to this research area
1.4.4 Publications
“Military tactics in multi-agent sinkhole detection in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks” , 
Computer Communications Journal, Vol.33, Issue 5, March 2010 [65]
1.5 Thesis outline
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows:
C h a p te r  2 provides a background on Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), a type 
of Wireless Ad Hoc Network used in various application domains, some of which 
require appropriate security measures. WSN were used in this work to provide a 
network environment to evaluate the performance of the C2-IDS framework. As 
such, the properties of WSN were studied in detail. Consequently, the chapter 
describes the anatomy of a sensor node and the associated resource constraints. 
In addition, the communication pattern particular to WSN is also explained. 
Following which, the chapter provides more detail on a popular type of on-demand 
routing protocol used by the WSN, namely the ad hoc on-demand distance vector 
(AODV) routing protocol [54]. Next, the security requirements and the challenges 
in implementing these requirements with regards to WSN are explored. This also 
includes a detailed description of the threat model and the type of attacks tha t 
can be carried out on WSN. From all the attacks, this work chose the Sinkhole 
attack for evaluating the performance of the C2-IDS framework, whereby the 
chapter concludes the background on WSN with a detailed case study on this 
attack.
The chapter proceeds by providing a background on multi-agent intrusion detec­
tion within the context of WAHN and a particular regard to WSN. The general 
functional requirements of an IDS were already explained in Section 1.2.1, so 
Chapter 2 contributes by describing the different characteristics th a t classify an 
IDS, and the common metrics and parameters used to evaluate the efficiency and 
effectiveness of an IDS. These served as fundamental concepts and a reference 
context for analysing existing implementations of multi-agent IDS in Wireless 
Ad Hoc Networks. The chapter provides also a background on software agents,
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including the three main design models to be considered when developing a multi­
agent system [7]. The section in this chapter concludes with an evaluation of the 
existing implementations of multi-agent IDS, tha t highlight the various design 
characteristics used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of an IDS.
Finally, Chapter 2 concludes by providing the background on specific aspects 
of the military doctrine and the manner in which they can be applied to the 
three design models underlying the multi-agent IDS. In particular, the section 
explains the core concept of a military operations framework within an oper­
ational environment, which is understood at all levels of the command chain. 
This operations framework is a collection of techniques, tactics and procedures 
implemented through various combat functions th a t tailor and organise modular 
combat resources in an efficient and effective manner.
C h a p te r  3 introduces the simulator API tha t was developed as part of this work. 
The API provides the capability to simulate WSN with multi-agent IDS, at an 
appropriate granular level of reporting required to establish a profile of perfor­
mance. The chapter provides an overview of the requirements tha t were satisfied 
in the implementation of this API. Following which, a detailed description is given 
on the various designed components th a t make up the WSN, including details 
with regards to the modelled representation of the wireless medium, CPU and 
radio antenna properties, and the simulation environment. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with an evaluation of the various conducted simulations, using differ­
ent network conditions to determine a baseline profile of performance for a WSN, 
operating without an IDS.
C h a p te r  4 describes the requirements, design and implementation of a Generic- 
IDS framework tha t utilises simple heuristics in the organisation and cooperation 
model underlying the design of the multi-agent IDS. This framework is built 
using the developed API, and installed in the Sensor nodes participating in the 
simulated WSN. The chapter then provides a description of the performance 
evaluation of the Generic-IDS with respect to the baseline profile established in 
Chapter 3. Ultimately, this evaluation serves as a reference point consisting of a 
profile of performance of a multi-agent IDS tha t does not exhibit properties with 
military connotations.
C h a p te r  5 explains how the concepts drawn from military doctrine are used 
to design and implement the C2-IDS framework. The chapter provides a de­
tailed description of the design of the IDS agent platform, which is modelled over 
the combat functions present in a military operations framework. In addition, 
an explanation is given of the command and control algorithm used at the core 
of mission planning for organising tactical teams of agents appropriately. The 
chapter concludes with an evaluation of the C2-IDS framework through simu­
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lations using the same network conditions for the Generic-IDS and the WSN. 
The evaluation is compared against the profile of performance established for the 
Generic-IDS and WSN.
C h a p te r  6 concludes this thesis with an overview of the work done to achieve 
the aim of demonstrating whether military tactics can be employed to improve 
the efficiency of a multi-agent IDS, whilst maintaining an effectiveness th a t is fit 
for purpose. As such, a summary of the results are presented for consideration. 
Finally, the work tha t can be further carried out to  broaden the scope of this 
research is given in the last section of this chapter.
Chapter 2
Intrusion detection in wireless 
sensor networks
This chapter provides a detailed description of the key aspects of multi-agent 
intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks (WSN), which contribute to the 
evaluation of the proposed C2-IDS framework. Initially, a background to  WSN 
is given together with a survey of the potential vulnerabilities present, and the 
attacks tha t can be carried out to exploit these vulnerabilities. This leads to a 
discussion on the existing types of intrusion detection techniques, and the metrics 
available to evaluate the performance of an IDS. In addition, a critical analysis 
is provided on the known implementations of multi-agent intrusion detection in 
WSN. The analysis also considers those implementations tha t have military con­
notations, and the relevant influence on their performance. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a case study on the sinkhole attack, which will be used for the 
evaluation of the proposed C2-IDS framework.
2.1 Key aspects of sensor networks
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are a particular type of network th a t uses 
wireless and ad hoc communication, with all the inherent challenges mentioned 
earlier, including a particularly resource constrained device node, also known as a 
Sensor node. WSN are popularly used in applications for - (1) monitoring spatial 
environment, such as surveillance and habitat monitoring, (2) monitoring objects, 
such as medical diagnostics and object tracking in urban terrain and (3) monitor­
ing the complex interactions between objects and their spatial environment, such 
as wildlife habitat monitoring [13]. The particular resource constrained sensor 
node in a WSN makes it an appropriate test environment to evaluate the proposed 
framework. Defence-in-depth through intrusion detection is particularly essen­
tial in such networks, because the device nodes can be deployed in unattended,
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potentially hostile zones. This increases the chances of a node being captured by 
an adversary, hence being there able to steal the cryptographic material, thereby 
compromising the intrusion preventive measures [62].
INTERNET
MobilizerPosition Finding System
Sensing Unit Processing Unit Transmission Unit
; Processor
Transceiver
_ A Storaget t r  f
r----- ---- ---
Power Unit k -—-i Power Generator
Figure 2.1: WSN model
2 .1 .1  A n a to m y  o f  a  S e n so r  n o d e
The top part of Figure 2.1 illustrates the arrangement of a typical WSN. The area 
or environment where Sensor nodes are distributed is called a sensor field, which 
could consist of nodes that are capable of collecting data from the environment 
and routing it to the Base Station (BS). The BS is considered to be a more 
powerful machine that does not suffer from the same resource restrictions present 
in sensor nodes and is usually a PC or server class type of machine. The WSN 
can be managed collectively through the BS, which also acts as a gateway to the 
other network domains, including other sensor networks.
A Sensor node is made up of a set of four basic components: a sensing unit, a 
processing unit, transmission unit and a power unit as depicted in the bottom  part 
of Figure 2.1. The sensing unit gives the eyes and ears to the node, and it usually 
consists of a sensor and an Analogue to Digital Converter (ADC) unit. The 
sensor acquires data signals in analogue format, for instance a thermistor records 
voltage level differences in response to temperature variations in the environment, 
which are then converted to digital format through the ADC. The processing 
unit consists of limited memory and processing power, with the unit executing
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the functions required for the sensor node. The transmission unit is made up 
of a transceiver, which is responsible for wireless connectivity with other sensor 
nodes. Sensor nodes typically have an outdoor transmission range up to 100 
metres [13]. Therefore, they utilise multi-hop routing to direct data, towards the 
nearest BS, on a hop by hop basis along intermediate nodes. Last but not least 
the power unit provides the required energy to sustain the function of the sensor 
node. The power source is usually finite, in the form of battery power; however 
some nodes can be equipped with a renewable energy source, for instance, solar 
rechargeable batteries, but whatever the case, the power limits the operation of 
the sensor node. Power management algorithms could be employed to distribute 
more efficiently the utilisation of the components so as to reduce the overall 
energy consumption of a node, and maximise its life span. In the eventuality tha t 
the power is depleted completely, the sensor node shuts down, thereby changing 
dynamically the operating topology of the network. The topology can also be 
altered when additional nodes are deployed within the network.
2.1.2 AODV routing protocol
The Ad hoc On demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol [37, 54] is used 
in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks, such as WSN. As the name suggests, the two main 
attributes of AODV is tha t it is both a distance vector (DV) and a on demand 
routing algorithm. In a DV protocol every node is aware of its neighbours and the 
hop cost incurred to reach them. The node maintains this information in a routing 
table, where it stores the identity of the destination node, as well as the distance 
(hop count) and the next hop to reach this destination. The on demand property 
of AODV means tha t a source node will only discover a route to  a destination 
node at the point tha t it needs to communicate with it, as opposed to discovering 
routes pro-actively as soon as it joins the network. This property ensures tha t 
each node’s routing table is populated with only the required (active) routes, 
hence, conserving the limited memory resource on sensor nodes. Furthermore, 
in AODV, each node performs periodic routing maintenance, where the active 
routes are updated with the freshest information, whilst those routes tha t went 
stale (i.e. have not been used), or have suffered an interrupted link, are marked 
as non-active and are eventually purged from the routing table.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the control messages used by the AODV protocol to carry 
out the route discovery and maintenance functions. A node broadcasts HELLO 
messages to discover its respective neighbours, who in turn  acknowledge these 
messages to mark their presence. When a source node needs to transm it data 
packets to a destination node for which it does not have an active route, it initiates 
a route request (RREQ) message broadcast to all its neighbours.
If none of the neighbours have a fresh enough route to the required destination,
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Figure 2.2: AODV protocol messages
the RREQ message is again broadcast until eventually the destination node, or 
an intermediate node with a fresh route to it, is reached. During the propagation 
of the RREQ messages, each intermediate node updates its routing table with 
the next hop towards the source node, which originally initiated the RREQ. This 
establishes a reverse path from the current intermediate node to the source node. 
The degree of freshness of a route is maintained through the use of a sequence 
number. A RREQ message contains both the source sequence number and the 
last sequence number of the destination to reach, when the latter is present. 
During the reverse path formation, the intermediate nodes compare their own 
source sequence number (as stored in their routing tables) to tha t in the RREQ 
message. A higher sequence number indicates a fresher route and hence, the 
intermediate node updates its routing table accordingly.
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Figure 2.3: AODV route discovery
Figure 2.3a demonstrates how several RREQ messages are propagated from the 
source node, N l, until eventually the destination node, N8, is found. All interme­
diate nodes maintain a reverse path to N l. When the RREQ message arrives at 
the destination node, a route reply (RREP) message is unicast along the reverse 
path back to the source node. During the propagation of the RREP message, 
each intermediate node along the reverse path will update its routing table with 
the next hop towards the destination node, thus, establishing a forward path. The 
routing information is only updated if the destination sequence number contained 
in the RREP message is higher than tha t stored in the table and if the sequence 
number is the same, then the route with the smallest hop count is selected. The
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established path will be used later by the source node to actually transm it the 
data packets. Figure 2.3b depicts the reverse path taken by the RREP message 
from the destination node N8 to the source N l.
Once the route has been discovered, the source node begins transm itting the 
buffered data packets. If one of the intermediate nodes suffers a broken link with 
its next hop, during packet transmission, then it has the option to perform one 
of the following:
1. Perform local repair
a) The outbound data packets are buffered at the intermediate node, 
whilst it initiates a route discovery process to find a new one to the 
destination node. This method is usually chosen if the intermediate 
node is closer to the destination node than to the source node. If 
a valid route is not found, then the intermediate node has no other 
option than to resort to route error (RERR) messages.
2. Use route error (RERR) Messages
a) The outbound data packets at the intermediate node are discarded. 
Furthermore a RERR message is broadcast to  all upstream nodes tha t 
hop over the broken link to reach their destination, which contains a 
list of unreachable destinations. Each node th a t receives this message 
will invalidate each route entry to those destinations and rebroadcast 
it. Eventually, the source node will receive the message and will then 
proceed to initiate a new route discovery process.
2.1.3 Security requirements and challenges
Technologies in application areas with a certain degree of data sensitivity are 
confronted with the issue of security and privacy, especially if it is to be accepted 
as a standard by industry. WSN is not an exception, for some of its current 
applications are considered mission-critical, and the data processed in these is 
extremely sensitive. Perrig and Shi [62] remark tha t security should be part of 
the design process of sensor networks, rather than a late addition. They proceed 
by outlining the security requirements tha t need to be considered while designing 
WSN, in particular:
• A vailab ility , A u th o riz a tio n  an d  A u th e n tic a tio n  The network services 
provided by each node should always be available even in the presence of 
a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Furthermore, only authorized Sensor 
nodes can take part in the network activity such tha t the node-to-node
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communication should be legitimate, and malicious nodes should not be 
allowed to disguise themselves as genuine ones.
• C onfidentiality and Integrity The communication between nodes should 
only be understood by the intended recipients of the message. Most impor­
tantly, data packets sent from a source node to a destination node should 
not be modified by the intermediate nodes.
• N on-repudiation  and Freshness A Sensor node should not be able to 
deny sending a message it previously sent. Furthermore, the data sent be­
tween nodes should be recent and adversaries should not have the possibility 
of replaying old messages.
Wang et al [91] also suggest tha t WSN should consider forward and backward 
secrecy as part of their requirements. In forward secrecy, when a node departs 
from a network it should not be able to take part in future communication, whilst 
in backward secrecy, when a node joins a network it should not be able to read 
any previously exchanged messages.
In traditional wireless networks, these requirements are usually satisfied through 
the use of asymmetric cryptography. However, in WSN, security is made more 
complicated because it is not feasible to use this in view of the resource con­
strained Sensor nodes. These constraints can be summarised as follows:
• L im ited energy consum ption
Culler et al [13] report tha t radio communication is the most expen­
sive activity in Sensor nodes, with each bit transm itted being equivalent 
to consuming as much power as executing 800-1000 instructions; hence 
any increase in message size due to security protocols is not a feasible 
approach.
• L im ited processing capabilities and storage capacity
The processors in Sensor node are usually not as powerful as those 
found in wired or wireless networks and consequently, processing-intensive 
cryptographic algorithms cannot be used in WSN. The storage capacity 
usually consists of flash memory, which contains the application code, and 
RAM, where the application processes and data are temporarily stored for 
execution. Generally, after all processes have been loaded into the memory, 
there is not enough space to execute complex security algorithms.
• L im ited com m unication bandw idth
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The radio communication bandwidth is limited both technically and 
by the limited energy consumption, as explained previously. The actual 
transmission range is dependent on various factors amongst which are 
environmental conditions, obstructions and interference.
• Low cost
Ultimately the low cost of the nodes implies th a t advanced design 
and increased complexity is not possible in WSN.
Another alternative would be to use symmetric cryptography since it is much 
faster and less resource intensive than the asymmetric form. However, symmetric 
cryptography still requires efficient and scalable key distribution schemes. WSN 
are expected to be quite large in size, with thousands of nodes deployed over 
multiple sensor fields and centralized key distribution would require a substantial 
amount of memory, which is not available in Sensor nodes. Furthermore, it does 
imply a single point of failure, which is not desired in a distributed system. On the 
other hand there is the possibility of sharing a pairwise key between every couple 
of nodes within the network. This would be fine for small networks; however this 
approach in a key management scheme tends not to scale well for larger networks. 
The current focus in research is on developing lightweight security protocols tha t 
consume a reasonable amount of energy and provide effective protection, whilst 
maintaining communication between nodes at all times [13].
2.1.4 Attacks on sensor networks
This subsection discusses the vulnerabilities tha t can be exploited in WSN, con­
structs a threat model based on the identified vulnerabilities and provides an 
overview of the known attacks tha t can be carried out on these networks. In ad­
dition, any countermeasures which can be implemented to defend against these 
attacks are provided, where possible.
V ulnerability A ssessm ent
This assessment is based on the existing literature, and covers both the Sensor 
nodes and the Base Station (BS). Perrig and Shi [62] and Wang et al [91] outline 
different vulnerabilities present in Sensor nodes tha t could be exploited by adver­
saries. The Sensor nodes are deployed in unattended environments, possibly in 
hostile areas. Consequently, the enemy would have no problem in capturing phys­
ically a node to steal cryptographic key material or other information, ultimately, 
to gain access to the rest of the WSN. Moreover, the nodes are non-tamper re­
sistant due to the high manufacturing cost tha t would be incurred if they were.
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This lack of physical protection facilitates the task for the adversary. Needless 
to say, once an attacker has access to the WSN, it can commence destructive 
activity tha t would affect every aspect of the network, including data collection 
and processing, message routing, etc.
The broadcast nature of the wireless medium itself, used to connect the nodes 
together, is deemed as a vulnerable point of entry to the WSN. For, when a sender 
node transmits, any other device in range equipped with a radio receiver is able 
to listen in, and intercept the transmission. Furthermore, radio transmission is 
subject to interference, such tha t the data communicated might get corrupted en 
route. The Sensor node’s network protocol allows for medium access control to 
prevent two nodes from communicating at the same time, and thus interfering 
with each other. However, such functionality could be exploited to jam  any 
communication between the nodes.
The weak physical security of the Sensor nodes, implies th a t the attacker has a 
feasible means of obtaining information on security measures present in them. 
It is possible for an attacker to compromise a node and infiltrate into the WSN 
disguised as a genuine node. Given this premise, intrusion prevention measures, 
such as cryptography, on their own are definitely not sufficient, and needs to be 
enforced with the presence of intrusion detection measures.
At a different level of physical specifications and functional role in a sensor net­
work, the base station is generally assumed to be a trusted entity [62]. Nonethe­
less, the connection between a Sensor node and the base station might be vulner­
able to an attem pt by an intruder node to bring down the base station. However, 
it is less difficult to control this vulnerability. As mentioned previously, a base 
station is usually resourceful and positioned in attended, possibly secure areas 
requiring appropriate authorised access. The base station would normally have 
a constant power supply, high end processor, and sufficient storage capacity and 
communication bandwidth to apply current strong encryption measures to pre­
vent an attack. It might also be equipped with a conventional intrusion detection 
system. Moreover, the presence of the base stations is less numerous when com­
pared to tha t of Sensor nodes. Therefore, it is possible to have tamper-resistant 
base stations with minimal overall effect on the cost of deployment.
T h re a t  M odel
In their survey of security issues in WSN, Wang et al [91] classify the attacks 
tha t could exploit the vulnerabilities mentioned in the previous section, under 
the following categories:
• In s id e r vs. O u ts id e r  An insider threat to the WSN can come from a 
Sensor node tha t on the outset looks like a legitimate participant of the
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WSN, which however has been tampered with and compromised. Alterna­
tively, an outsider threat can come from a node tha t does not belong to the 
network.
• P assive  vs. A ctiv e  In a passive attack, the adversary only eavesdrop the 
communication between legitimate nodes. Whereas in an active attack, the 
adversary plays an active role by possibly modifying the data stream, or 
injecting false messages within the stream.
• M ote-c lass  vs. L ap to p  class In a mote-class type of attack the attacker 
can use one or more nodes with similar capabilities as the Sensor nodes 
to carry out the attack. Alternatively, a laptop-class type of attack would 
utilize a more powerful device to compromise the WSN. The specifications 
of the latter would be equivalent at least to those of a base station.
K now n A tta ck s  a n d  C o u n te rm easu re s
The known attacks on WSN [31, 57] can be analysed in terms of the security 
requirements discussed in section 2.1.3. Perrig and Shi [62] categorise them as 
attacks on the availability, authentication, confidentiality and integrity of the 
WSN.
• J a m m in g  The radio frequency on which the Sensor nodes communicate 
is jammed by interference originating from another device. The jamming 
device or devices might be powerful enough to affect part, or all, of the 
WSN. The attack could be carried out using rogue Sensor nodes. Possi­
ble countermeasures would include frequency hopping, whereby the nodes 
rapidly switch frequencies according to a random sequence known to the 
communicating parties only. Nonetheless, the selection of frequencies might 
be limited to a particular bandwidth, such tha t a resourceful attacker might 
jam  the whole bandwidth.
• P h y sica l T am p erin g  An attacker might physically capture and tam per 
a Sensor node with the intention of acquiring cryptographic material. Al­
ternatively, the Sensor node might be replaced with a compromised node 
and re-attached to the network, now under the control of the attacker. 
The only possible countermeasure is to tamper-proof the node; however, as 
mentioned previously, this is a costly measure.
• C ollisions When two nodes attem pt to communicate on the same fre­
quency in the same instance, a collision occurs. The collision would prob­
ably corrupt a portion of the data packet resulting in a check sum error 
on the receiving end. The corrupted packet is then discarded, and the
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medium access control protocol would trigger the back-off procedure. Vol­
untary collisions caused by an attacker might result in the back-off time 
frame increasing exponentially. A possible countermeasure is to use Error 
Correction Codes (ECC); however, it is assumed tha t an attacker will cor­
rupt a large portion of the packet such tha t the ECC is neutralized. Wang 
et al [91] state tha t even though it is possible to detect these collisions, 
a complete defense against collision attacks has not yet been established. 
Furthermore, collisions attack combined with a primitive medium access 
protocol could give rise to a number of repeated transmissions tha t would 
eventually exhaust the resources of the Sensor nodes. This could be con­
trolled by throttling the retransmissions accordingly. The attack could also 
take up a different form whereby, random delayed collisions could be caused 
to force other nodes miss their transmission slot, giving rise to an unfair 
allocation of the radio channel. Small frames of data could be used to mit­
igate the risk by reducing the time slot an attacker can take control of the 
channel.
Spoofed  M odified  o r R ep lay ed  R o u tin g  In fo rm a tio n  This is a direct 
attack against the routing protocol whereby an attacker would aim to spoof, 
modify or replay routing information tha t is exchanged between nodes. The 
consequences of such an attack vary in degree of severity, ranging from route 
loops to partitioning of a network. Perrig and Shi [62] mention SPINS, a 
suite of security protocols consisting of 2 building blocks: uTESLA and 
SNEP as a solution to prevent attacks of this nature against routing pro­
tocols. uTESLA provides broadcast authentication, whilst SNEP provides 
data confidentiality, two-party data authentication and data freshness. Se­
lective Forwarding Multi-hop networks such as WSN are based on an im­
portant assumption tha t all nodes will accurately forward their received 
messages. The attacker might insert or compromise nodes to selectively 
forward specific messages and ignore the others. Possible countermeasure 
is to detect the malicious nodes, thus choosing alternative routes around the 
node. Flooding-like routing protocols might mitigate the risk of selective 
forwarding, since multiple paths are taken to reach the destination.
S inkhole A tta c k  In this kind of attack an attacker would lure network traf­
fic towards a compromised node, hence the term  sinkhole. This is achieved 
by falsifying routing information, forcing the nodes to think tha t the sink­
hole node is closer to the base station. The sinkhole node can then control 
the fate of the traffic flowing through, such as selectively forwarding packets, 
or dropping them completely, thus acting as a black hole.
Sybil A tta c k  In a sybil attack, the malicious nodes presents multiple iden­
tities to the WSN. This type of attack was first observed in traditional peer
Key aspects of sensor networks 29
to peer networks [32], whereby the attack targets distributed storage, voting 
systems, etc. For instance, in the case of distributed storage, the network 
might replicate the storage over 3 nodes. If 2 out of those 3 nodes are false 
identities presented by the same node, it defeats the purpose of redundancy. 
Possible defences include the use of a radio resource testing, random key 
pre-distribution and multi-space pairwise key distribution [52].
W orm ho les A wormhole is a low-latency link over which messages are 
received by the malicious node, which in turn  forwards them to another part 
of the network. One or more nodes could collude to set up wormholes in 
the network. This attack could be used to eavesdrop or selectively forward 
messages. Wang et al report a mechanism used for detection and defence 
against wormhole attacks, called packet leashes. This uses geographic or 
temporal information to deduce the location of the colluding nodes.
H ello  F lo o d  A tta ck s  In most routing protocols when a node receives 
a HELLO message it assumes tha t the sender is within range, hence a 
neighbour of the recipient node. Adversaries could take advantage of this 
naive assumption to use a high-powered transm itter to trick the receivers in 
thinking tha t they are neighbours. The results could be disastrous with the 
conned nodes attem pting to transm it to the fictitious neighbouring node, 
which is in reality out of range. An appropriate defence would be to use 
authentication and verify the link bi-directionally.
A cknow ledgem ent Spoofing Acknowledgement messages are used in 
many routing protocols to confirm tha t a message has been received. Mali­
cious nodes could spoof an acknowledgement message on behalf of another 
node, which could be dead, to provide false information. Again authenti­
cation would be an adequate countermeasure.
F lo o d in g  A malicious node might request connections repeatedly to a re­
cipient node. Depending on the transport protocol used, the recipient node 
might keep state information for all the requested connections, until even­
tually the memory is flooded, or reaches a maximum limit. In either case 
legitimate nodes would not be able to connect to the targeted node. The use 
of challenges or puzzles for every connection request could avoid malicious 
nodes trying to starve the victim’s resources. Even though this solution 
requires some overhead, it is still more advantageous than excessive com­
munication.
D e-sy n ch ro n isa tio n  In this kind of attack an attacker tries to disrupt 
existing transport layer connections, by exchanging carefully timed spoofed 
messages to force the end host to miss out on frames. This will result in 
the recipient depleting energy resources whilst trying to recover from the
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errors. Similar to the previous attacks, authentication would prevent the 
attacker from spoofing messages.
for multi-agent IDS. The primary reason for this choice is tha t the dynamics of the 
attack results in a modus operandi of the sinkhole node tha t is distinct from tha t 
of other legitimate nodes in the WSN; an essential premise required for intrusion 
detection in general [72, 91]. Other reasons include the ease of implementing such 
an attack and measuring its damaging effect. The following subsections provide 
a more detailed look at how a sinkhole attack is implemented in a WSN, which 
uses the AODV routing protocol.
Goal and Trait
According to Karlof and Wagner [32], the goal of a sinkhole attack is to:
“Lure nearly all the traffic from a particular area (of the network) 
through a compromised node, creating a metaphorical sinkhole with 
the adversary at the centre. ”
/ B S \  Base Station (ff) Node (X) Affected Node Çfÿ Sink Hole -----------  C onnection-------------- High quality connection
2.1.5 Case study: Sinkhole attack
The sinkhole attack is the candidate choice for evaluating the proposed framework
a) Using a  fictitious high 
quality route b) Using a  wormhole
v
Figure 2.4: Sinkhole attack scenarios
The sinkhole node accomplishes this objective by making itself attractive to the 
neighbouring nodes from a routing perspective. Consequently, the latter choose 
the sinkhole as their next hop to route the data packets. The specifics of how
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this is carried out are tied to the routing algorithm used. Figure 2.4a illustrates 
a sinkhole advertising a fictitious high quality route to the base station. The 
net result is tha t all surrounding nodes divert their traffic towards the sinkhole. 
The attractive force of the sinkhole can extend to various layers of neighbouring 
nodes, causing a devastating effect to a significant segment of the network. After 
setting up the attack, the sinkhole has now control of the data packets transiting 
through, opting for either selectively forwarding the packets, also known as a 
grey-hole attack, or dropping the packets completely, also known as a black-hole 
attack. This is the behavioural trait tha t can be captured as evidence of the 
presence of a sinkhole.
Figure 2.4b shows a second scenario of a sinkhole attack, which is carried out 
through the collusion of two nodes forming a wormhole between them. One 
of the colluding nodes, Node A, could be located one hop away from the base 
station. The other colluding node, Node B, would be linked through a low latency 
connection (the wormhole) to Node A. The neighbouring nodes of Node B, which 
in fact are several hops away from the base station, will now believe that they 
are just a few hops away. As in the case of the previous scenario the nodes tha t 
have been conned will consequently divert their traffic to Node B.
Karlof and Wagner [32] remark on an interesting characteristic of the sinkhole 
attack on WSN. The regular data flow in the network exhibits a many-to-one pat­
tern communication, whereby the data collected is converged to one destination, 
i.e. the base station. This innate pattern and the underlying routing mechanism 
is the actual vulnerability that is exploited by the adversary to carry out the 
attack. Therefore the sinkhole node needs to only advertise, or provide, an a t­
tractive high quality route to the base station to impact a considerable number 
of nodes in the network.
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A
Figure 2.5: AODV - Sinkhole scenario
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The manifestation of a sinkhole is also possible because the specification of the 
AODV routing protocol does not define any specific security services, mainly 
due to the costs associated with this. Furthermore an intermediate node can 
reply to a RREQ message, if it contains a fresh route to the destination node. 
A compromised Sensor node participating in the AODV route discovery process 
can fabricate false routing information to mount a sinkhole attack. In Figure 
2.5, Node 1 wants to send data packets to Node 4. It therefore initiates the 
route discovery process by broadcasting a RREQ message to its neighbours. The 
malicious Node 3 receives the RREQ message from Node 1. As shown in the 
figure, even though Node 3 is several hops away from the destination Node 4, 
it can still generate a RREP message indicating tha t it has a fresh route to the 
destination node. The RREP message will contain a hop count of one and a high 
sequence number. On receipt of the false RREP message, Node 1 has no means 
to verify the claim made by Node 3. Therefore Node 1 proceeds to updating 
its routing table with the information provided by the now sinkhole Node 3. 
There is also the possibility tha t a genuine RREP message is received by Node 1 
prior to receiving the false RREP sent by the malicious node. In th a t case Node 
1 updates the routing table with the freshest routing information contained in 
both replies, i.e., the route with the highest sequence number. As a result, the 
routing information provided by the genuine RREP is discarded and the route 
is updated with the information contained in the false RREP tha t leads to the 
sinkhole. The sinkhole can now either drop all the received data packets or else 
selectively forward them to the next hop.
2.2 M ulti-agent intrusion detection
This section describes in detail the features of an IDS and different metrics used 
to evaluate the IDS performance. These discussed features and metrics help 
to provide a critical evaluation of the existing implementations of multi-agent 
intrusion detection systems in WSN.
2.2.1 Features classification
The functional components in an IDS have already been presented in section 1.2.1, 
which are: (1) data collection, (2) data analysis and detection and (3) intrusion 
response. The actual design and implementation of an IDS can be classified 
according to particular features of these components [8, 50]. This classification 
provides an aid in evaluating the existing implementations of multi-agent IDS. 
It is im portant to emphasize tha t one feature is not necessarily better than the 
other. A desired feature in an IDS is largely dependent on the requirements of 
the application area tha t it is serving; hence an expensive feature, in terms of
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energy cost, might still be required if justified by the nature of the application 
being secured.
Features o f data collection
An IDS can be classified according to the source of the collected data. The 3 
main types are:
• H ost-based intrusion detection  system  (H ID S) This type of IDS can
monitor component usage and events with a host device node. Examples of 
component usage includes processor allocation, memory access, file storage 
access, whilst system events can include failed login attem pts and critical 
software failures. The IDS attem pts to detect anomalous behaviour or any 
known attack signatures by collecting data either from examining host event 
log files or from performing real-time monitoring of the components.
• N etw ork-based intrusion detection  system  (N ID S) A network-based 
IDS monitors passively or actively the traffic flow within a network, collect­
ing data on transiting packets and potentially their payloads, depending on 
whether the decryption key is available.
• H ybrid intrusion d etection  system  is an efficient approach of employ­
ing features from Host-based IDS and a Network-based IDS through the 
combination of static and mobile agents. The agents collect data at fixed 
designated locations and by traversing certain nodes in the network succes­
sively.
Features o f data analysis and detection
An IDS can be further classified by the location where the data analysis is carried 
out, and also by the type of detection method used on the outcome of the analysis, 
in order to determine the presence of an intruder.
The location of where the data is analysed is dependent on the various types of 
IDS architectural approaches, explained below:
• Centralised A centralised IDS is positioned at central points in a network, 
such as gateways and routers, to monitor all activities and traffic flow. The 
data is analysed on site by the IDS.
• Stand-alone A stand-alone IDS is present on each node within the net­
work, and analyses only the data tha t is collected locally. This type of 
IDS acts independently of each other and does not share information, or 
cooperate on any level, to detect the presence of an intruder.
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•  D is tr ib u te d  a n d  c o o p e ra tiv e  A distributed and cooperative IDS is gen­
erally implemented in the form of static agents tha t carry out a specific 
functional role th a t is local to the host. The process of data analysis is 
carried out on site, however when the analysed evidence is not substantial 
enough to draw a verdict, the local agent can invoke and participate in 
a global analysis effort to provide stronger evidence. This is achieved by 
interacting with the IDS agents present on the other nodes within the net­
work. This approach is applicable to a flat-based network; however there 
is a h ie ra rch ica l variation of a distributed and cooperative IDS for a clus­
tered network topology. This type of topology groups nodes using a related 
property into clusters, and are then managed by a nominated cluster head 
(CH) node. The IDS agents positioned on the CH nodes are also responsi­
ble for analysing data collected from the cluster member nodes, apart from 
participating in a global effort, when necessary.
• M obile  ag en ts  Mobile agents enhance the concept of a distributed and 
cooperative IDS, whereby the agent is capable of migrating to other nodes 
to execute the data analysis functional role. These mobile agents traverse 
nodes as required to achieve a cooperative goal of analysing data in order 
to detect an intruder. This behaviour increases the lifetime of a node and 
efficiency of an IDS.
Existing implementations of IDS [8, 19, 20, 44, 47, 50, 51, 56, 59, 61, 64, 71], 
in general, use various methods for analysing the data, ranging from (1) simple 
statistical methods, for instance, mean and standard deviation, to (2) advanced 
data mining techniques, such as clustering and regression analysis, to (3) machine 
learning, such as Bayesian networks and Neural Networks. Once the data  is 
analysed, a detection method is applied and there are 3 main types used in IDS:
• A n o m aly -b ased  d e te c tio n  This type of detection requires the construc­
tion of a statistical behavioural baseline profile of what constitutes normal 
operations in the network. Any anomalous behaviour tha t differs signif­
icantly from the baseline profile is considered to be an intrusion. This 
approach can achieve excellent detection precision in networks tha t exhibit 
predictive and repetitive behavioural patterns, as is the case of WSN with 
the many-to-one data flow pattern. However, in other cases it is possi­
ble tha t anomalous activities tha t are actually genuine can be profiled as 
intrusive (false alarm), or intrusive activities tha t are not anomalous can 
be executed undetected (failure to report). A considerable advantage of 
anomaly-based detection is tha t it can detect unknown attacks or anoma­
lous behaviour tha t has not been previously encountered. Whilst on the
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downside, there is a need to go through a learning phase (for baseline profil­
ing), which also requires a reference data storage to  be continuously updated 
to reflect any change in the dynamics of the normal operations. This could 
potentially exercise a toll on resource-constrained nodes.
• M isuse  d e te c tio n  Also known as signature-based, this type of IDS de­
tects the presence of an intruder by pattern matching the analysed data 
to signatures of known attacks. An attack signature can constitute any 
behavioural pattern, which is unique to the attack and leaves some trace 
in the system. For instance, patterns could be represented by system calls 
sequence, particular data flow or a sequence of actions, e.g. 3 failed lo­
gin attem pts within 1 minute. Misuse detection can accurately and effi­
ciently detect known attacks with a very low rate of false alarms; however 
it fails to detect unknown attacks tha t have different signatures. Similarly 
to anomaly-based detection, this type of detection requires continuous up­
dates of the attack signatures in the data dictionary to perform effectively. 
This could be problematic on device nodes with storage limitations.
• S pecifica tion -based  d e te c tio n  In this type of detection method, a set of 
constraints describes the range of normal operations within a network. Any 
deviation of the analysed data beyond those constraints is considered to be 
an intrusion. The constraints are usually specified manually, which could be 
quite time consuming depending on the complexity of the application area; 
however the storage requirements would be relatively less than maintaining 
signatures of all known attacks. The set of constraints need to be kept 
updated to  ensure appropriate freedom of operation within the network. 
Although quite similar in principle to anomaly-based detection, this method 
differs in tha t there is no need for a learning stage to baseline the normal 
operations; hence this type of method is immediately effective. It is possible 
for this method to detect unknown attacks tha t operate outside the specified 
constraints; however it could be less effective against attacks originating 
from outside of the network, since it is potentially more challenging to 
determine normal behavioural parameter constraints. On the whole, this 
method has achieved good results with a low false alarm and failure to 
report rates [8, 50].
These detection methods can be used in isolation or compounded to complement 
each other depending on the requirements on the application area.
F ea tu re s  o f in tru s io n  resp o n se
An IDS can also be classified by the type of response strategy th a t it carries 
out when it detects anomalous activity or the presence of an intruder. Mitchell
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[50] mentions two types: (1) passive response and (2) active response. In passive 
response, the IDS would generate an alert for further manual intervention by a 
system administrator, whilst in an active response, the IDS would take immediate 
action to disable the intruder and the intrusion. Both types of responses can be 
further classified into (1) corrective action or (2) preventive action. A corrective 
action would temporary disable the violating node for a specified time period, 
until either further evidence is gathered, or a long term measure is applied. A 
preventive action would basically disable the intruder without any possibility of 
rejoining the network, for instance by re-issuing communication encryption keys 
to all other legitimate nodes. This type of action is usually carried out over 
a longer period and could potentially impact on the overall performance of the 
network. Therefore, the use of both actions should be considered according to 
the application area, the severity and type of the attack as well as, the impact of 
disrupting the application service provided. For instance, highly sensitive defence 
data being leaked to a terrorist organisation could warrant the total disruption 
of the network service to prevent further leakage.
2.2.2 Evaluation metrics and parameters
Works in the literature [8, 50, 64, 69, 94, 95, 100, 99] have presented performance 
results of existing IDS implementations using specific metrics, which help evaluate 
the performance in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. This section explains the 
various metrics tha t can be used, together with the contextual parameters and 
attributes tha t need to be considered when evaluating the performance of an IDS.
M easu rin g  effectiveness
The effectiveness of an IDS can be measured using a set of metrics based on the 
detection classification of all the device nodes in the network, as follows:
T ru e  p ositives (T P ) device nodes identified correctly as the intruder
T ru e  n egatives (T N ) device nodes identified correctly as genuine
False p o sitives (F P ) device nodes identified incorrectly as the intruder
False n egatives (F N ) device nodes identified incorrectly as genuine
Table 2.1: Detection classification
W ith the above classification, it is possible to compute the following metrics tha t 
provide an overall picture of the IDS effectiveness:
• D e tec tio n  p rec ision  is the fraction of the actual intruders (TP) over all 
the nodes identified as intruders (TP +  FP)
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T P
precision = r p  +  F p
D e te c tio n  accu racy  is the fraction of nodes identified correctly as intrud­
ers and as genuine (TP+TN ) over all nodes (T P+T N + FP+ FN )
T P  + T N
accuracy =
T P  + T N  + F P  + F N
R eca ll is the fraction of the identified intruders (TP) over all the actual 
intruders (TP +  FN)
recall =  T P
T P  + F N
F allou t is the fraction of nodes identified incorrectly as intruders (FP) over 
all the genuine nodes (FP +  TN)
fa llou t =
F P  + T N
Specificity  is the fraction of nodes identified correctly as genuine (TN) 
over all the genuine nodes (FP +  TN)
specificity  = F ™ T N
F -sco re  is a value between 0 and 1 tha t represents a measure of the detec­
tion accuracy
_ /  precision  * recall \f  score =  2 *  —--  -
\precision  +  recall J
R O C , or Receiver Operating Characteristic, is a graph tha t plots recall 
against fallout to portray the performance of the detection function, whilst 
varying the discriminating threshold between the genuine node and an in­
truder
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Beside the above detection classification metrics, there are two other im portant 
ones of effectiveness, which are the Mean Time to Detection (MTTD) and Mean 
Time to Response (MTTR). These measure the average time taken to detect 
intruders within a network and the average time taken to apply an effective 
response strategy respectively. Finally, it is also possible to measure effectiveness 
in terms of loss o f data due to the intruder present within the network. The 
loss of data is calculated by measuring the number of packets dropped whilst the 
network is in service.
D ataPacketsLost = N um berO f Packets Sen t — Num berO f  PacketsReceived  
M easu rin g  efficiency
The efficiency of an IDS can be measured in terms of energy consumption and 
IDS operational overheads incurred by the Sensor node. The energy consumption, 
measured in Joules, of an IDS in a Sensor node can be broken down into the energy 
consumed by the CPU executing IDS processes (including software agents), and 
the energy consumed by the radio component to transm it and receive IDS agents 
and messages.
Whilst the overheads incurred by a Sensor node to operate an IDS can be defined 
as follows:
• C o m m u n ica tio n  overheads The total number of software agents and 
IDS messages tha t were transm itted or received; hence denying the Sensor 
node from available bandwidth to transm it or receive data packets
• P ro cess in g  overheads The usage allocation of the CPU to execute IDS 
processes; hence denying the CPU to other processes for aggregating sensed 
data, etc
• S to rag e  overheads The amount of memory occupied by the IDS data 
structures during execution, such as software agents, messages, etc
C o n te x tu a l p a ra m e te rs  an d  a t t r ib u te s
It is im portant to consider certain contextual parameters and attributes when 
evaluating the IDS performance with the mentioned metrics, with the main being 
the following:
• N etw o rk  d im ensions a n d  sca lab ility  The dimensions of a network can 
be expressed primarily by the size of the network and the node density. An 
IDS should be able to maintain effectiveness and efficiency, whilst scaling 
according to the size of the network. The node density determines the
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distance between neighbouring nodes; hence a high density zone would have 
several nodes within range of each other, whilst a low density would have few 
nodes within range. The IDS should be able to function within reasonable 
range of the node density parameter tha t is normal for the application area 
it is serving. For instance, a WSN could be initially deployed with an 
average node density of 200 nodes within transm itting range of any node, 
and after a period of operation the node density could deteriorate to 50 
nodes due to power exhaustion.
• Traffic load  a n d  freq u en cy  The data traffic within a network could 
exhibit different load size with varying transmission frequency depending 
on the application area. The IDS should be able to cope with the load and 
frequency of the data traffic within the network
• In tru s io n  ty p e  an d  sev erity  There are various types of attacks in a WSN 
as described in section 2.1.4 and each attack has a different severity that 
can be defined as the number of intruders carrying out the attack and the 
damage payload delivered. The performance of an IDS should be evaluated 
against the types of an attack and whether it can handle multiple attackers.
• A d a p ta b ility  an d  p o r ta b ili ty  The IDS should be able to adapt to the 
dynamic changes present in the network, such as topology changes, and also 
be portable on various Sensor node platforms within a network.
• S ecurity , u n p re d ic ta b ility  a n d  su rv iv ab ility  The IDS should employ 
appropriate security measures to ensure proper authentication and autho­
risation of its functionality, together with the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of its service and communication. Furthermore, the IDS should 
be able to exhibit a degree of unpredictability in order to prevent being 
outstripped by a smart attacker and to increase its chances of survival.
2.2.3 K ey technology: Software agents
Software agents have already been introduced in section 1.2.4 as a static, or mo­
bile, software program tha t exhibits a degree of intelligence to perform processing 
on behalf of an entity. The main differences between software agents and other 
software programs are (1) the agent’s internal state consisting of mental notions 
like plans, beliefs and goals, which make it autonomous, and (2) its collection of 
structured messages tha t allows cooperation with other agents through a common 
communication protocol [7]. In addition, software agents operate in an environ­
ment called the agent platform, which interfaces with the hosting node. The 
software agents can interact with the hosting node through the agent platform 
to achieve their goals. Both static and mobile agent have been used to impie-
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ment various multi-agent IDS architectures; however mobile agents do provide 
additional benefits as explained in the following paragraphs.
Network
Home Platform A gent Platform
A gent Platform
Figure 2.6: Mobile agent model
The mobile agent is conceived on a specific agent platform, namely, the home 
platform, which is assumed to be a trusted environment for the agent. An agent 
platform supports specific locations where mobile agents can migrate and dock. 
In these particular locations, the agents can rendezvous with other agents, or 
interact with the host environment, as illustrated in Figure 2.6. For instance, 
agents can monitor their environment, rationalize about their actions as well as 
those of other agents and cooperate with their peers. They are able to interact 
and exchange information between themselves through a common agent com­
munication language, which can take up the form of publish/subscribe model or 
direct message passing. The proliferation of mobile agents in distributed comput­
ing was achievable with the progress made in developing software systems tha t 
support portability of code over heterogeneous platforms, as is the case with the 
Java programming language. Agent portability can be described as either strong, 
whereby by the code, internal state and execution state are transferred to a ta r­
get platform, or weak, whereby only the code and internal state are transferred 
[26, 92].
Lange and Oshima [39] mention several reasons for using mobile agents in dis­
tributed and cooperative applications. The following are some of the reason with 
particular focus on IDS in wireless and ad hoc types of networks, like WSN:
N etw o rk  load  is red u ce d  The majority of intrusion detection models in exis­
tence today are based on cleverly distributed algorithms [26]. However, in most 
of them, the principle of these algorithms is to analyse the normal flow of traffic, 
and identify whether there is any variation due to the presence of an intruder. 
This is largely based on statistical data extracted from the ongoing traffic. This
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data might amount to large volumes tha t have to be moved across the network 
to a specialized node, which would perform further computations to identify any 
particular feature, or trend, in the traffic. In the case of WSN, this movement 
of data through wireless communication would impact dramatically the energy 
expenditure of the Sensor nodes. On the other hand, the analysis and detection 
functionality can be packed into a mobile agent. The agent is injected into the 
WSN, travels to the appropriate node and processes the data locally. Supposedly, 
the agent would have a smaller footprint than the statistical data with the overall 
effect of reducing the network traffic.
O vercom e n e tw o rk  la ten cy  One of the main requirements of an intrusion de­
tection model is to detect in a timely manner the presence of an intruder in the 
WSN and its application in real time critical scenarios makes this requirement a 
vital one. The efficiency of the detection operation might be influenced by the 
latency present in the network connectivity. In a mobile agent-based intrusion 
detection model, this latency is circumvented by dispatching the actual function­
ality to where it is required, as opposed to first having to transm it the data to 
the specialised node, do the computation and then send back the results to take 
the required action.
A u to n o m o u s  a n d  asy n ch ro n o u s ex ecu tio n  It has already been established 
tha t it is essential to conserve energy in Sensor nodes and possibly try  to avoid 
continuous, long term radio communication tha t would exhaust the power source. 
The conventional intrusion detection model requires tha t statistical data is con­
tinually fed into these specialised nodes for data analysis. Naturally, the energy 
required to sustain this activity is beyond the limitations of the Sensor nodes. In 
the mobile agent solution, once the agent is injected into the network, it oper­
ates independently of the spawning process in an autonomous and asynchronous 
fashion. It can subsequently re-establish communication with the parent process 
periodically.
D y nam ic  a d a p ta tio n  WSN are a self-organizing type of network with a highly 
dynamic topology due to node failures, connectivity interference, etc. A con­
ventional intrusion detection model with a rigid infrastructure will not tolerate 
similar behaviour, and will negatively affect its operation. The specialised nodes 
might be cut out from the rest of the network for an indefinite period of time. Al­
ternatively, a mobile agent-based model would dynamically adapt to the topology 
of the network, thus offering high resiliency. Furthermore an agent might monitor 
the energy consumption of the hosting node, and relocate itself to neighbouring 
node if the energy levels have fallen below a predefined threshold. This would 
allow fair use of the limited resources amongst the Sensor nodes.
At this point; however it is also fair to consider the potential drawback of in­
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troducing mobile agents, which Jansen [26] mentions as being the security of 
the agents themselves. If not properly secured, mobile agents are regarded as a 
vulnerability tha t an adversary might exploit to cause havoc the network. The 
rogue agent might compromise the platform on which it is hosted, or conversely, 
a compromised platform might corrupt a genuine agent. Furthermore a malicious 
agent might masquerade itself as genuine, initiate communication with genuine 
agents with the intention of providing incorrect information, or even intercept 
communication to modify the information. Digital signatures might be employed 
to mitigate the risks of rogue agents affecting the integrity of the system. The 
domain of mobile agent security is a research area on its own, which is out of the 
main scope of this thesis. Therefore, the proposed solutions in this work make 
use of existing encryption-based mobile agents security measures [4], For further 
information on the topic, the reader is referred to the NIST website.
The agent’s role in a system and the cooperation with other agents are key in 
the design of an efficient and effective multi-agent system, as explained in the 
following subsection.
2.2.4 Design models in multi-agent system s
Burmeister [7] in her work considers 3 key models in the analysis and design of 
multi-agent systems:
Agent model
Organisation model Cooperation model
Cooperation processes
Figure 2.7: Agent, Organisation and Cooperation model
• A gen t m odel The agent model represents the software agent together with 
its internal structure and process, which is described in terms of goals, plans 
and actions tha t allow the agent to interact with its environment. This 
comprises the agent behaviour in its designated role. In an IDS context, 
the agent could also encapsulate a functional component of the IDS, for 
instance, the analysis and detection functionality.
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• O rg an isa tio n  m odel The organisation model describes the relationships 
amongst agents and agent types. This can take up the form of (1) inher­
itance relationships between the agent and the agent type, and between 
the agent type and sub-types, and (2) relationships amongst agents based 
on their roles in the organisation. The organisation model is a means to 
structure complex systems into subsystems to draw out efficient interac­
tions. This model can be inspired by or used to represent a real world 
organisation.
• C o o p e ra tio n  m o d e l The cooperation model describes the interactions 
amongst agents, and how they cooperate together to achieve a common 
objective. This would consist of the various message types and the protocol 
used to communicate with each other and the hosting platform, via the 
agent platform.
Several papers [1, 14, 15, 46] in the literature discuss the impact of the organisa­
tion and cooperation structure on the efficiency of the multi-agent system being 
implemented. Existing implementations of multi-agent IDS architectures tha t 
provided innovative design models to improve the efficiency and effectiveness are 
described in the following subsection.
2.2.5 Existing im plem entations
This subsection looks into existing distributed and cooperative IDS architectures 
for WAHN, with particular focus on WSN, which are implemented through static 
and mobile agents. The referenced IDS architectures discussed in this section are 
selected works tha t have provided a significant contribution, in the researcher’s 
opinion, towards the advancement of multi-agent IDS architectures in terms of 
efficiency, whilst maintaining a level of effectiveness tha t is fit for purpose. The 
features classification and evaluation metrics presented in the earlier sections are 
used, where applicable, to evaluate each architecture critically. In addition, char­
acteristics of those architectures tha t have a military connotation are highlighted 
and discussed.
Zhang and Lee [99] laid down the grounds for multi-agent distributed and co­
operative IDS with their proposed conceptual architecture in 2000, illustrated in 
Figure 2.8. The architecture can be classified as both a host-based (HIDS) and 
network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS), since the collected data po­
tentially consists of real-time audit data such as system calls and network traffic 
data. Although in the proof-of-concept given by Zhang and Lee, the audited data 
consisted of routing information used to detect attacks on the routing layer, more 
specifically, route message falsification and denial of service.
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Figure 2.8: Zhang and Lee’s multi-agent IDS architecture
Figure 2.8 shows tha t the IDS agent architecture consists of 6 modules. The local 
data collection and detection modules handle the data collection, analysis and 
detection on the local host node. Once the data is collected, the local detection 
engine extracts features from the data, and applies a rule-based pattern  matching 
algorithm to determine whether those features conform to the normal baseline 
profile, making this architecture an anomaly-based IDS. Zhang and Lee remark 
tha t the task of extracting the features to detect anomalies with a low rate of 
false positives is non-trivial. The features required depends on the attack being 
modelled and other characteristics of the application area. Some of the features 
used in this architecture are the percentage of routes th a t have changed, the 
percentage change in the sum of the hop count for all routes and percentage of 
newly added routes.
In the case tha t the local detection engine does not have strong evidence, it can 
invoke the intervention of the cooperative detection module, which confers with 
other cooperative modules on neighbouring nodes. The invoking node conduct a 
vote based on the local evidence received from the neighbouring nodes through the 
secure communication module, to determine collectively whether an intrusion has 
occurred. The size of the evidence communicated could have a potential impact 
on the radio energy consumption. The intrusion response strategy is carried out 
by the local response and global response modules; however the authors only 
provide potential examples of passive corrective and preventive actions through 
alert notifications to the user.
The results from the experiments demonstrate a good detection performance rate 
with low false positive classifications; however there was no indication of findings 
regarding the time to detection, metrics related to the efficiency architecture or 
any particular contextual parameters.
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In 2003, Zhang, Lee and Huang [100] proposed an alteration to their original 
work, whereby an IDS agent is positioned at a more granular level within the 
device host on each functional layer (application, network, routing, etc). This 
approach was called the multi-layered integration detection, which claims better 
detection performance in terms of higher true positives and lower false positives.
In their Local Intrusion Detection System (LIDS) architecture, Albers [3] pro­
posed the use of mobile agents to reduce the amount of data traffic caused by 
communication exchange between the IDS local agents. The mobile agents, which 
carry the analysis and detection function, travel towards the location of the data, 
thus the IDS avoids the energy cost associated with the need to transfer poten­
tially large volumes of data between nodes.
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Figure 2.9: Albers’ proposed LIDS architecture
Figure 2.9 illustrates the LIDS architecture. This IDS uses the Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMP) data related to host and network activities as the 
source of audit data from the Management Information Base (MIB), with the 
additional support of mobile agents; hence classifying it as a hybrid IDS. The MIB 
agent on the host collects data and interacts through the local communication bus 
framework with the local LIDS agent. The latter is responsible for local analysis, 
detection and response. The detection method used could be either misuse or 
anomaly-based; however the authors have not provided further details on the 
underlying algorithm. If the local data collected is not sufficient to determine 
an intrusion, the IDS dispatches mobile agents to collect and process data on 
remote hosts. The mobile agents interact with each local node through docking 
places, or interfaces, which also take charge of the security and interaction with
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the agents. The type of response strategy described in their architecture mentions 
only passive responses through alerts to the local user. The authors carried out 
a feasibility study on this architecture claiming positive and encouraging results, 
albeit no actual details of the findings were given.
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Figure 2.10: Kachirski architectural hierarchy of agents
Kachirski and Guha [29] enhanced the concept of utilising mobile agents in their 
proposed architecture by distributing individual IDS functions to a hierarchy 
of agents, as depicted in Figure 2.10. Therefore each agent has an associated 
functional role, more specifically, the IDS architecture consists of monitoring, 
decision and action agents. The monitoring agents are responsible for collect­
ing data related to network traffic (packet-level), application activity (user-level) 
and host-based activity (system-level); hence being a hybrid IDS. The decision 
agents are responsible for the analysis and detection of an intrusion. The authors 
use existing anomaly-based detection methods tha t are attack-specific. Once an 
intrusion is detected, the action agent carries out a suitable passive or active 
response. The strong point of Kachirski’s approach is tha t agents are efficiently 
allocated to designated nodes, thus minimising power consumption by restricting 
computational intensive activities to only those nodes. The allocation algorithm 
groups the nodes into clusters based on related properties and elects a cluster 
head (CH). The CH is the only node in the cluster to be equipped with specific 
monitoring agents, such as packet-level agents, which are responsible for collect­
ing traffic data from the cluster. The clustering eliminates the need to employ 
a packet-level monitoring agent on every node, whilst still covering the whole 
network area. The author provides positive results that show the reduction in 
percentage of packet-level monitor agents required, as the number of nodes in­
creases in the network (up to a maximum of 100 nodes per unit area). There were 
no other results presented or additional parameters and attributes considered. A 
similar concept of using cluster hierarchy to restrict IDS functional activities to
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specific nodes, in order to save energy, was also used by various other authors 
[35, 42], including Huang and Lee [100] in their cooperative intrusion detection 
system for ad hoc networks. However, the authors pointed out tha t a drawback 
in restricting IDS functions to cluster heads could create a single point of fail­
ure for tha t cluster, in particular, if the CH is compromised by an attacker thus 
eventually leaving the whole cluster defenceless and at the will of the attacker. 
Therefore, they have emphasised the need to seek an appropriate security controls 
to guarantee the integrity and availability of the IDS service on the CH.
The works given above make use of a static hierarchy, however Sterne et al [66] 
acknowledge tha t the choice of an organisational model is fundamental to the 
architecture of a distributed system, and therefore introduced the concept of an 
organisational model with a dynamic hierarchy. The dynamic component allows 
for a scalable and adaptable solution architecture to the volatile demands of the 
network, thereby achieving efficient incremental aggregation of the collected data, 
analysis and detection, and dissemination of the IDS response directives. The leaf 
agents in the hierarchy collect and propagate the data upwards through the higher 
nodes eventually reaching the root of the tree hierarchy. As the data propagates, 
higher nodes can selectively aggregate and analyse the data efficiently and at 
a managed bandwidth cost by reducing the footprint of the data. Detection 
decisions occur at the lowest level of the hierarchy tha t provide sufficient data for 
evidence of the presence of an intrusion. The hierarchy maintains its dynamic 
component through continuous topology-based clustering algorithms to reflect 
changes in the arrangement of the nodes in the network; however the authors do 
not provide any results on the effect of these clustering algorithms in terms of 
the overall energy cost.
Figure 2.11 illustrates the logical IDS architecture components within each node. 
The data collected is sourced from the host and network protocol layers, making 
the IDS both a HIDS and a NIDS. The monitor modules are responsible for 
monitoring this data and creating appropriate events in the IDS log files, whist 
the correlation modules group and analyse these events by related properties to 
carry out the detection decision. The detection methods used are a combination 
of misuse and anomaly-based detection. The response modules implement the 
response strategies as directed by the higher nodes, which could be both passive 
and active responses. All these 3 components are dynamically loadable depending 
on the position of the node within the hierarchy. The figure also indicates the 
presence of various storage facilities to store local and remote data tha t has been 
shared. The authors do not publish proof-of-concept results to evaluate both the 
efficiency and effectiveness of this approach.
The design characteristic tha t is evident in most of the previous works mentioned 
above, is the use of a hierarchy of agents to separate functionality. As explained,
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Figure 2.11: Sterne et al’s agent architecture
this approach allows for scalability, the efficient use of resources and the restric­
tion of computational-intensive activity to fewer nodes. Hierarchy, in the form 
a command chain, and separation of duties are also two distinctive features of a 
military structure. Similarly in [41], Li et al have designed a MA-IDS architecture 
that employs a hierarchy of static and mobile agents with specific roles, namely, 
Manager, Assistant Mobile Agent, Response Mobile Agent and Host Monitor 
agent. This is illustrated in Figure 2.12. The Host Monitor agent is fixed on each 
host node and is responsible for the local intrusion detection. It reports directly 
to the Manager agent, which also resides on the host. If the Host Monitor agent 
cannot conclude decisively on whether an intrusion is happening, it resolves to 
the help of the Manager component. The latter dispatches an Assistant MA to 
patrol the neighbourhood on a specific itinerary. The agent collects intrusion 
detection-related information from the visited nodes. On its return back, the 
Manager uses the collected information to decide whether a distributed intrusion 
is in effect. If so, the Manager dispatches a Response MA to take the necessary 
action accordingly. The MA-IDS model introduces the concept of patrols, which 
also has a military connotation.
The data collected in MA-IDS is both host and network-based. Li et al proposed 
the use of synthetic fuzzy analysing method to analyse the data and detect an 
intrusion, which is based on a suspicion level associated with various monitored 
activities. This level varies according to the action pertaining to the associated 
activity. For instance, a failed login attem pt would increase the suspicion level, 
whilst a successful login would decrease or reset the level. If, eventually, the sus-
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Figure 2.12: Li et al’s agent architecture using mobile agents
picion level exceeds a pre-determined threshold, then a detection is confirmed. 
The agents cooperate together on a local and global scale to manage these sus­
picion levels. The Manager agent coordinates all the mobile agents, including 
encryption-based security scans, on the integrity of the mobile agents when they 
return to the dispatching platform. This agent could be regarded as a form of 
command and control on the IDS resources; albeit with very limited contribution 
towards the overall efficiency of the IDS operations with respect to the dynamic 
changes in the network environment. The authors present a very short summary 
of the promising simulation-based results with 94.1% detection of the attacks, 
and less than 1% time of CPU usage and approximately 5% memory usage; 
however they do not provide much helpful context surrounding the conducted 
experiments.
Ramachandran et al [55] and Xiao et al [95] take multi-agent IDS architecture a 
step further by applying society inspired semantics to the organisational and co­
operative model of their proposed IDS architecture. The advantage in mimicking 
efficient and effective social behaviour is to potentially reflect similar qualities in 
the operations of the IDS. This is also one of the main reasons for considering the 
application of military-inspired semantics to the multi-agent IDS architecture.
Ramachandran et al [55] proposed a multi-agent IDS (IDSA), which consists of 
a number of agents, more specifically, Chief, Detectives and Cops. It also uses 
the concept of virtual neighbourhoods, which can be thought of as a clusters of 
nodes. The cops are mobile agents tha t are dispatched by Detectives to roam 
these neighbourhoods. The cops collect information at these sites and report back 
to the Detective. The latter examines the reports, and if any suspicious activity
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is found, it informs the Chief accordingly. The Chief of the neighbourhood is re­
sponsible for the decision making of tha t particular site. This is achieved through 
cooperation with other chiefs and a voting process that determines the outcome of 
the various reports. The data collected in IDSA consists of host-based data, such 
as checksums of critical files, and access history of a file, and also network-based 
data by monitoring network traffic. Whilst the analysis and detection method 
is based on both misuse detection through attack signature matching, and also 
anomaly detection. There is no mention of the type of response strategy tha t can 
be effected. The authors do not present any concrete results of the performance 
of the IDS; however they make claims that their proposed architecture is both 
flexible and scalable to suit the needs of the environment. Having said that, the 
authors express some concern on the potential overheads of cops tha t are fre­
quently dispatched to neighbourhood sites, thus impacting the IDS performance.
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Figure 2.13: Xiao et al’s voting approach in MAPIDS
Xiao et al [95] proposed MAPIDS (Mobile-agent based Peer-to-Peer IDS), whose 
design is inspired by MA-IDS [41] and IDSA [55], in an attem pt to overcome 
the shortcomings of each. Unsurprisingly, it uses a hierarchy of agents, specif­
ically, Monitor, Executor, Controller, Coordinator, Voting-Agent, Result-Agent 
and Response-Agent. The Monitor resides locally on the host node. On detecting 
a suspicious event, the Monitor collects the necessary information and reports to 
the Controller. The latter does the necessary decision making. If an intrusion 
is conclusive the Controller delegates to the Executor to act on the intrusion. 
Otherwise, the Controller delegates to the Coordinator, which is responsible to 
dispatch a Voting-Agent to the affected neighbours for a collective decision on 
whether the suspicious event is an intrusion or not. If so, a Result-Agent is dis-
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patched to all affected nodes to raise the suspicion level, thus react accordingly 
to the intrusion through a Response-Agent which carries out a preventive action. 
The authors do not mention an details of the type of action.
Similar to other proposed architectures, MAPIDS collects data related to both 
host-based activities and network traffic; however the use of mobile agents to 
collect further evidence makes this a hybrid IDS. MAPIDS uses a combination 
of signature-based and specification-based detection method to match analysed 
data to known signature attacks and determining whether system usage is within 
expected constraints. It uses a fuzzy analytic approach similar to MA-IDS [41] 
to associate a suspicion weight to activities tha t are carried out, where suspicion 
level varies according to the nature and frequency of the activity. Xiao et al 
present some results on MAPIDS related to the detection precision, communica­
tion overheads and latency in the voting process (which translates to a longer time 
to detect an intrusion). The results demonstrate th a t MAPIDS achieved good 
detection performance as the involvement of more nodes in the voting process 
increases; hence the node density of the network could have a critical bearing 
on the overall performance. Both the communication overheads and detection 
latency demonstrate reasonable results; however the authors do not present ad­
ditional context such as traffic load and frequency, or the types of attack and 
quantity of attackers.
Zamani et al [97] proposed the use of immune-inspired models, such as Clonal 
Selection (CS), Co-stimulation with Helper T-cells (TH) and Danger Theory, to 
implement a multi-agent IDS to detect distributed denial of service (DDOS) a t­
tacks on wireless sensor networks. Immune-inspired models are quite popular in 
IDS due to the behaviour affinity with IDS functionality, and have been proposed 
in various works on multi-agent IDS for different types of networks. Zamani et 
al’s proposed architecture consists of stationary agents, which represent organs 
and tissue such as thymus, bone marrow, lymph nodes and local tissue), and mo­
bile agents tha t play the role of immune cells, such as lymphocytes (B-cells and 
T-cells) and Antigen Presenting Cells (APC). At least one instance of each type 
of stationary agent is present in every host node. The mobile agents are spawned 
from the bone marrow (BM) stationary agent and distributed evenly to other or­
gans (stationary agents) within the system. The other organs (stationary agents) 
collect specific data, such as host-based audit logs or network-based traffic. The 
collected data is then analysed by APC mobile agents, and using signature-based 
detection, the agent could generate a determined amount of stress signals to 
indicate the presence of anomalous behaviour. The lymphocyte mobile agents 
provide the necessary response mechanism in case the quantity of stress signals 
exceeds a specific threshold. The authors report false negative and false positive 
rates of 40.0% and 8.23%, respectively.
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In recent years, there has been significant progress on the organisational and 
cooperative model for multi-agent IDS architectures. Techniques, such as clus­
tering, hierarchical structures, social- and bio-inspired semantics, are some of the 
main approaches used by researchers to obtain better efficiency and effectiveness. 
The related work tha t has been reviewed have presented various results when 
assessing the detection performance of the proposed architecture; however the 
majority have lacked complete results with regards to the efficiency of the pro­
posed solution. This makes it very difficult to compare the efficiency of newly 
proposed architectures. One of the objectives of this work is to provide transpar­
ent results on the efficiency of the proposed multi-agent C2 IDS framework with 
the intention of providing a benchmark for comparison with other work.
2.3 Applying a military operations structure
A military operations structure is a common construct of the doctrinal meth­
ods used to develop and conduct operations in a specific environment [82, 84]. 
This construct is understood by commanders at all levels in the chain of com­
mand, and as such lies at the core of every planned operation allowing for rapid 
and effective organisation of resources throughout. Essentially, the operations 
structure consists of a Command and Control (C2) process tha t is driven by the 
commander and it takes into account the conditions and input variables (state) 
of the operating environment. The C2 process allows the commander to express 
the art of command (leadership) and exercise the science of control on the various 
combat resources, grouped by function, into eventually producing the operation 
(as a sequence of events) to achieve an objective.
An event could be either a simple tactical action, such as a team deployment 
or manoeuvre at a specific time, or another tactical objective tha t requires an 
operation of its own. The complexity of an event usually depends on the level 
at which the commander operates. For instance, a Team Leader commanding a 
squad of operators (soldiers) might be carrying out an operation consisting en­
tirely of a tried and tested procedure of tactical actions, such as a route patrol, 
whilst a commander at a regional level commanding various subordinates might 
be conducting a major operation consisting of various sub-operations e.g. Op­
eration Desert Storm in 1991 in response to Iraq’s invasion and annexation of 
Kuwait [93].
In a similar manner, an IDS could use an operations structure at its core to 
orchestrate the various roles within each functional component, as described in 
Section 1.2.1, into an operation. The following subsections explain the nature of 
an operational environment and provide an overview of the C2 process used to 
control combat resources, outlining the relation to the environment of the IDS
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and its operations.
2.3.1 Operational environment
In a military context, each commander is in charge of an Area of Operations 
(AO) where operations are conducted. An AO could have a surrounding area 
of influence, which is an area tha t can be affected or reached by the available 
combat resources during an operation. Each AO and surrounding area of influence 
has an associated operational environment. The environment is a composition 
of variables representing state, constraints and conditional rules tha t affect the 
capability and reach of the combat resources, and also has a bearing on the 
decisions made by the commander [84]. Commanders at all levels in the chain of 
command have their own operational environments for their operations. The state 
and rules in an environment are not just isolated to th a t particular environment, 
but could be influenced by a global or regional environment. Therefore, it is 
possible tha t an operational environment can form part of a higher operational 
one depending on the complexity of the strategic objective.
Similarly, an IDS could have its own Area of Operations (AO) with a surrounding 
area of influence, and associated operational environment. In a simple example, 
the AO could extend to the hosting node, consisting of the various physical 
and logical components, including the energy source and routing functions. The 
operational environment would then contain, for instance, variables about the 
amount of energy available, neighbouring nodes, data throughput, transmission 
power, etc. The area of influence could be all those nodes exchanging commu­
nication with the host node. In a more complex example, the same IDS could 
extend its AO to a cluster of device nodes in a specific neighbourhood, so tha t 
the associated environment is now composed of the operational environment of 
each node in the cluster, and could also contain additional information such as 
conditional rules on how to distribute cooperative activities within the cluster.
One of the fundamental variables in an operational environment is the presence 
of threats, which are any entities tha t have the capability, or intention, to exploit 
a vulnerability and carry out an attack. In a WAHN, threats could manifest 
themselves through the presence of one or more nodes tha t act anomalously. The 
anomalous behaviour could be caused by other variables in the environment, such 
as signal noise, selfish behaviour or the presence of an intruder. Under certain 
conditions, it might be difficult to differentiate between the three scenarios, which 
is a risk tha t has to be managed by the IDS. In certain cases, an intruder could 
behave passively (e.g. eavesdropping) and not reveal its presence until a decisive 
point in time. The operational environment evolves continuously as the variables 
change, therefore possessing a degree of uncertainty. As such the operational 
environment needs to be continuously assessed to adjust any impact it might
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have on the ongoing operations.
2.3.2 Command and control (C2)
As mentioned earlier in Section 2.3, the command and control (C2) process is an 
essential part of the operations structure. It is a commander-centric activity for 
planning, preparing, executing and assessing a military operation [83, 85].
P la n n in g
The planning activity starts as soon as the commander receives an assignment, 
or mission order. As part of this activity, the commander performs a mission 
analysis, whereby data on variables from the operational environment are filtered 
by the following categories: Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and 
support available, time available and civil considerations (METT-TC). These 
categories are also known collectively as the mission variables. The available data 
depends on the gathered surveillance and reconnaissance information. As part of 
the mission analysis, the commander gains a situational understanding through 
the mission variables to make key decisions on the plan to achieve the objective. 
The analysis also involves a risk management exercise on the mission variables to 
identify any hazards or threats tha t could impact the outcome of an operation. 
The mission analysis results into one or more course of actions to achieve the 
objective. These course of actions are evaluated and eventually one is chosen tha t 
is fit for purpose. Whilst formulating a course of action, the commander might 
decide to employ military deception to expose an enemy or place the enemy in 
a position of disadvantage. Military deception is an activity in support of an 
operation tha t can contribute to decisive outcome. Various deceptive tactics can 
be employed, including the use of a ruse such as falsifying messages, or tha t of 
a display of an activity, force or equipment intended to deceive the observations 
made by the adversary. Related work on IDS has already demonstrated deceptive 
tactics, for instance, through the use of honey pots to lure intruders [9].
The METT-TC categories can also be applied to an IDS context as follows:
• M ission  could contain information required tha t is key to achieving the 
objective, and also any constraints placed on the mission.
• E nem y  variable could contain information on a potential threat, such as 
a signature of a known attack or detected anomalous behaviour th a t needs 
further investigation.
• T e rra in  a n d  W e a th e r  variable could contain information about the sta­
bility of the transient routing connections or signal strength of the hosting 
node.
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• T roops an d  su p p o r t availab le  could contain information about the 
amount of agents tha t can be deployed depending on power available.
• T im e availab le  is an im portant variable tha t determines the execution 
and tempo of an operation to ensure resources are not over-utilised. This 
variable could be a function of the hop count between the hosting node and 
other nodes within the area of influence.
• C ivil co n s id e ra tio n s  in an IDS context could refer to the state of the 
components tha t do not belong to the IDS, for instance, the civil compo­
nents of a hosting node are potentially the CPU, radio antenna, battery, 
etc. This is a key variable for tailoring operations whilst factoring in the 
energy required as well as preserving the functioning and interests of other 
civil components.
P re p a ra t io n
After a course of action is chosen, the involved combat resources carry out the 
necessary preparation through rehearsals of the operation. This is a way for the 
leaders to ensure th a t the subordinates understand the plan and objective. Any 
unexpected outcome of the rehearsed operation is evaluated and the necessary 
adjustments are made accordingly. It is not always possible to train for every 
mission, however preparation is a must for decisive action with a most likely mix 
of tactical actions. The preparation step in an IDS context allows for a learning 
phase and thus acquire further understanding of the operational environment to 
tune key parameters in the IDS operations.
E x ec u tio n
Once prepared, the plan is put into motion to  achieve the mission objective. As 
the plan unfolds, the commander and combat resources use situational under­
standing to assess progress and make key decisions in the execution or adjust­
ments to the plan. The live execution of a mission in an IDS context entails 
full-scale team of mobile agents carrying out their mission according to plan, 
whilst the IDS receives feedback and assesses decisive points in the mission.
A ssessm en t
Assessment is the continuously monitoring of the current operational environ­
ment and progress of an operation, including after action reviews and debriefing 
reports. In an IDS this ensures tha t subsequent operations are planned as re­
quired to the needs of the evolving operational environment.
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Overall the C2 process tailors and organises the available combat resources, 
grouped by function, to achieve an objective in an operation. The next section 
describes these combat resources and their properties.
2.3.3 Combat functions and resources
The ultimate aim of the doctrinal principal and methods is the efficient and 
effective organisation of combat resource assets in an operations structure. In a 
military context, combat resources mainly consist of 6 main groups of tasks and 
systems (i.e. people, organisation and equipment, information and processes) 
tha t carry out a specific function during an operation to achieve the operational 
goal [84, 85, 86]. The six main functions of combat resources, and relevance to 
the IDS, are the following:
• C o m m an d  a n d  C o n tro l cen tre , also known by the name of Tactical 
Operations Centre (TOC) or Tactical Command Post (T /C P), is the seat 
of the commander and supporting staff tha t gains situational understanding 
and executes the C2 process. This is where the plan is conceived to achieve 
the mission objective. It is therefore a key component th a t controls and 
coordinates the rest of the other functions and interacts with the operational 
environment. There can be more than one TOC depending on the number 
of ongoing missions in an area of operations. In an IDS setting, the TOC 
would be installed as part of the core engine tha t would coordinate the 
activities within each functional component of the IDS, ensuring th a t each 
activity, e.g. the rate at which data is collected, is tailored and organised 
according to the needs of the operational environment. The TOC would also 
be responsible for the interaction with the operating environment including 
civil components such as the CPU, radio antenna, routing function, etc.
• M ovem en t a n d  M a n o eu v re  function is the group of related tasks and 
systems responsible for moving and employing forces to achieve a position 
of relative advantage over the enemy. Some of the tasks involved include de­
ployment, move, manoeuvre (positioning) and conduct reconnaissance and 
surveillance. Similarly, in an IDS, this function is responsible for the mi­
gration and/or manoeuvring (activation/ positioning) of software agents to 
carry out the assigned functional roles, e.g. detection function for a specific 
attack, and conduct data collection (reconnaissance and surveillance) ac­
tivities. It is im portant to emphasize tha t the term  manoeuvre is also used 
to imply the activation of stationary assets at a specific time and location.
• In te llig en ce  function is tha t group of related tasks and systems responsible 
for analysing the collected information from the operational environment,
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thus providing intelligence support to the Command and Control centre as 
well as deployed assets to make informed decisions and adjustments to an 
ongoing operation. In an IDS context, this is the equivalent function done 
by the software agents to analyse the data collected from the environment 
to feed into the decision making done by the command and control process, 
eventually deploying mobile agents when necessary. The analytical tools 
employed can vary from simple statistical analysis to advanced theory, such 
as decision or game theory.
S u s ta in m en t, or Logistics, function is the group of related tasks and sys­
tems tha t provide support and services tha t ensures freedom of action and 
operational reach. These services could include, for instance, transporta­
tion, maintenance (house-keeping), communication services, etc. In an IDS 
context, the sustainment function translates to the underlying functionality 
responsible for handling agent housing whilst in transit and all communi­
cations, and also consists of the house keeping procedures to ensure that 
the underlying data structures in an IDS are managed without burdening 
the constrained resources of the hosting node.
F ire s  is the group of related tasks and systems used to provide collective 
and coordinated weaponry support through the targeting process to control 
the enemy behaviour and movement. In an IDS setting, this is equivalent 
to the the response carried out in retaliation of the detected intruder, and 
would consist of the actions to mitigate the attack, for instance by overload­
ing their system thereby denying them service, or neutralise the intruder 
completely through isolation or eviction. The fires function is a sensitive 
one tha t should be used carefully and responsibly as to avoid fratricide 
(other IDS turning their response mechanisms, genuinely (false alarm) or 
maliciously (rogue), on friendly IDS). Therefore proper control procedures, 
such as command chain authorisation (one level up) or timed exposure to 
the response mechanism, should be in place.
P ro te c tio n  function is the group of related tasks and systems responsible 
for preserving the integrity and existing of the fighting force, whilst the 
commander can carry out the mission to achieve the operational goal. The 
tasks would consist of conducting and implementing operational security, 
safeguard measures for fratricide (friendly fire) avoidance, conduct surviv­
ability operations and information protection. The protection function in 
an IDS setting is responsible for the preservation of the IDS operations 
and fault tolerance capabilities. The core structure and communications 
protocol of the software agent platform underlying the IDS should imple­
ment control mechanisms tha t mitigate the risk of another IDS, genuinely 
or maliciously, interfering with its operations. This could be achieved, for
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example, through a lightweight symmetric encryption protocol tha t uses a 
hierarchy of keys aligned to the various levels in the chain of command in 
charge of the different areas of operations. For instance, an assault team 
of software agents could share a key th a t encrypts communication amongst 
the team members. In the next level up from the command chain, the IDS 
in charge of the designated area of operations can share a different key with 
the Team leader. The strict adherence to the the chain of command is 
essential to the preservation of the IDS operations.
2.3.4 M odularity
Modularity is a key property of combat resources tha t allows for flexible arrange­
ment and use within the operations structure at each level in the hierarchical 
chain of command. For instance, at the lowest level of the command chain is a 
Team Leader, who is the Commanding Officer (CO) leading a small team  of op­
erators (soldiers) [78, 81]. The team  members are grouped in pairs, known as the 
buddy formation, whereby each operator has a shadowing member. Team mem­
bers report only to the Team Leader. Teams can be re-arranged and allocated 
as necessary within an operation to achieve a particular objective. One level up 
the chain, the Team Leader responds to the commander, or CO, in charge of the 
Tactical Operations Centre (TOC) and the other combat functions within an area 
of operations. The six combat functions are the core functions within a military 
base. Operations are deployed out of a main or forwarding base. Military bases 
can be deployed throughout as necessary, each with their own areas of operations 
and surrounding area of influence. The chain can extend further both vertically 
and horizontally depending on the complexity of the strategic and operational 
objectives.
The modular property allows for an efficient approach to allocating resources for 
solving a problem, whilst providing the scaling capability to adapt to a changing 
demand. Furthermore, it provides the necessary redundancy required to provide 
fault tolerance in a mission critical environment. In an IDS context, the modular 
property in combination with the chain of command, allows for distributed and 
cooperative command and control together with efficient allocation of resources, 
to carry out the IDS functions in the challenging environment typical of a WAHN. 
For example, if a node hosting an IDS in charge of a specific area of operations 
is running low on energy, then the IDS can initiate secure transfer of command 
and control to another neighbouring IDS. The neighbouring IDS will then extend 
its area of operations to the low energy node, thus relieving it of the energy tha t 
would have been consumed by the IDS.
The previous sections provide the rationale together with a description of the po­
tential application of the military operational structure to multi-agent intrusion
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detection in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. As one of the the underlying technolo­
gies within the design implementation of the IDS, software agents provide the 
necessary autonomy and flexibility to  implement the operations structure.
Chapter 3
Defenceless wireless sensor 
network
This chapter focuses on the simulator for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), which 
was designed and implemented with the purpose of measuring network behaviour 
and performance under different simulated conditions. More specifically, these 
conditions are network size, node density, traffic load and frequency, and the pres­
ence of multiple threats in the form of sinkhole device nodes. The behaviour and 
performance of the network is evaluated in terms of data packet loss due to an 
ongoing attack, energy consumption, processing and communication overheads. 
The first section discusses the requirements in relation to  the research aim, fol­
lowing which an outline of the various algorithms used in the network is given. 
The section then proceeds with a detailed description of the major components 
within the simulator. Lastly, an evaluation of the WSN under different simulated 
conditions is provided, together with a discussion of the results.
3.1 Requirements
The first step of the methodology for this research was to establish a baseline 
of performance for a WSN tha t does not have an IDS present. This baseline 
of performance was then used later to evaluate the performance of an IDS with 
a Generic-IDS (see Chapter 4) and the C2-IDS (see Chapter 5). The results 
obtained depict the difference in costs incurred due to the overheads from the 
presence of the respective IDS framework. The evaluation of both the Generic- 
IDS and the C2-IDS on WSN required the use of an appropriate simulator to 
measure the efficiency and effectiveness of the underlying multi-agent framework. 
There are many off-the-shelf simulators available for evaluating WSN behaviour 
and performance, such as SensorSim (NS-2 extension for sensor networks) [53], 
GloMoSim [23, 98], and OM NeT++ [38, 90]; however they do not offer agent-
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based functionality at the desired granularity required to implement and evaluate 
the frameworks. Therefore, a decision was made to build an API from the ground 
up that would facilitate the implementation and evaluation accordingly. This API 
would also serve as a tool for other researchers to implement and evaluate their 
own multi-agent framework, and compare the performance of their framework to 
tha t of the WSN baseline, the Generic and C2-IDS framework. The current lack 
of such a tool was another reason tha t motivated this approach in evaluating the 
Generic and C2-IDS framework.
BS
Figure 3.1: Conceptual view of WSN
Figure 3.1 illustrates the conceptual view of the wireless sensor network in the 
simulator API, depicting a source device node communicating over the wireless 
channel with a base station through multi-hop routing on intermediate nodes. In 
line with the stated purpose, the simulator API satisfies the following require­
ments:
• The API allows the simulation of WSN up to at least 500 device nodes, in­
cluding sinkhole nodes and base stations. Although a WSN can be deployed 
with thousands of nodes, in practice the network’s topology is subdivided 
into areas containing a more manageable number of Sensor nodes and one, 
or more, receiving base stations.
• The API provides a functional implementation of a device node tha t senses 
artificial signals and transm its them in data packet form over the wireless 
medium to the nearest known base station.
• The device nodes can transm it signals at various frequencies to simulate 
different data traffic conditions.
• The node implements the network protocol stack to allow ad hoc commu­
nication over the wireless medium, including AODV routing.
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• The nodes employ AODV routing to discover routes over intermediate nodes 
to reach the destination. Also, as part of the AODV functionality, the device 
node is capable of forwarding data packets to the next hop in line to the 
destination node. In addition, it can also perform local repair at a node 
when a route is invalidated, because it either becomes stale or the next hop 
node is not present in the network.
• The device node is equipped with a battery source, which can hold a con­
figurable amount of charge, a CPU with a configurable processing speed in 
terms of instructions per second, and a radio antenna tha t transm its and 
receives data frames at a configurable bandwidth speed. Both the CPU 
and radio antenna draw a configurable amount of electric current from the 
battery when in use at a specified power level.
• The base station node is similar to the device node from a functional per­
spective, with the additional capability of processing received signals.
• The sinkhole node is similar to the device node, with overridden function­
ality in the network protocol stack. The functionality implements the sink­
hole attack on the network in its both variations: black-hole and grey-hole 
(selective forwarding) attacks.
• The API models the wireless medium, including configurable specification 
of signal path loss and noise tha t could affect the signal strength and band­
width during communication.
• The API allows positioning of the nodes at specific (x,y) coordinates with 
varying node density.
• The API provides simulation management and reporting capabilities tha t 
measure the network performance.
3.1.1 Assum ptions
The following assumptions were made for these simulations:
• Radio transmission and receiving draw the same amount of electric current 
from the battery source in a node.
3.2 Design and implementation
The WSN API simulator was designed and implemented in SimJava2 [16], which 
provides the foundations for a discrete event simulator using the JAVA program­
ming language. This makes the simulator API portable to many platforms and
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easy to extend with custom functionality. The API essentially consists of the 
following core components: device node, wireless channel, world and simulation 
manager.
3 .2 .1  D e v ic e  n o d e
S ensor Node without IDS
Sensor
S en so rap p CPU
Network layer f?■3
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Figure 3.2: Device node design
Figure 3.2 represents the functional design of a device node consisting of a bat­
tery, sensor, CPU, radio transceiver and the communication network protocol. 
The 3 main processes in a device node are described hereunder, including the 
interactions of each component.
Sensing  signals
The sensor component is responsible for generating a signal represented by a 
decimal sequence. The frequency of the signal generation for a specific node 
can be set to vary between a high frequency with a period of 500 milliseconds 
to a low frequency with a period of 60 seconds. The sensor application layer 
processes the generated signal and determines the nearest registered base station. 
It encapsulates the decimal sequence and the base station id into an application 
payload message and hands over to the network layer for outbound transmission.
T ra n sm ittin g  d a ta
The network layer encapsulates the application payload message in a network data 
packet and populates the node id of the next hop en route to the destination (base 
station). If the next hop is not known, the network layer delegates to the routing 
layer, in this case the AODV protocol, which is responsible for discovering a 
route to the intended destination. The routing algorithm followed by AODV has 
already been discussed in Section 2.1.2. Once a route is found to the destination, 
the network data packet is then passed on to the physical layer. If the route is not 
found, then the data packet is discarded after a time out period has expired. The 
physical layer encapsulates the data packet into a data frame, and is responsible
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Figure 3.3: Sensor node - Transmitting data
for transm itting the data frame over the wireless medium to the MAC id of the 
next hop. The transmission is simulated according to the specified properties for 
the radio antenna component. Figure 3.3 depicts the flow of messages when a 
sensor node transm its the data to the base station.
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Figure 3.4: Sensor node - Receiving and forwarding data
When a device node receives a data frame, the physical layer determines whether 
the frame is intended for the node itself; otherwise it will discard the frame. 
The frame could be intended for the node in the case of either a broadcast or if 
it was specifically addressed to the node. If so, the physical layer extracts the 
payload from the data frame consisting of the network packet and passes it on 
to the network layer. The network layer determines if the packet has reached 
its destination; otherwise it will forward the packet onwards accordingly, unless
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the packet has reached its time to  live (TTL) threshold. In tha t case, it will 
discard the network packet. The packet forwarding follows the same process 
described earlier for transm itting data. If the packet has reached its destination,
i.e. the device node is a base station, then the network layer extracts the payload 
consisting of the application payload message and passes it on to the sensor 
application layer. This in turn  processes the payload message and aggregates the 
signal data received. Figure 3.4 depicts the flow of messages when a sensor node 
receives and forwards data.
R adio antenna properties
The configurable properties of the radio antenna component simply consists of 
the bandwidth and the power level used during transmission. The bandwidth 
determines the data transfer rate and the duration of the transmission. Typical 
bandwidth values range from 10 Kbits/second up to 54 Mbits/second depending 
on the type of node [13]. The node transm its at maximum bandwidth speed; 
however the speed is negotiated during transmission depending on the signal 
strength at the location of the receiver. A low signal strength would mean tha t 
some packets will not be received correctly and the sender would have to re­
transmit. Therefore the sender slows down the transmission to give time for 
the packets to be resent and avoid a potential congestion. The simulator com­
putes the signal strength as a function of the distance between the transm itter 
and receiver. The signal degradation is based on a configurable path loss factor. 
The duration of the transmission is calculated and used to determine the energy 
required from the battery.
C P U  properties
The configurable properties of the CPU component consist of its power level, 
speed (instructions per second) and an instruction scaling factor tha t is used to 
specify the amount of machine-level instructions per line of code (LOG) [30, 33]. 
The amount of instructions and the CPU speed determine the duration of the 
process execution, which is used to calculate the energy required from the battery 
source. The duration of a process is thus computed as follows:
D uration = (B C  * A L B  * I F ) / I P S  (3.1)
where:
1. BC =  Time complexity of the block based on the data size, which could 
be constant: 0(1), or linear O(n). A block of code is either an IF-THEN 
block, Loop block or method block
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2. ALB =  Average LOG per block
3. IF =  Instruction scaling factor
4. IPS =  CPU instructions per second
The average LOG per block was determined by manually parsing and profiling the 
actual code tha t implement the processes, using the following designed procedure:
1. Identify all main classes in a process
2. For each class, identify all main methods
3. For each method, identify blocks within the method, which could be made
up of the method block itself, IF-THEN blocks or LOOP blocks
4. For each block, calculate the LOG by counting the number of whilst
ignoring blank lines
This procedure ensures consistency when measuring CPU usage amongst the 
IDS frameworks. Figure 3.5 shows the outcome of the code profiling for the class 
implementing the AODV functionality. Each main method within the class has 
been expressed in terms of the basic actions of on an entity, namely create, read, 
update and delete (CRUD). Thus it is possible to provide a consistent context 
to the CPU energy cost consumed for the WSN baseline and the multi-agent 
frameworks. The analysis shows an average of 6.1 LOG per block. The rest of 
the code analysis is included in Appendix B for reference.
Class Interface (Contract) M ethod Main Entity CREATE READ UPDATE DELETE Blocks LOC LOC/Block
AODV forwardRouteRequestM essage RREQ 0 0 1 0 3 18 6.0
AODV generateRouteReplyM essage RREP 1 0 0 0 4 28 7.0
AODV receiveRouteErrorMessage RERR 0 0 1 0 2 7 3.5
AODV receiveRouteReplyMessage RREP 0 0 1 0 5 39 7.8
AODV receiveRouteRequestM essage RREQ 0 0 1 1 7 35 5.0
AODV RREQtimeout RREQ 0 0 1 0 4 18 4.5
AODV send(NetworkPacket pkt) NetworkPkt 0 0 1 0 4 26 6.5
AODV send(NetworkPacket pkt, int nextHop) NetworkPkt 0 0 0 3 21 7.0
AODV update RouteToOrigi n RREQ 0 0 1 0 1 9 9.0
Total 1 0 8 1 33 201 6.1
Figure 3.5: Code analysis for class AODV
B attery  properties
The battery is represented by 3 main properties: voltage (V), the rating as a unit 
of charge in ampere-hours and the energy available (in Joules). The maximum
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available energy tha t a battery can dissipate is dependent on the voltage and 
the charge rating. For instance, if the voltage is 12V and the battery charge is 
500 milliAmp-hour, this means th a t the battery can supply enough energy for an 
electric current of 500 milliAmps for 1 hour duration, or conversely 1 milliAmp 
for 500 hours duration. Therefore, the battery power (rate of energy dissipated) 
available for one hour duration can be computed using the following standard 
equation [63]:
Power = Voltage * C urrent
Power =  12 V * 1 m illiA m p ( for  1 hour duration)
Power = 12 m illiW a tts  ( for  1 hour duration)
Consequently the maximum power generated by the battery yields the following 
total energy for 500 hours:
Total Energy = Power * B attery charge duration
Total Energy  =  12 m illiW a tts  * (60 seconds * 60 m inutes  * 500 hours)
Total Energy = 21600 Joules
Whenever the CPU or radio component antenna is operating at a certain power, 
an electric current is being supplied from the energy stored in the battery. It 
has already been established in Section 2.1.3 tha t radio communication is more 
expensive than CPU processing, in terms of energy required; hence the simulator 
allows to specify an electric current ratio for each component in the node. For 
instance, the current ratio for the sensor, CPU and radio antenna can be specified 
as 1:3:6, whereby the radio antenna draws twice as much current as tha t of the 
CPU [70]. W ith this example in mind, it is possible to compute the battery 
energy required for such current using standard equations. If the CPU draws 
3 milliAmps whilst operating at 100% power for a duration of 500 milliseconds, 
then the rate of energy consumed (power) from the battery would be computed 
by the following:
B attery Power = Voltage * C urrent 
B attery Power =  12 V * 3 m illiA m p  
B attery Power = 36 m illiW a tts
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The battery is therefore dissipating 36 milliJoules of energy per second. If the 
duration of the process executed by the CPU is 500 milliseconds, then the energy 
consumed would be calculated as follows:
E nergy consumed = B a ttery  Power * D uration  
Energy consumed = 36 m illiW a tts  * 0.5 seconds 
Energy consumed = 18 m illi Joules
Once the energy available in the battery has been depleted completely, the Sensor 
node will stop functioning accordingly. The same calculations apply in a similar 
manner for radio component usage.
Sinkhole node
The sinkhole device node is special instance of a node with its network protocol 
stack overridden to implement the sinkhole attack. Hence, it acts completely in 
the same manner as a genuine device node; however it is capable of advertising 
fake route reply messages during the route discovery phase of the AODV routing 
protocol. This is achieved by intercepting route request messages and responding 
with a route reply message advertising a (false) one hop distance to the intended 
destination with a high sequence number, indicating valid freshness of route in­
formation. This behaviour would force the source node requesting the route to 
accept the sinkhole node in the path for delivering data packets to the destina­
tion node. This is the set-up phase of the attack. Once the sinkhole node starts 
receiving data packets, then depending on its configuration it will either drop the 
packets indiscriminately or selectively drop the packets based on a configurable 
probability weight. For instance, a probability weight of 0.7 would make the 
sinkhole node likely to drop 70 packets out of 100 packets.
The sinkhole nodes can be positioned at random points and also at fixed points 
on primary routes within the network. A primary route would consist of nodes 
closer to the base station, such tha t any attack on those nodes would impart 
maximum damage to the overall functionality of the network.
3.2.2 World and wireless channel com ponents
The world component is the data structure responsible for storing location in­
formation of the nodes within the virtual world of the simulator environment. 
It is a grid structure where each grid represents a virtual zone coverage. This 
approach allows for efficient localisation of any specific node based on the Carte­
sian coordinates system. Figure 3.6 represents a conceptual view of the world.
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Figure 3.6: World representation
When the simulation is initialised, each node is placed at specific (x,y) coordi­
nates that fall within a specific zone. The zone stores the reference to tha t node 
accordingly. Therefore, in order to locate a node, it is possible to determine the 
hosting zone from the (x,y) coordinates of the node, instead of having to linearly 
search through the whole collection of nodes, each time a specific node reference 
is required.
3
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Figure 3.7: Wireless coverage model
The wireless channel component is a simple representation of the properties of the 
wireless medium. In essence, it is capable of simulating (1) the broadcast nature of 
wireless communication when a device node is transm itting and (2) the associated 
signal loss that happens due to atmospheric conditions, and distance between a 
sender and a receiver node. It is closely interfaced to the world component, so 
that it can retrieve location information of neighbouring nodes within coverage 
distance. In addition, each world zone can be associated with a path signal loss 
model, which represents the degradation factor of signal strength throughout its 
propagation in the medium. This signal loss model factors in the distance between 
nodes to compute the signal strength in a particular zone during communication
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exchange. Figure 3.7 illustrates the signal coverage tha t a device node has in 
a particular zone. This extends to one layer of neighbouring zones, where each 
device node present has a potential of receiving communication depending on 
the computed signal strength. If the signal strength is above a configurable 
threshold set for the receiving radio component, then the signal is strong enough 
for communication exchange to happen; otherwise the receiving node is deemed 
out of coverage. The device nodes tha t are within coverage are said to be within 
one-hop distance of the transm itting node. The node density within a zone plays 
a role in determining the number of nodes tha t are within one hop distance; hence 
bearing on the communication overheads and the number of path redundancies 
available for delivering data to the destination.
3.2.3 Simulation manager
The simulation manager, or manager in short, is responsible for coordinating 
the overall simulation, specifically the set-up, execution and tear down phases 
for a particular simulation profile. A simulation profile consists of a set of key 
parameters tha t define the simulation, such as network size, signal frequency, 
node density, etc. In the set-up phase of the simulation, the manager initialises 
and configures all the components according to these key parameters. Following 
which, the simulation begins execution for a specific amount of time period, which 
is also defined in the profile. After the simulation is complete, the manager tears 
down the environment, and resets relevant counters, for the next simulation to 
run. A profile specifies also the number of times the simulation is executed for 
tha t particular profile instance. These are called simulation runs and a profile 
could have any number of simulation runs (default is 3). The results produced 
from the simulation of a particular profile are the computed average based on the 
results of each simulation run. This is done to reduce the presence of any bias on 
the generated results. Simulation profiles can be specified in a Comma Separated 
Value (CSV) file and passed as a command line argument to the simulation 
manager.
3.3 Evaluation
This section provides a detailed description of the simulations tha t evaluated the 
performance of the sensor network. In particular, the results of these simulations 
contribute to understanding the effect of certain properties of the network on 
the energy consumption and communication overheads of the Sensor node. In a 
similar manner, the effect of the sinkhole attack on the network was also studied to 
understand the repercussions accordingly. The compiled results form a baseline
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profile of network performance used for comparison against the profile of the 
Generic and C2-IDS.
3.3.1 Experim ent plan
The experiment plan is categorised according to the properties of the sensor 
network th a t have been analysed, in particular:
Traffic frequency
The frequency of the signal data generated by the Sensor nodes and propagated 
through the network to reach the base station, has a direct impact on the per­
formance of the Sensor node, and eventually the whole network. The simulation 
measures the impact of high, medium and low traffic frequency in the context of 
a sensor network. A Sensor node would generally aggregate the signal data into 
a message payload, and then transm it the payload to the base station [13]. As 
such the frequencies in the simulations have been modelled to represent potential 
patterns tha t could result from the various existing data aggregation and energy 
conservation methods. These are defined as follows:
• High traffic frequency has an interval period tha t ranges between 500 ms 
and 1000 ms.
• Medium traffic frequency has an interval period between 1000 ms and 5000 
ms.
• Low traffic frequency has an interval period between 5000 ms and 60000 ms
• Partial traffic frequency has an interval period between 1000 ms and 5000 
ms; with some of the Sensor nodes being in sleep mode, and are therefore 
not transmitting.
Each packet transm itted through the network can carry a different payload, de­
pending on whether it is either a data packet or routing packet. Specifically, the 
type of payload in the simulator could be an aggregated data message (signal 
data) payload or an AODV message (routing). The payload is then encapsulated 
by the network protocol stack for transmission over the wireless. For instance, a 
data packet consists of:
[MACframe: 32 bytes [network packet: 32 bytes [message payload: 64 bytes]]]
Therefore the total size of a data packet is fixed at 128 bytes. An AODV RREQ 
payload would consist of:
[MACframe: 32 bytes [network packet: 32 bytes [RREQ: 24 bytes]]]
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Therefore the total size of the RREQ routing packet is fixed at 88 bytes. Other 
types of AODV payload, such as a RREP, have a fixed size of 20 bytes:
[MACframe: 32 bytes [network packet: 32 bytes [RREQ: 20 bytes]]]
Therefore the total size of the RREP routing packet is fixed at 84 bytes. The 
packets size together with the bandwidth property of the radio antenna determine 
the duration of a transmission; hence the energy consumption.
N etw ork size
The size of the network determines the traffic load on the Sensor nodes as they 
route the packets towards the base station. This affects the network in two ways: 
(1) the larger the size, the more Sensor nodes are potentially generating signal 
data and (2) route discovery in larger networks is more energy expensive due to 
the nature of route request broadcasting to find a route to the destination. The 
simulated sizes of the network are: 180, 270, 360, 450 and 540 nodes, and in each 
size, the network always contains 3 base stations.
O ne-hop ratio and network density
The one-hop ratio is the number of nodes in the network tha t are within one hop 
distance of a transm itting node. For instance, consider a network consisting of 
180 nodes arranged in a rectangular grid format of [9 * 20] nodes. A 0.5 one- 
hop ratio of the network would imply tha t a node can reach 90 nodes in one 
transmission. Therefore, in theory, a transm itting node S  a t the far end of the 
network can reach the destination node D a t the other end, in a minimum of 2 
hops. In practice, nodes found at the edge of the wireless coverage would not have 
a signal strong enough to receive the packet; hence creating longer (and winded) 
routes. Nonetheless, for the purpose of these simulations, the one-hop ratio is 
used as an estimation of the largest number of hops required for a packet to travel 
towards the destination. This ratio provides context during the evaluation of the 
results.
In addition, the one-hop ratio has a bearing on the network density, i.e. how 
distant each node is from each other. The wireless model, described earlier in 
Section 3.2.2, provides omnidirectional signal coverage from a transm itting node 
to the nodes in the hosting and neighbouring zones (a total of 9 zones). Therefore, 
it is possible to estimate the node density within each zone from the one-hop ratio. 
Using the same previous example, a 0.5 one-hop ratio for the 180-node network, 
yields 90 nodes within coverage of one transm itting node, which would estimate 
a zone density of approximately 10 nodes per zone. The higher the density, 
the more redundant paths exist for a destination; hence if an intermediate node 
shuts down, the transm itting node is still able to choose one of the other nodes
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within the zone to hop off towards the destination. The downside is tha t a single 
broadcast message in a high density zone would reach more nodes; hence creating 
more traffic and eventually more energy consumed and communication overheads. 
The range of the one-hop ratio for each simulated network size is 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 
0.4 and 0.5. Appendix C provides the detailed estimations of the one-hop ratio 
and density for each simulated network size.
Black-holes and grey-holes
The two variations of the sinkhole attack: black-hole and grey-hole (selective 
forward), have a different manifestation on the network tha t can be expressed in 
terms of packet loss, energy consumption impact and additional communication 
overheads in a network. This manifestation varies depending on the number of 
sinkhole nodes present and their respective position within the network. For 
instance, a sinkhole node positioned closer to the base station would expect to 
cause more significant data loss since it is part of a primary route serving a 
large number of other nodes. The simulations experiment with different number 
of sinkholes and variations, positioned at a combination of fixed and random 
locations in the network.
O ther properties
Other properties of the network and the Sensor node have been kept constant 
throughout all simulations, since they do not exercise an influence on the aim of 
this research work, in terms of eventually establishing any efficiency differences 
due to the type of multi-agent IDS used in the sensor network. In particular, 
these properties are: the signal path loss of the wireless medium, the electrical 
current drawn by the CPU and radio antenna, the CPU model and the battery 
model used.
The simulation time was 15 minutes and constant for all simulations. This time 
provided a sufficient indication of the underlying trend in the observed simulation. 
In order to obtain significant measurable changes in the energy consumption over 
the simulated time, the magnitude of the electrical current was amplified 15 times; 
whilst preserving the current ratio with respect to the CPU and radio antenna 
component.
Sim ulator calibration
The simulator was calibrated extensively through several systematic tests with 
controlled increments of the various properties, starting with small, calculable 
values. The expected results were then calculated manually for each measured 
property and validated against the actual results produced by the simulator. This 
provided enough confidence in the workings and precision of the simulator.
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The full list of simulations contained in the experiment plan can be found in 
Appendix A.
3 .3 .2  R e s u lt s
The highlights of the results of the simulations within the categories defined in 
the experiment plan, are discussed in the following sections.
Traffic frequency
CPU energy  consu m p tio n
—  High traffic
Figure 3.8: Traffic frequency - CPU energy consumption
Figure 3.8 depicts the percentage cumulative moving average of the CPU en­
ergy consumption for various types of traffic frequencies, in a 270-node network 
with a 0.2 one-hop ratio. As expected, the energy consumption increases as 
the frequency of the traffic tends towards higher values. This is largely due to 
an increased constant stream of signal data being generated and processed for 
transmission, and the routing that occurs in intermediate nodes towards the des­
tination.
The Sensor nodes do not start transm itting all at the same time, since this would 
create a network congestion due to the route request broadcast in the discovery 
phase. This can be observed in the initial part of the curve (up to approximately 
270 seconds), where less energy is consumed and then the energy increases at a 
linear rate indicating tha t the data packets are flowing regularly.
Although the actual frequencies are different, a similar amount of CPU energy is 
consumed for the partial and low traffic frequencies. This is attributed to some 
of the nodes being in sleep mode; hence not transmitting.
In figure 3.9, a similar trend can be observed for the radio energy consumption, 
whereby the energy consumed increases as the frequency increases, with the ex­
ception of the partial traffic frequency for the reasons explained previously. The 
noticeable difference here is the significant energy consumption for radio trans­
mission and receiving, when compared to CPU energy consumption. For example,
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Figure 3.9: Traffic frequency - Radio energy consumption
in a high frequency traffic scenario, radio operations would consume over 45% 
of the node’s energy available, whilst the CPU consumes just over 3.5% for its 
operations. Therefore an IDS should manage to balance the radio communica­
tion and CPU processing with respect to the frequency of the traffic, in such a 
manner that the overall energy consumed is less.
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Figure 3.10: Traffic frequency - Communication overheads
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The graphs in figure 3.10 illustrate the cumulative moving average for the com­
munication overheads in terms of transm itting and receiving packets. The pack­
ets consist of data and routing packets. In figure 3.10a, the trend conforms to 
the expectation of the number of packets transm itted increasing linearly, as the 
frequency increases. Whilst in figure 3.10b, there is a different trend exhibited 
for the packets received. The steep increase in the first 400 seconds is due to 
the route discovery phase, whereby nodes are receiving multiple route requests 
broadcasted from neighbouring nodes. After a route is found, the rate of increase 
changes to a lesser one indicating that the nodes started to receive data packets 
with a lower, but constant, intensity. It can be seen that in a high frequency 
scenario, the total amount of received packets reached almost 12,000 as opposed 
to nearly 3,00 transm itted packets. In the partial traffic frequency, the amount 
of received packets is less due to some of the nodes being in sleep mode.
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Figure 3.11: Network size - energy consumption
Figure 3.11 shows the cumulative moving average CPU and radio energy con­
sumption for medium traffic frequency in a network with varying number of 
Sensor nodes, and a 0.2 one-hop ratio. As expected, the energy consumption 
increases with the number of nodes present in a network, reaching just over 6% 
CPU and 50% radio energy consumption in a 540-node network.
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Figure 3.12: Network size - Communication overheads
The communication overheads incurred with respect to the network size is il­
lustrated in figure 3.12. In figure (a), the transm itted packets reveal tha t the 
540-node network transm itted less packets than the other network sizes. This is 
attributed mainly to some of the nodes starting transmission later in the simula­
tion, which is more evident in figure (b), for the 540-node scenario, as the trend 
change for received packets occurs around 810 seconds. In this scenario, more 
nodes in the 540-node network participate in the route discovery process until 
a route is found, receiving over 35,000 packets compared to just under 10,000 
packets for a 270-node network.
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O ne-hop  ra tio
Figure 3.13 shows the cumulative moving average CPU and radio energy con­
sumption for medium traffic frequency in a 270-node network with varying one- 
hop ratio. The energy consumption for CPU and radio increases as the one-hop 
ratio increases, due to the number of Sensor nodes participating in the route 
discovery process. This is more evident in the chart for the communication over­
heads in Figure 3.14b, where the amount of received packets for a 0.5 one-hop 
ratio reaches just under 18,000 packets, compared to less than 10,000 packets for 
a 0.2 one-hop ratio.
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Figure 3.13: One-hop ratio - energy consumption
CMA tra n sm itte d  packets
 0.1 hop ratio
•0.4 hop ratio
(a )  P a c k e t s  t r a n s m i t t e d
CMA received packets
- 0.1 hop ratio 
- 0.2 hop ratio 
0.3 hop ratio 
- 0 .4  hop ratio
0 90 180 270 360 450 540 630 720 810 900
seconds
(b )  P a c k e t s  re c e iv e d  
Figure 3.14: One-hop ratio - Communication overheads
The initial slower rate of increase observed in the 0.1 one-hop ratio for received 
packets (Figure 3.14b) is due to less nodes participating in the route discovery 
process. Specifically, the AODV protocol broadcasts route request messages with 
a small initial value for the time to live (TTL) parameter. This parameter is 
used to ensure tha t the route request message does not keep on propagating in 
cyclic routes. When the TTL expires, the AODV protocol at the source node, 
times out and attem pts another broadcast with a larger TTL parameter value. 
This process is reflected in networks with lower density and larger number of hops 
away from destination, as is the case for a 0.1 one-hop ratio. From a transm itting
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perspective, it can be noticed tha t a 0.1 one-hop ratio has a higher number of 
transm itted packets when compared to the rest. This is caused by a higher 
number of hops required to route the data packets towards the destination.
B lack-holes
The presence of one or more black-hole in a 270-node network with a 0.2 one-hop 
ratio resulted in a lower average energy consumption and average communication 
overheads. This is to be expected, since less nodes participate in the routing 
functionality due to the sinkhole node attracting all the data packets. Figure 3.15 
illustrates the amount of data packets lost due to to the presence of the various 
sinkholes. It is observed that 1 black-hole positioned close to the base station 
is sufficient to drop over 40% of the data packets transm itted in the network. 
However, the effect of adding more sinkholes to the network is less, as shown 
in the figure. There was no recorded difference between 3 and 5 black-holes in 
the network, with a similar percentage of dropped packets. W ith 10-black-holes 
present in the network, the total percentage of dropped packets is slightly less 
than 80%.
CMA packet loss
Figure 3.15: Black-holes - Packet loss
The reason for the diminished effect of more sinkholes in the network can be 
attributed to the sinkholes partitioning the network into isolated segments. These 
particular segments tha t contain a sinkhole node were caught in the attractive 
force of the neighbouring black-holes, hence having less packets to capture. This 
can be viewed in the 10-black-holes scenario depicted in Figure 3.16a, which shows 
the amount of dropped packets per node. The higher spikes in the graph are the 
first black-holes tha t formed in the network; hence attracting the data packets. 
The consequence of this is tha t the other black-holes tha t formed in the middle 
have less data packets to capture. Thus, more black-holes does not necessarily 
mean more damage impacted, but rather it is the position of the black-hole tha t 
determines the amount of damage done. In Figure 3.16b, the most damaging 
black-holes reaching higher spikes, are those formed closer to the base station 
nodes with id 0,1 and 2. Grey-hole attacks presented a similar performance
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profile to the black-hole attack, where intensity varies according to the amount 
of packets being dropped.
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Figure 3.16: Black-hole behaviour
Chapter 4
Generic m ulti-agent IDS 
framework
This chapter presents a detailed description of the Generic multi-agent IDS frame­
work, which also extends the functionality of the simulator API introduced in the 
previous chapter. The first section mainly describes the purpose of this frame­
work with regards to this research and the requirements to achieve tha t purpose. 
The following section elaborates on the design and implementation of the multi­
agent IDS framework, in particular the design of the three agent-oriented models 
th a t make up a multi-agent system, as described in Section 2.2.4. The chapter 
then concludes with an evaluation of the IDS framework and a comparison with 
the baseline of network performance established in chapter 3.
4.1 Requirements
The purpose of implementing the Generic multi-agent IDS framework is threefold: 
(1) to extend the simulator API with basic components to design and build a 
multi-agent IDS deployed within a WSN, (2) to obtain a performance profile of 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the Generic-IDS, (3) to compare the established 
performance profile to the baseline of network performance and the performance 
profile of the C2-IDS framework. Ultimately, the whole purpose is to provide a 
clear bearing on the performance of the Generic-IDS framework, and any other 
framework tha t requires a benchmark accordingly.
The following API requirements were satisfied in line with the stated purpose:
• The API basic components can be extended with any custom functionality.
• The API provides a basic agent platform th a t houses software agents and 
is an interface with the hosting environment. The agent platform is also
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responsible for the following functionality: management of agents deployed 
from the platform, handling of inter-agent communication local to the plat­
form, docking of migrating agents and basic house keeping procedures to 
ensure the hosting environment’s resources are not exhausted.
• The API provides a basic software agent component tha t is capable of 
executing a series of tasks to achieve an objective. The agent is also capable 
of interacting with its environment and other agents, through events and a 
set of available actions. In addition, the agent can be mobile and migrate 
to any agent platform according to a specified itinerary.
• The API provides a basic agent communication protocol for agent-to-agent 
communication and a publish/ subscribe model tha t allows agents to listen 
for specific events. The routing mechanism for agent messages can make 
use of the native routing algorithm in operation on the hosting node.
In addition, there are also the requirements specific to the Generic-IDS frame­
work. The adjective term generic, in the context of this research, is used to 
describe a framework tha t implements a distributed and cooperative multi-agent 
IDS tha t satisfies particular constraints. The requirements and constraints are 
summarised hereunder:
• The IDS provides the 3 basic functional components: data collection, data 
analysis and detection, and intrusion response, in order to detect and neu­
tralise the presence of one or more sinkhole nodes.
• The IDS only uses simple heuristics in the organisation and cooperation 
model of the software agents underlying the functional components.
• The data collection function is network-based, as such it monitors and col­
lects data on the network traffic.
• The data analysis function consists of basic statistical analysis tha t deter­
mines irregularities in the network traffic flow.
• The detection method is specification-based and does not require any learn­
ing period to become effective.
• The intrusion response when a sinkhole node is detected is an active action, 
which could be either a corrective or a preventive action.
• The IDS cooperation is achieved through the use of mobile agents th a t carry 
out the analysis and detection function on the collected data, or carry out 
the intrusion response.
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• The IDS platform is present on every device node and is integrated with 
its internal environment.
4.1.1 Assum ptions
The following assumptions have been made:
Trusted entities and genuine node behaviour
• The base stations are trusted entities. As explained previously in Section 
2.1.1, these entities are more powerful devices tha t can afford to employ 
stronger intrusion prevention measures.
• An genuine node will accept inbound data packets from the previous hop 
and will forward the same total number of packets to the next hop. The 
only exception is when the next hop or destination node is unreachable. In 
tha t case a genuine node will attem pt local repair or raise a RERR message, 
as dictated by the AODV protocol.
Sinkhole node behaviour
• A sinkhole node will attem pt to position itself on nodes that are critical for 
the success of the attack. The success of a sinkhole attack is defined by the 
ability to disrupt significantly the data flow of the sensor network.
• A sinkhole node will always accept inbound packets to avoid having the 
previous hop node performing local repair or raising a RERR message, 
with the consequence of disabling itself. Moreover, a sinkhole node will 
never raise a RERR message itself since doing so would result in route 
disconnection from the network.
• A sinkhole node will either drop the packet or selectively forward the packet 
on to the next hop. The same behaviour will apply to the mobile agents 
transiting through tha t node.
• A sinkhole node could compromise the behaviour of the local IDS compo­
nent.
Software agent security
• The software agents use a lightweight encryption cipher suite to encrypt 
communication and authenticate themselves with their home platform. The 
encryption material is specific to each agent platform and their agents; 
hence any compromised node will not have knowledge of tha t material.
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4.2 D esign  a n d  im p le m e n ta t io n
The Generic-IDS component is essentially an agent platform consisting of an 
organisation of agents tha t cooperatively carry out the function to detect the 
sinkhole attack. This section takes a closer look at the architectural design of 
this component, providing a detailed description of the agent, organisation and 
cooperation model implemented using the API.
Generic-IDS S ensor Node
S e n so r
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B
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S e n s o r a p p
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G en eric-ID S
P h y s ica l layer R adio
Figure 4.1: Generic-IDS in a hosting node
Figure 4.1 illustrates the position of the Generic-IDS component within the en­
vironment of the host device node. It is situated in between the network layer 
and the physical layer in the network protocol stack. This ensures tha t the IDS 
on the local node always: (1) monitors outbound data packets that have already 
discovered a route to their destination and thus have their next hop information 
populated, and (2) monitors inbound data packets that are forwarded to the next 
hop. This is the network traffic data required to analyse and detect the presence 
of a sinkhole attack.
4 .2 .1  A g e n t  a n d  o r g a n isa t io n  m o d e l
Figure 4.2 depicts the architecture of the Generic-IDS component, which consists 
of the the local data collection agent, analysis and detection centre, messaging 
central component and the agent docking station component.
Local d a ta  co llec tion  agen t
The data collection agent collects network traffic data that is transiting through 
the IDS component on the local node. This can be either data packets that 
originated from the node itself or packets that are being routed towards their 
destination. The agent monitors and records the traffic data by counting the 
amount of inbound packets and outbound packets on a particular route from a 
specific source to a destination. The agent is then able to serve queries on the 
collected data using the source and destination node id for a specific time period.
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Figure 4.2: Generic-IDS architecture
A nalysis an d  d e te c tio n  c en tre
The analysis and detection centre (ADC) is the main engine responsible for the 
IDS analysis, detection and response. The ADC allocates a route monitor agent 
for each route tha t is discovered and exists in the routing table of the local 
node. The agent monitors the designated route and deploys a mobile agent, at 
regular interval periods, to traverse the intermediate nodes present in the route 
to the destination node. The mobile agent carries out an analysis of the traffic 
data collected on the traversed nodes and detects any irregularities tha t would 
indicate the presence of a sinkhole node. If the mobile agent detects a sinkhole 
node, it will carry out an appropriate response to neutralise it. The ADC is also 
responsible for housekeeping procedures on the route monitor agents.
M essag ing  ce n tra l co m p o n en t
The messaging central component is part of the agent platform functionality tha t 
handles all the messaging between the route monitor agent and the deployed 
mobile agent. In addition, it taps into the routing layer to listen for route error 
notifications. These notifications are then published for all route monitor agents 
on the local node. It can then terminate any mobile agents on those routes.
A gen t docking  s ta tio n
The agent docking station is also part of the agent platform functionality tha t is 
responsible for handling the migration of mobile agents. It essentially instantiates 
a migrated agent and allocates the necessary resources to operate. The mobile
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agent is able to interface with the IDS component on the local node through the 
docking station. When the mobile agent is ready to migrate, it will initiate a 
transfer request to the docking station, which will capture the state of the agent 
and transm it it to the next node in the itinerary.
M obile  ag en t
The mobile agent is deployed by a route monitor agent to traverse a specific 
route to a destination. The agent’s internal design can be viewed in figure 4.3. It 
consists mainly of a task with a goal, self-check routine, an event-state transition 
engine and a set of actions. This design gives the agent a degree of autonomy to 
react to events and take actions accordingly. It also allows the agent to plan a 
route based on the events received, in order to carry out its task and reach its 
goal.
Provides se lf-aw areness
m essages and signals
Mobile agent
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Figure 4.3: Mobile agent model
The ta sk  s tru c tu re  consists of the information required to carry out the anal­
ysis and detection function on the traversed nodes. The information could vary 
depending on factors, such as the type of analysis and the detection method em­
ployed. In the Generic-IDS, the task has (1) the route to be traversed, including 
hop count to destination, (2) a condition that determines whether the goal has 
been achieved, for instance, a check on whether the node id of the current host 
is equivalent to that of the destination, and (3) the expected data packet count 
to be found on the traversed node.
The self-check ro u tin e  is a set of simple conditions tha t are checked in se­
quence each time the agent is instantiated on a node following a migration. This 
establishes the agent’s awareness and state on the current host. The conditions 
would include, for instance, checks on the current position with respect to the
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goal (using hop count), the current level of threat on the route, the last known 
state and the next event to be expected. This could be viewed also as a boot up 
sequence.
The e v e n t-s ta te  tr a n s i t io n  eng ine  is the core of the mobile agent, which 
determines the behaviour to achieve the task at hand. It is essentially a dynamic 
rule-based engine, where each rule determines the actions to be taken based on 
the event received and the current state of the agent. As a consequence of those 
actions, the engine establishes the target state of the agent. Each rule can be 
represented as follows:
Rule: <event, i n i t i a l  s ta te ,  event handler, target sta te>
An event can be either (1) a type of message received, for instance, an instruction 
from the route monitor agent, or (2) a type of signal, such as move, th a t could also 
originate internally from the agent itself. The initial state is the current state of 
the agent when the event was received, which is dependent on the location, threat 
level and distance from the goal. As explained earlier, the state is evaluated from 
the self-check routine. The combination of an event and initial state are unique 
to an event handler. The event handler can consist of a sequence of actions to 
be carried out, or possibly other events tha t are self-signalled (thoughts) to the 
agent. The target state is the final state tha t should be reached as a consequence 
of those actions in a happy path case; however it is not guaranteed since, the 
agent might self-signal (think) other actions depending on any exception tha t 
might arise during the execution of those actions. For instance, if the agent is 
planning to migrate to the next node, however the node is no longer in range, 
then the agent handles the exception by signalling itself to find a different route. 
Alternatively, if a route cannot be found then the agent informs the route mon­
itor agent accordingly. The event-state transition engine is considered dynamic 
because the rules can be loaded on the fly when the agent is deployed by the 
route monitor agent.
The se t o f ac tio n s  consists of the various procedural implementations th a t an 
agent can execute. This is the actual code logic tha t implements the functionality. 
It contains functional methods tha t determine, for example, the logic for the data 
analysis and the detection method, or intrusion response. It also contains the low- 
level methods required for handling communication and migration. In theory, 
the access to these methods should be controlled depending on the dynamic 
configuration of the event-state transition engine; however this will be considered 
as part of the future work. The following sections provide a description of some 
of the main implemented actions.
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D ata  analysis and detection  action
The data analysis and detection method detects inconsistencies in data packet 
traffic along a particular route. It mainly uses two variables, which are the 
Expected Packet Count (EPC) and the Actual Packet Count (APC). The EPC 
is a variable tha t is known to the mobile agent as part of the task at hand. When 
the agent is deployed at the source node, the EPC is set to the total number 
of data packets tha t were transm itted to the next hop . The APC is the total 
number of actual packets tha t were received (inbound channel) and transm itted 
(outbound channel) by a node. The mobile agent queries the data collection 
agent on the host node for the APC values.
Two indices are derived - the Inbound Detection Index (Dlinbound) and the Out­
bound Detection Index ( D I o u t b o u n d ) - from the following equations based on the 
E P C ,  A P C j n b o u n d a n d  A P C o u t b o u n d •
- D / i n b o u n d  =  obs{EPC  — A P Q n b o u n d  )/E P C  (4.1)
^ o u t b o u n d  =  abs(EPC -  APCoutbound)/ E P C  (4.2)
A value of Dlinbound and D I o u t b o u n d  tha t tends to 0 would indicate tha t there 
was no inconsistency, whereas a larger value would indicate high inconsistency in 
the data packet traffic. The Dl^bound and DIoutbound are then compared with a 
Detection Threshold (DT) using the logical OR function, as follows:
- D l i n b o u n d  > D T  11 D I o u t b o u n d  > D T  (4.3)
A true evaluation of expression 4.3 would result into a detected threat. The DT is 
a fixed threshold which value is calibrated through experimentation. By default 
the DT is set to 0.7. It is im portant tha t this value is calibrated well since a high 
value for DT might result in more false negatives, whilst a low value might result 
in more false positives. Furthermore, the calibration of the DT should also take 
into consideration packet loss due to lack of connectivity.
The EPC is updated only if the agent observes tha t more than one hop was used 
to forward the data packets, i.e. a local repair has occurred at the observed node. 
In tha t case the next hop with most data packets is chosen and the EPC set to 
the number of packets transm itted. This ensures tha t correct tallying between 
the EPC and APC is taking place. If the EPC is not updated then there would 
be high probability tha t more false detections would happen.
Intrusion response action
Apart from the analysis and detection action, the mobile agent can also carry 
out a response on a suspected sinkhole node. On detection of a sinkhole, the
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mobile agent sends a message to the route monitor agent located at the source 
node, notifying the intrusion and the node Id of the sinkhole. The agent also 
broadcasts a warning to notify the neighbouring nodes, so tha t they can initiate 
local repair of any routes tha t involve the suspected node. In addition, the route 
monitor agents at the source node and on each notified node maintain a blacklist 
of suspected nodes to exclude from future participation in the route discovery 
process.
4.2.2 Cooperation model
This section describes the cooperation model for the agents in the Generic-IDS 
framework, in particular, the manner in which they cooperate and interact to 
carry out the intrusion detection operations. Each device node has an IDS plat­
form installed.
A llocating a route m onitor agent
The device node is sensing signals, converting them into data packets and trans­
mitting the data packets over the network to a base station. Whilst the device 
node carries out this main function, the Generic-IDS conducts its operations in 
the background. Specifically, the Analysis and Detection centre (ADC) monitors 
the routes tha t are being discovered to deliver those packets. For each discovered 
route, the ADC allocates a route monitor agent to control the data analysis and 
detection for tha t particular route.
Tagging originating data  packets
The data collection agent monitors the inbound and outbound traffic to the node. 
The outbound traffic consist of (1) data packets tha t have originated by the device 
node and (2) data packets tha t are being forwarded to a destination. The data 
collection agent tags the data packets tha t have originated from the node with a 
tag id, before they are transm itted to the next hop. The tag id is a numerical id 
unique to a particular route, and is managed by the route monitor agent. The 
id is changed every time a mobile agent is deployed. The data collection agent 
groups the amount of data packets by the tag id. For instance, node X could 
have originated 100 packets with tag id 1.
C ollecting traffic data
The data collection agent on a node groups the amount of data  packets tha t are 
inbound and outbound to the node, by their tag id. Therefore, the tag id in a 
data packet allows the synchronisation of the data collection function on each 
node in the network. In addition, the outbound data is also grouped by the next
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hop. For instance, node X has transm itted 100 packets with tag id 1 to next hop 
Y. This data will be queried by the mobile agent when it traverses the node to 
carry out the data analysis and detection function.
D isp a tch in g  a  m obile  agen t
The route monitor agent dispatches a mobile agent at fixed time intervals to 
traverse the route and determine whether a sinkhole node is present. When a 
mobile agent is being deployed, the route monitor agent increments the tag id 
used by the local data collection agent and assigns a task to the mobile agent. The 
task details contain the expected packet count for the last tag id, and the mobile 
agent is instructed to traverse the route followed by those tagged packets to reach 
the intended destination. Once the mobile agent has been dispatched, the route 
monitor agent waits for the mobile agent to complete its task or otherwise.
T raversing  a  ro u te
MAM obile a g e n t
R ou te
Figure 4.4: Conceptual view of a route
Figure 4.4 depicts the conceptual view of a route to be traversed by a mobile 
agent. The mobile agent is initially deployed at the source node, where it imme­
diately migrates to the next node in the route. At each traversed node, the mobile 
agent queries the local data collection agent with the known tag id. The local 
data collection agent returns the data traffic information for tha t particular tag 
id. The mobile agent carries out its analysis and detection function as described 
earlier. If no detection occurs, then the mobile agent packs up and migrates to 
the next node informing the route monitor agent accordingly.
L an d in g  on a  s inkhole node
The are two main courses of action that are considered when a mobile agent lands 
on a sinkhole node:
1. If the sinkhole node is acting as a black-hole, then the agent might be 
disabled without giving the opportunity to even perform an analysis or carry
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Figure 4.5: Landing on a sinkhole node
out an intrusion response accordingly. In that case, the route monitor agent 
will wait a time out period before dispatching another agent and raising the 
threat level on that route accordingly. If the same course of action happens, 
then when the threat level increases beyond a defined threshold, for instance 
3, the route monitor agent declares the route as being compromised and 
warns all the nodes tha t have been traversed by the mobile agent until its 
last known movement.
If the sinkhole node is acting as a grey-hole, and is selectively forwarding 
packets, then the mobile agent can be faced with two fates:
• If the sinkhole node did not compromise the IDS, then when the mobile 
agent carries out its analysis and detection function, it could poten­
tially determine the presence of the sinkhole node due to the anomalous 
traffic data measured. In that case, the agent will warn the analysis 
and detection centre (ADC) on the neighbouring nodes and the route 
monitor agent accordingly. The nodes will take the necessary action. 
If the message to the route monitor agent is intercepted by the sink­
hole node, then the route monitor agent will assume the worse case 
scenario and initiate a threat level assessment as described in point 1 
previously.
• If the sinkhole node compromised the IDS and lies about the collected 
data, then the mobile agent will proceed to the next node, assuming 
that the sinkhole node selectively forwards the agent. On the next 
node, the mobile agent will perform its regular query and potentially 
determine a discrepancy with the inbound packets coming from the 
previous node. Similarly, the mobile agent will carry out the appro­
priate intrusion response.
92 Chapter 4. Generic multi-agent IDS framework
R eaching th e  destination  node
Once the mobile agent reaches its destination node, it would have completed 
its task and informs the route monitor agent accordingly. The mobile agent 
terminates and informs the ADC on the destination node, tha t the route has 
been traversed. The route monitor agent at the source node, waits for the next 
mobile agent to be deployed, repeating the cooperative effort accordingly.
4.3 Evaluation
Simulations were conducted to evaluate the performance of the Generic-IDS 
framework using the same network properties tha t were discussed in the previ­
ous chapter. In particular, the simulations provided (1) an understanding of the 
excess energy consumption due to the operations of the IDS, (2) a quantisation 
of the communication overheads incurred due to the presence of agent migration 
and communication packets in the data stream, which is flowing through the net­
work and (3) focus on the effectiveness of the IDS, in terms of detection accuracy, 
ensuring tha t a presence of a sinkhole node is detected and neutralised, within 
reasonable time. For the purpose of this research, an assumption was made tha t 
defines a reasonable detection and response time as sufficient to ensure tha t the 
overall percentage packet data loss incurred is less than 10%. In a real case sce­
nario, a reasonable time would depend on the criticality of the application area 
of the sensor network. The results from the evaluation portrayed a well-rounded 
picture of the performance of the Generic-IDS framework, in the context of the 
sensor network tha t is being simulated.
4.3.1 Experiment plan
The experiment plan mainly consisted of the same simulation conditions tha t 
were executed to determine the performance of the sensor network without the 
IDS present. Any difference in the result of the Generic-IDS was then compared 
against the established baseline profile of the network.
In addition, other supporting simulations were executed to determine:
1. A minimum agent deployment interval period tha t would provide reasonable 
trade off between the detection time and the energy consumption. It was 
found tha t deployment intervals of less than 5 seconds would severely impact 
the overall performance of the network, since the Sensor node would spend 
more resources on deploying and routing, agents rather than transm itting 
signal data to the base station. Hence, a compromise was established at a 
deployment interval period of 30 seconds.
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2. A value for the threshold value used in the detection function that would 
provide a detection accuracy greater than 80%. This threshold value was 
found to be more accurate around 0.7, which yielded a lower rate of false 
positives caused.
C a lib ra tio n
The approach used in calibrating the simulator was similar to that of the sen­
sor network simulations. In particular, tests were carried out with incremental 
amounts of nodes deploying agents and various quantities of agents deployed. The 
actual results were than evaluated against manual calculations of the expected 
results. This provided enough confidence in the precision of the Generic-IDS 
framework in the simulated environment.
4 .3 .2  R e s u lt s
The highlights of the results of the simulations within the categories defined in 
the experiment plan, are discussed in the following sections.
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Figure 4.6: Traffic frequency - comparison of CPU energy consumption
The graphs in figure 4.6 compares the effect of different traffic frequencies on 
the cumulative average CPU energy consumption for (a) a Sensor node with 
a Generic-IDS platform and (b) a Sensor node without an IDS. The modelled 
network consists of 270 nodes with a 0.2 one-hop ratio. The general trend is that 
the energy consumption increases with the frequency; however the consumption 
for the Generic-IDS is higher with approximately 2% difference, as expected due 
to the IDS ongoing operations. The interesting behaviour in this graph is the CPU 
energy consumption for the partial traffic frequency scenario. Although in this 
case some of the nodes were not transmitting, the Generic-IDS was still deploying 
and routing agents that required to proceed to the next hop by discovering a
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route to the destination. These events triggered route request message broadcasts 
with the associated processing cost. This behaviour is also reflected in the radio 
energy consumption for the same scenario as illustrated in Figure 4.7a. This is a 
limitation in the design of the Generic-IDS that does not take into account the 
traffic frequency of the hosting node.
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Figure 4.7: Traffic frequency - comparison of radio energy consumption
Figure 4.7 illustrates the radio energy consumption for the various traffic fre­
quencies. The radio consumption for the Generic-IDS has a mean increase of 
approximately 12% when compared to the Sensor node without the IDS. This 
increase can be seen consistently in the various traffic frequencies. The line series 
for the partial traffic scenario indicates an initial similar trend in radio energy 
consumption as that of the high traffic scenario; however it tapers off once the 
route has been discovered and the data packets are transm itted. The cause 
for this behaviour has been explained previously, and is attributed to the non­
participating nodes still performing route discovery and broadcasting messages 
due to the agent communication overheads.
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Figure 4.8: Traffic frequency - agent overheads
The agent overheads incurred are illustrated in figure 4.8, in terms of average 
percentage of agents and agent messages out of the total packets transm itted 
by the Sensor node. The percentage of agent overheads increases as the
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frequency of the traffic decreases. This happens because the Generic-IDS 
uses a fixed deployment interval period tha t does not account for changes in 
the frequency of the generated traffic, hence the hosting node is expending 
more energy for the IDS operations rather than its own operations. This is re­
lated to the design limitation of the Generic-IDS th a t has been mentioned earlier.
Traffic frequency TP TN FP FN Detection accuracy
High 0 267 3 0 99%
Medium 0 262 8 0 97%
Low 0 262 8 0 97%
Partial 0 236 34 0 87%
Table 4.1: Traffic frequency - detection accuracy
Table 4.1 shows the detection accuracy achieved for each traffic frequency applied. 
All scenarios scored a high detection accuracy with the partial frequency scoring 
the least. The number of false positives is due to the sensitivity of the detection 
threshold value used to classify a node as an intruder or genuine. However, the 
increased number in the partial frequency scenario was due to a number of agents 
ending up on a node where the flow of data took more than one route to reach 
the destination. The agent chose the next hop with most packets; however the 
collected data on the new route had a discrepancy with the expected packet count 
of the agent resulting in a false positive. It is possible to reduce the amount of 
false positives by increasing the threshold value to reduce the sensitivity. The 
cause of the discrepancy is attributed to the instability of the route, which makes 
the data collection process for a particular task lose synchronisation by an amount 
of packets sufficient enough to trigger the detection.
Sensor node without IDS Sensor node with Generic-IDS
Category
Total node energy 
consumed (J)
Total node energy 
consumed (J)
Energy Cost 
IDS (J)
RM
Mobile
agents
Energy cost 
per agent (J)
H-traffic 40233.27 50030.81 9797.54 7.60 83.52 107.52
M-traffic 13571.03 23094.56 9523.53 7.60 83.52 104.52
L-traffic 3673.91 13353.35 9679.44 7.69 82.80 106.97
P-traffic 7306.72 37317.76 30011.04 7.10 75.14 364.93
Legend: J =  Joules, RM =  Route monitor agent
Figure 4.9: Traffic frequency - Generic-IDS energy cost
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Figure 4.9 illustrates the average energy cost of the Generic-IDS operation for the 
various traffic frequencies used. The energy cost in the simulations represents:
• Processing costs for setting up the route monitor agent
• Processing and radio costs for transm itting and receiving an agent
• Processing and radio costs for transm itting and receiving an agent message
• Processing and radio costs for carrying out an intrusion response
The energy cost is similar for the various traffic frequencies, since the Generic- 
IDS does not differentiate accordingly. However, there is a noticeable increase in 
the partial traffic frequency scenario due to the higher number of false positives 
detected triggering a corresponding intrusion response. Also slightly less agents 
were deployed for the partial traffic scenario, since some nodes were not trans­
mitting signal data, but only served as intermediates nodes to route data packets 
and agents.
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Figure 4.10: Network size - comparison of CPU energy consumption
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 illustrate the CPU and radio energy consumption for the 
various network sizes. As expected the Generic-IDS consumes more energy due 
to the agent overheads; however network sizes 270 and 540 exhibit a specific 
pattern tha t is a consequence of the intrusion response triggered by the false 
positive detection, which was relatively higher than the other sizes (see Table 
4.2). The intrusion response consisted of a reinitialisation of the routing tables in 
the neighbouring nodes of the suspected sinkhole in order to exclude the intruder. 
This led to a broadcast of route request messages to rediscover a new route to 
the destination, which is reflected in the specific pattern observed in the graphs. 
Hence, an efficient intrusion response should consider the cost of the actions 
taken on the rest of the network, in particular when the response is carried out
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Figure 4.11: Network size - comparison of radio energy consumption
on a false positive. In this case, a false positive detection caused the unnecessary 
expenditure of limited energy resource.
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Figure 4.12: Network size - agent overheads
The agent communication overheads for the various network sizes are depicted 
in Figure 4.12. The overheads are higher in smaller sized networks due to routes 
being discovered quicker and therefore agent deployment starting earlier in the 
simulation. The Generic-IDS deploys agents on every discovered route in the 
network at a fixed interval on completion of every task. In the case of the 180 
node, the agents and their messages accounted for 14% and 30% of the average 
transm itted packets respectively.
Table 4.2 provides the detection accuracy for the various network sizes. As ex­
plained in the previous category, the false positives were caused by a particular 
sensitivity of the detection function to data in a specific task, which has taken 
multiple routes to the destination. The intrusion response action of a false pos­
itive detection actually causes a chain reaction that results in the data taking 
a different route; hence potentially yielding more false positive detections. This 
was particularly noticed in network sizes 270 and 540.
The average energy cost of the Generic-IDS is depicted in Figure 4.13. There
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Network size TP TN FP FN Detection accuracy
180 0 179 1 0 99%
270 0 241 29 0 89%T
360 0 354 6 0 98%
450 0 440 10 0 98%
540 0 517 23 0 96%
Table 4.2: Network size - detection accuracy
Sensor node without IDS Sensor node with Generic-IDS
Size
Total node energy 
consumed (J)
Total node energy 
consumed (J)
Energy Cost 
IDS (J)
RM
Mobile
agents
Energy cost 
per agent (J)
180 9468.90 17661.85 8192.95 8.08 101.91 74.49
270 13556.80 35783.10 22226.30 7.66 86.45 236.17
360 16780.68 26926.11 10145.43 7.06 67.39 136.27
450 19994.23 29963.46 9969.23 6.60 56.85 157.11
540 22589.55 43884.18 21294.62 6.00 48.31 392.09
Legend: J =  Joules, RM =  Route monitor agent
Figure 4.13: Network size - Generic-IDS energy cost
were more mobile agents deployed on average in smaller sized networks due to 
routes being discovered quicker and agents completing their tasks in a relatively 
shorter time. However, the higher number of false positives yielded in the 270 and 
540 node scenario has increased the energy cost due to the intrusion response. 
It si also noticeable tha t the larger networks exhibit some latency in discovering 
routes; hence less agents were deployed.
O ne-hop ratio
The trend in the energy consumption observed in Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15 is 
consistent with the underlying network behaviour without an IDS. The energy 
consumption increases with each increment of the one-hop ratio due to more 
nodes within coverage of the transm itting node. The presence of the agents has 
approximately doubled the energy consumption for both the CPU and radio when 
compared to the results for the network without an IDS. This reflects the change 
in node density tha t occurs with every simulated scenario. For instance, a 0.1 
one-hop ratio in the modelled 270-node network is equivalent to 3 nodes per zone,
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Figure 4.14: One-hop ratio - comparison of CPU energy consumption
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Figure 4.15: One-hop ratio - comparison of radio energy consumption
whilst a 0.2 one-hop ratio is equivalent to 6 nodes per zone; hence agents were 
deployed to traverse double the amount of nodes.
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Figure 4.16: One-hop ratio - agent overheads
The node communication overheads due to the presence of agents is illustrated in 
Figure 4.16. The number of agents transm itted reaches between 8% and 14% of 
the total packets transm itted for the node. There is some latency present in the 
0.1 one-hop ratio scenario, since the nodes were more distant from each other and
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hence, it took longer to discover a route to the base station. This was reflected 
in the lower percentage of agents transm itted. In Figure 4.16b, the percentage of 
agent messages transm itted reached between 24% and 30% of the total packets 
transm itted. The same latency is observed for the 0.1 one-hop ratio scenario.
One-hop ratio TP TN FP FN Detection accuracy
0.1 hop ratio 0 249 21 0 92%
0.2 hop ratio 0 265 5 0 98%
0.3 hop ratio 0 268 2 0 99%
0.4 hop ratio 0 270 0 0 100%
0.5 hop ratio 0 270 0 0 100%
Table 4.3: One-hop ratio - detection accuracy
The latency observed previously is also caused by the false positive detection 
of a relatively higher number of nodes in the 0.1 one-hop scenario, which cause 
an intrusion response and corresponding reinitialisation of the routing discovery 
phase for specific nodes. The 0.4 and 0.5 one-hop ratios have managed to achieve 
100% detection accuracy due to less hops involved in reaching the destination, 
making the routes more stable over time and hence, facing less discrepancies when 
analysing the collected data.
Sensor node without IDS Sensor node with Generic-IDS
One-hop
Total node energy 
consumed (J)
Total node energy 
consumed (J)
Energy Cost 
IDS (J)
RM
Mobile
agents
Energy cost 
per agent (J)
0.1 12592.03 21217.50 8625.48 7.71 77.66 101.03
0.2 13617.69 23364.92 9747.23 7.65 83.73 106.67
0.3 14712.73 25841.36 11128.63 7.68 83.11 122.57
0.4 15365.86 28202.78 12836.93 7.66 82.92 141.72
0.5 16272.32 30333.02 14060.69 7.71 82.75 155.44
Legend: J =  Joules, RM =  Route monitor agent
Figure 4.17: One-hop ratio - Generic-IDS energy cost
Figure 4.17 illustrates the average energy costs of the Generic-IDS for the various 
one-hop ratios used. There were slightly less agents deployed in the 0.1 one-hop 
ratio scenario due to a higher number of hops present between some of the source 
nodes and the destination node. This caused a latency in propagation of the route 
request message to discover a route; hence less agents were used in the simulated
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time frame. The general trend is that the energy cost per agent increases as the 
one-hop ratio increases. This was attributed to the increased number of device 
nodes within coverage; hence an agent and an agent message could potentially 
take up a route with more hops resulting in higher communication overheads.
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Figure 4.18: Black-holes present - comparison of CPU energy consumption
Figure 4.18 depicts the CPU energy consumption when different number of black­
holes are present in a 270-node network with 0.2 one-hop ratio. The consumption 
increased approximately up to 9% from 1.4% when one black-hole was present due 
to the presence of the agents and their response actions towards the black-hole 
and the false positives.
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Figure 4.19: Black-holes present - comparison of radio energy consumption
The radio energy consumption illustrated in Figure 4.19 shows a significant in­
crease as the average percentage consumption reaches almost 55% of the total 
energy available. When compared to the radio energy consumption measured for 
the same network parameters in the other scenarios without a black-hole present 
(see Figure 4.15), the consumption measured at around 27% of the total en­
ergy available. The 28% difference is largely caused by the aftermath damage of
102 Chapter 4. Generic multi-agent IDS framework
the black-holes on the routing integrity of the network, in combination with the 
relatively higher number of false positives detected (see Table 4.4).
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Figure 4.20: Black-holes present - agent overheads
The black-hole has damaged the routing integrity of the network by creating a 
number of cyclic routes in its vicinity. This is a collateral effect of the main attack 
carried out by the black-hole. The intrusion response neutralises the black-hole; 
however it does not cater for these cyclic routes. Thus when the agents are 
dispatched, they can get caught in these cyclic routes, traversing the same nodes 
more than once (and using resources) until their time to live (TTL) expires. This 
results in more energy consumed on the impacted nodes. This particular event 
highlights the importance of the intrusion response action taken. Most actions are 
focused on neutralising the attack; however they usually do not cater for collateral 
damage of the attack, such as the cyclic routes formed. For instance, in a future 
implementation, it could be possible to equip the agents with a memory notion 
of the path traversed, which could carry out repairs on the routing structure in 
the node when a cyclic route is detected. This would form part of the intrusion 
response action.
The presence of these cyclic routes also resulted into agents aborting their tasks, 
raising the threat level for the route and eventually incorrectly detecting a sink­
hole node. The intrusion response taken caused a number of route request broad­
cast to happen; hence increasing the energy consumption accordingly.
Figure 4.20 shows the node communication overheads caused by the agents. A 
similar percentage of agents is deployed for all black-hole scenarios, since the 
interval period for deployment is constant. The same can be observed for the 
amount of agent messages; however the 3-black-holes scenario has reached a 
higher percentage of messages caused by more cyclic routes present, resulting 
in agents sending notification messages whilst traversing the cyclic routes until 
they expire.
The packet loss incurred by the presence of the black-holes is depicted in Figure
4.3. Evaluation 103
Packet lossPacket loss
-blackhole
-blackholes
-blackholes
(a )  G e n e r ic - ID S  (b )  W i t h o u t  ID S
Figure 4.21: Black-holes present - packet loss incurred
Black-holes TP TN FP FN Detection accuracy
1 1 226 43 0 84%
2 2 228 40 0 85%
3 3 218 49 0 82%
Table 4.4: Black-holes present - detection accuracy
4.21. A different range was used for the Y-axis in the graph depicting the results 
for the Generic-IDS, due to the significantly less amount of packet loss incurred. 
This ensured a level of magnification that allowed the trend lines to still be 
clearly visible to the reader. The agents detected all the sinkhole nodes in the 
three scenarios on deployment within 13 to 38 seconds seconds of the simulation. 
This is observed by the significant reduction (under 0.2%) in the packet loss 
incurred due to the presence of the Generic-IDS. The detection of the sinkhole 
nodes occurred more than once by multiple agents dispatched from different route 
monitor agents. This creates the necessary redundancy in a distributed and 
cooperative IDS to continue the operation when nodes leave the network. A 
point to mention is also the behaviour of the sinkhole nodes during the set-up 
phase of the attack. The scenario with 1 black-hole managed to capture more 
packets within the same time frame. The simulator log indicates tha t there was 
less latency in setting up the attack on the neighbouring nodes when compared 
to having more sinkhole nodes present in the vicinity of each other, thus resulting 
in quicker damage.
Table 4.4 shows the detection accuracy achieved for the conducted simulations. 
Although all the sinkholes were correctly classified, there was a higher number of 
false positives detected. As explained earlier, this was caused by the cyclic routes 
tha t were formed by the presence of the sinkhole nodes.
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Sensor node 
without IDS
Sensor node with Generic-IDS
BH
Node energy 
consumed (J)
Node energy 
consumed (J)
Energy Cost 
IDS (J)
RM
Mobile
agents
Energy cost for 
response (J)
Energy cost 
per agent (J)
1 13581.84 50832.55 37250.71 7.66 86.22 29615.05 81.33
2 13581.84 49336.50 35754.66 7.62 85.16 28119.00 82.29
3 13581.84 47433.63 33851.79 7.58 82.10 26216.13 85.14
Legend: J =  Joules, RM =  Route monitor agent
Figure 4.22: Black-holes present - Generic-IDS energy cost
The average energy costs of the Generic-IDS for the different black-holes present 
are depicted in Figure 4.22. The energy cost per agents is similar in all three 
scenarios, since all network conditions are essentially constant. The only differ­
ence is the number of black-holes present, which translates to a different intrusion 
response cost. This cost has been extracted and highlighted in a column of its 
own in the referenced figure. The cost covers the true detection of the sinkhole 
nodes and also the false positives detection accordingly. The scenarios with less 
black-holes produced more mobile agents, since it was assumed tha t a a sinkhole 
node would have compromised the local IDS behaviour.
Chapter 5
Command and Control (C2) 
m ulti-agent IDS framework
This chapter focuses on the application of a military operations structure, as de­
scribed in Section 2.3, to the Generic-IDS framework introduced in the previous 
chapter. The resulting product of this application is the Command and Control 
(C2) IDS framework. The first section in this chapter introduces the purpose and 
requirements of the C2-IDS framework with regards to the aim of this research 
work. In the following section, a detailed description of the design and implemen­
tation of the C2-IDS framework is given, whilst highlighting the differences when 
compared to the Generic-IDS framework. The last section provides an evaluation 
of the C2-IDS framework with particular focus on the metrics for efficiency, as 
described in Section 2.2.2, including a comparative study with the Generic-IDS.
5.1 Requirements
The purpose of the C2-IDS framework is to improve the efficiency of the IDS 
operations, by applying a military operations structure to the organisation and 
cooperation model of the agents, whilst maintaining a similar, or better, effec­
tiveness as evaluated in the Generic-IDS framework. In addition, the simulator 
API has been extended to include functionality tha t supports and implements 
the military operations structure.
The following requirements with regards to the IDS functional components are 
almost similar to the ones stated for the Generic-IDS; however they have been 
repeated here for emphasis and clarity:
• The IDS provides the 3 basic functional components: data collection, data 
analysis and detection, and intrusion response, in order to detect and neu­
tralise the presence of one or more sinkhole nodes.
105
106 Chapter 5. Command and Control (C2) multi-agent IDS framework
• The IDS uses a military operations structure in the organisation and coop­
eration model of the software agents underlying the functional components.
• The data collection function is network-based, as such it monitors and col­
lects data on the network traffic.
• The data analysis function consists of basic statistical analysis tha t deter­
mines irregularities in the network traffic flow.
• The detection method is specification-based and does not require any learn­
ing period to become effective.
• The intrusion response when a sinkhole node is detected is an active action, 
which could be either a corrective or a preventive action.
• The IDS cooperation is achieved through the use of mobile agents tha t carry 
out the analysis and detection function on the collected data, or carry out 
the intrusion response.
• The IDS platform is present on every device node and is integrated with 
its internal environment.
In addition, the stated purpose of the C2-IDS framework has been achieved with 
the following main requirements:
• The C2-IDS framework models the operational environment of the IDS, 
discussed in Section 2.3.1, and takes into account factors, such as the energy 
levels of the node, route stability in terms of frequency of local repairs, data 
throughput and continuous threat level assessment.
• The C2-IDS framework models the Command and Control (C2) process, 
discussed in Section 2.3.2, which is responsible for tailoring and organising 
resources to carry out the IDS functions.
• The C2-IDS framework models the combat functions, discussed in Section
2.3.3, to organise the software agents accordingly.
• The C2-IDS framework applies the modular combat structure, discussed in 
Section 2.3.4, on the available resources to take advantage of the efficiency 
gained in managing resources to achieve an objective.
5.1.1 Assum ptions
The same assumptions, which have been stated for the Generic-IDS in Section 
4.1.1, apply.
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Figure 5.1: C2-IDS in a hosting node
Figure 5.1 illustrates the position of the C2-IDS platform, also known as the 
military base, on the hosting node. Similarly to the Generic-IDS, it is logically 
situated in the network protocol stack of the Sensor node for the same reasons 
mentioned earlier.
5 .2 .1  A g e n t  a n d  o r g a n is a t io n  m o d e l
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Figure 5.2: C2-IDS architecture
The internal architecture of the C2-IDS framework can be seen in Figure 5.2. The 
framework consists of 4 main components, which are the protection, operations, 
sustainment and intelligence component. These components implement the main 
combat functions of a military operations structure. The C2-IDS considers the 
node’s environment as the area of operations (Section 2.3.1), and has thus in­
tegrated access to the various components, particularly, the energy source. The
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area of influence (Section 2.3.1) of the C2-IDS is every route tha t originates from 
the hosting node to a specific destination.
P rotection
The protection component provides a security service and also controls the flow 
of traffic through the C2-IDS platform. It contains an encryption agent tha t 
is responsible for allocating encryption material unique to a specific task, or 
mission, to detect a sinkhole node. This ensures tha t the encryption material 
is on a need-to-know basis to only those resources involved in the mission. The 
encryption agent encrypts and decrypts on-going communications between the 
IDS platform and the deployed mobile agents. The encryption material used can 
be either symmetric or asymmetric encryption, depending on the node resources 
available.
In addition, the protection component also has a checkpoint agent, which basically 
intercepts route reply messages from blacklisted nodes to  save the hosting node 
from falling into the set-up of a sinkhole attack. The checkpoint agent also 
maintains a threat level assessment of the neighbouring nodes, also known as an 
area of interest. The assessment is based on reports received of potential enemy 
activity in the area of interest. Lastly, the protection component has a sentry 
agent which filters the packets tha t are of interest to the IDS, whilst bypassing 
the rest. It is possible for the sentry to bypass all traffic, when the node is low 
on energy and cannot sustain the IDS operation.
Intelligence
The intelligence component contains a surveillance agent tha t primarily imple­
ments similar functionality as tha t of the data collection agent in the Generic-IDS 
framework. It is therefore responsible for counting the quantity of inbound and 
outbound packets transiting through the node on a specific route. However, in 
addition, the surveillance agent can also report on the stability of the route, in 
terms of local repairs occurred, and the route utilisation, in terms of data traffic 
throughput, when collecting the data. These 2 factors are used in the planning 
of a mission.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the internal data structure of a surveillance report produced 
by the agent. The report is essentially a relation table, where each row consists of 
a route id and a collection of surveillance snapshots. The route id is the concate­
nation of the source node id and the destination node id. Whilst a surveillance 
snapshot contains the data on the collected traffic, including the additional data 
on the route stability and utilisation. Each snapshot is also identified by a unique 
id. The surveillance agent is able to serve queries on any particular surveillance 
report and relevant snapshot by using the route id and snapshot id respectively.
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Figure 5.3: Intelligence component
Regular housekeeping of the surveillance report is maintained by a shredder pro­
cess, which ensures that the report does not exhaust the node’s resources. The 
shredder process is triggered on a regular basis by the surveillance agent to purge 
out-of-date information.
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Figure 5.4: Operations Component
Figure 5.4 illustrates the internal structure of the Operations component. The 
component contains a tactical command post (T /C P) for each monitored route 
originating from the hosting node to a specific destination node. The T / CP is the 
seat of tactical operations tha t are carried out by a team of mobile agents, also 
known as operators, to search and attack a sinkhole node whilst traversing the 
monitored route. A commander agent manages the command post by exercising 
command and control on the agent resources involved in carrying out the assigned 
mission. The mission essentially consists of a deployed tactical team of operators
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cooperating, whilst carrying out the data analysis and detection function on the 
monitored route.
C o m m an d e r
The commander agent implements the command and control (C2) process de­
scribed in Section 2.3.2. More specifically, the agent plans, prepares, executes 
and assesses the mission.
P la n n in g  - When a T /C P  is set up to monitor an originating route, the com­
mander agent receives a mission order to carry out a specific type of offensive 
task called movement to contact [87]. Essentially, a movement to contact mis­
sion is an effort to search for the presence of a sinkhole node on the route, using 
the smallest team of operators possible; and on contact, proceed to attack as 
necessary to neutralise the damaging effect of the sinkhole.
On receiving the mission order, the commander agent evaluates the mission vari­
ables (METT-TC) to plan the mission. Most of the data tha t populate these 
variables is acquired by the surveillance agent. The mission variables are:
• M ission  - This variable contains the details of the mission, including ex­
pected data traffic behaviour, the hop count of the route to destination, the 
minimum data packet loss allowed on the route and the surveillance time 
period to acquire intelligence data on the operational environment. These 
details are ultimately used to carry out the mission.
• E n em y  - This variable contains the current threat level assessment of the 
area of operations and influence. The commander factors in any suspicious 
behaviour, which was detected on previous missions, to deploy urgently a 
team of operators to confirm tha t suspicion.
• T e rra in  a n d  w e a th e r  - This variable contains acquired surveillance data 
on the route stability and utilisation, which determine the operational con­
ditions tha t impact (1) the team  of operators carrying out the mission and
(2) the operations of a potential intruder.
• T roops a n d  su p p o r t availab le  - This variable contains details on the 
team of operators required to carry out the mission. The details mainly 
include the size of the team and role of the agent within the team (e.g. 
covering force, advance guard or main body).
• T im e availab le  - This variable contains the expected duration of the mis­
sion, which is a function of the other variables. The time available deter­
mines the tempo of the whole IDS operations, and ultimately the rate at
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which energy is consumed for carrying out IDS functionality, as opposed to 
executing the main functionality of the device node.
• C ivil co n s id e ra tio n s  - This variable contains details of civil entities in the 
area of operations and influence. The term  civil is used to describe entities, 
such as the node’s components, e.g. the battery, or even data packets, which 
do not form part of the IDS architecture; however they play an essential 
role in the purpose of the device node. In this case, a commander agent 
evaluates the energy levels available from the node’s battery and the data 
throughput on a route. The IDS functionality is a means to protect the 
correct operation of the node, and ultimately the whole network, whilst 
preserving as much energy as possible for the node to carry out its purpose.
The evaluation algorithm for the mission variables is based on a set of rules and 
decisive threshold values, which are used to primarily determine (1) the frequency 
of the missions tha t are carried out, (2) when to deploy a team of agents and
(3) the amount of agents deployed. These have been identified as the three main 
decisive decisions made by the commander agent, during the planning phase, 
which could have an impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the IDS. The 
evaluation algorithm is explained hereunder, in terms of the definition of an 
energy level and explanation of the three decisive decisions:
• E n erg y  level - The energy level of the node determines the decisive thresh­
old values tha t are applied to  the 3 mentioned decisions. The energy level 
is classified as follows
1. N orm al: The node has sufficient energy to conduct both node and 
IDS operations normally.
2. W arn ing : The node has energy to conduct normal node operations 
and economical IDS operations.
3. Severe: The node has energy to conduct normal node operations and 
austere IDS operations.
4. C ritica l: The node has energy to conduct normal node operations 
only.
The difference between the level of IDS operations: normal, economical and 
austere IDS operations is implemented through an adjustment factor th a t 
is applied incrementally to the decisive thresholds used.
• C o m p u tin g  th e  tim e  o f th e  n e x t m ission  - The time of the next mis­
sion is based on the average data throughput on the route and the average 
number of local repairs. This data determines the utilisation and stability
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of the route respectively. As per assumption on the sinkhole node behaviour 
(Section 4.1.1), the attack is intended to carry out significant damage on 
the network, presumably by positioning itself on routes with a considerable 
amount of throughput. In addition, if the route is not stable, then the 
sinkhole node would suffer from similar route connection instability; hence 
impacting its operation and ultimately the success of the attack. Conse­
quently, the commander agent would order urgent missions on relatively 
stable routes with a larger volume of data flowing through and less urgent, 
or possibly rare, missions on unstable routes with less volume of data, to 
avoid wasting resources accordingly. If the node’s energy is normal, then 
default thresholds apply to determine whether the route is stable and signif­
icant enough to protect; otherwise an adjustment factor is applied according 
to the energy level reached.
• D ecid ing  on  dep loy ing  a  te a m  o f ag en ts  - When the commander agent 
receives a mission order, then it needs to assess the situation with the latest 
information; hence it conducts an active surveillance on the route, thus 
retrieving the latest information on the current threat level, throughput and 
stability. There are three levels of threat, or defence conditions (DEFCON), 
which are interpreted as follows:
1. If the threat level is DEFCON 1 (high), then the commander will 
deploy a team immediately, unless energy levels are critical (then no 
deployment).
2. If the threat level is DEFCON 2 (medium), then the commander will 
factor only the route stability, before deciding on deployment.
3. If the threat level is DEFCON 3 (normal), then the commander will 
factor both the data throughput and the route stability, before decid­
ing on deployment.
The route stability and data throughput are evaluated against decisive 
thresholds as explained earlier. The thresholds are also adjusted according 
to the energy levels.
• D ecid ing  on  th e  size o f th e  te a m  - Once the mission is considered 
feasible, then the commander decides on the size of the team  of agents to 
be deployed to carry out the mission. At a minimum, a team  consists of a 
covering force agent and a main body agent.
The covering force agent is responsible to make initial contact with the 
sinkhole node and develop the situation, in order to protect and cover the 
main body agent from the sinkhole node. The main body agent is the last 
resource in a particular mission tha t can take decisive action against a sink­
hole node, making it a critical member of the team. The main body agent
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Figure 5.5: Tactical team arrangement
protects itself by keeping a certain distance from the covering force agent. 
The team can also have an advanced guard agent, which would be located in 
between the main body agent and the covering force agent (see Figure 5.5). 
The advanced guard also contributes to distancing the main body agent 
from the sinkhole node. Both the covering force and the advanced guard 
agent give the main body agent ample warning on the threat level on the 
route. The default size of the team is 3, consisting of the main body agent, 
advanced guard agent and covering force agent. The commander makes 
the decision on the team size based on the threat level assessment during 
mission planning. Essentially, if the threat level is DEFCON 1 (high) or 
DEFCON 2 (medium) , then the commander will deploy a team of size 
3, unless energy levels are critical (therefore no deployment). Whilst in 
DEFCON 3 (normal), size of the team is 2.
P re p a rin g , E x ec u tio n  an d  A ssessing  - After planning the mission, the com­
mander agent orders the execution of the mission, and oversees the progress of 
the team of agents as they traverse the route to the destination. Once the mission 
is completed, the commander conducts a debriefing of the mission to update the 
mission variables accordingly, thus maintaining a feedback loop on the perfor­
mance of the IDS operation, which contributes to refining the decisive thresholds 
used, in particular average throughput, average number of local repairs and num­
ber of sinkholes detected. Finally, the commander decides on the time interval 
to the next mission, and the command and control process repeats itself.
S u s ta in m en t
The sustainment component implements similar functionality of the messaging 
central and agent docking station (see Section 4.2.1); however it has been en­
hanced to support the migration and coordination of a team of agents.
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Tactical team  o f operators
The tactical team consists of a team of mobile agents, also known as operators, 
tha t carries out the offensive mission. The roles of the member in the team 
have already been discussed earlier. Specifically, a team  consists of a main body 
agent, an advanced guard agent and a covering force agent. These different roles 
are implemented with the same mobile agent design introduced in Section 4.2.1. 
However the role specifies a different task with variations in the set of rules and 
actions. All agents in the team  are capable of querying the local surveillance 
agent on the hosting node to retrieve surveillance reports and carrying out the 
data analysis, detection and response functionality accordingly. The following is 
a detailed description of each operator role in the team:
M ain b ody agent - The main body agent is the commanding officer of the team 
with a designated call-sign of OP-Lead. The task of OP-Lead is to traverse the 
route to the destination, whilst exercising command and control on the tactical 
team during execution of the mission. As such, OP-Lead maintains an under­
standing of the developing situation, and the potential presence of a sinkhole 
node, through received observation reports. These reports contain the findings 
of the analysis and detection for the node being traversed by the covering force 
agent and the advanced guard agent.
OP-lead makes decisions with regards to the execution of the mission based on 
those reports and also interactions with the C2-IDS on the hosting node. For 
instance, the absence of an observation report from the covering force agent 
might indicate the presence of a sinkhole, or just simply the disconnection of the 
route. OP-Lead verifies the threat level assessment maintained by the checkpoint 
agent on the hosting node for the local area of interest, and also checks with the 
local messaging central component for any notification of a route error message, 
indicating tha t the route connection has been interrupted. OP-Lead uses this 
information together with its threat level assessment (provided during mission 
briefing) to decide whether the event is suspicious or normal. It then can either 
raise the threat level accordingly or proceed ahead as normal.
OP-Lead is also responsible for maintaining contact with the commander agent 
at the tactical command post on the source node. However, communication is 
not continuous, but only happens at decisive points throughout the mission, for 
instance, the detection of a sinkhole node, or the decision to abort the mission. 
This ensures tha t the majority of the communication overheads are confined to 
the team of agents, as opposed to sending continuous messages to the source 
node, which is the case in the Generic-IDS. OP-Lead is therefore responsible for 
reporting feedback on the outcome of the mission to the commander agent.
A dvanced guard and covering force agent - The advanced guard agent
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and covering force agent have designated call-signs of O P-1  and O P -2  respec­
tively. The main task of both operators is to traverse the route ahead of OP-Lead 
towards the destination node, whilst providing observation reports on each tra ­
versed node. The operators are therefore responsible for making initial contact 
with a sinkhole node, developing the situation for OP-Lead to take the necessary 
action accordingly. Both operators perform local analysis and detection to eval­
uate the threat level on those nodes and take action accordingly. The findings of 
the threat level assessment are reported to OP-Lead.
D a ta  ana ly sis  an d  d e te c tio n  ac tio n
The C2-IDS uses the same data analysis and detection method in use by the 
Generic-IDS, as described in Section 5.2.1.
In tru s io n  re sp o n se  ac tio n
Similarly to the Generic-IDS, the operator responsible for the initial detection of 
suspicious activity, broadcasts a warning to the checkpoint agents on the neigh­
bouring nodes, so tha t they can initiate local repair of any routes tha t involve 
the suspected node and blacklist the node accordingly. OP-Lead also reports to 
the tactical command post on the outcome.
5.2.2 Cooperation model
This section describes the cooperation tha t occurs between the various combat 
functional components and relevant agents, in order to carry out the IDS func­
tionality:
S e ttin g  u p  a  ta c tic a l co m m an d  p o s t
When the device node discovers a route to a particular destination node, the 
operations component sets up a tactical command post (T /C P) to monitor tha t 
route. As soon as the T C /P  is instantiated, the operations component orders a 
mission to the commander agent in charge of the command post. Therefore the 
commander agent plans the first mission.
R eq u es tin g  ac tiv e  su rveillance
The commander agent plans the mission, as described earlier, by evaluating the 
mission variables tha t factor in the operational environment. The commander 
requests an active surveillance of the route to obtain the latest data to populate 
those mission variables, and gain an understanding of the situation.
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The surveillance agent carries out the requested active surveillance and moni­
tors the outbound packets, which are transm itted from the hosting node to the 
destination node on tha t route. The active surveillance activity consists of the 
agent tagging each outbound packet with a snapshot id. The length of the active 
surveillance depends on either the minimum number of data packets loss allowed 
or a time out period that is based on the hop count of the route.
The minimum number of data packets loss allowed is the minimum quantity of 
data packets that is deemed as acceptable to lose, in the presence of a sinkhole 
attack. If the data throughput for the monitored route is not high enough to 
reach the minimum quantity, then the active surveillance will terminate after the 
time out period expires. The duration of time out period should be long enough 
to allow the data packets to reach the destination, which is a known number of 
hops away. The final product of the active surveillance is a snapshot containing 
the id used, the quantity of outbound packets grouped by next hop, and the 
number of local repairs that have occurred during surveillance. The snapshot is 
then handed over to the commander for evaluation.
As soon as the active surveillance is completed, the surveillance agent switches 
to passive surveillance, whereby the data packets are tagged with a new snapshot 
id; however this snapshot is not used in the planning of a mission. The reason 
for maintaining passive surveillance is to ensure that a smart intruder will not 
use the snapshot id as a tell-tale sign of an incoming tactical team.
E v a lu a tin g  th e  su rve illance  sn ap sh o t
The commander evaluates the active surveillance snapshot received together with 
the other mission variables, and decides whether the mission is feasible to deploy 
a tactical team. If the mission is not feasible, the commander can decide to 
retry the active surveillance for a number of times before aborting the mission. 
Alternatively, if the mission is deemed feasible, then the commander orders a 
deployment of the tactical team on the route.
C on tinuous su rve illance  on every  node
S urv e illan ce
CP | INTEL INTEL j  INTEL [ INTEL |
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Figure 5.6: Continuous surveillance
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The surveillance agent, in the intelligence component on every node, also carries 
out continuous surveillance of the network traffic tha t transits through the hosting 
node (see Figure 5.6). This is similar to the function of the local data collection 
agent in the Generic-IDS. The surveillance agent creates surveillance snapshots 
consisting of the number of inbound and outbound packets tha t have the same 
snapshot id. The outbound packets are also grouped by the next hop id.
D eploy ing  th e  ta c tic a l te a m
M ovem ent to  c o n ta c t
T actical
te a m
INTEL INTEL INTELCP INTEL
R oute
Figure 5.7: Movement to contact
A tactical team of operators is deployed to carry out an offensive task on the 
monitored route. As shown in Figure 5.7, the team consists of 3 operators, 
namely OP-Lead, OP-1 and OP-2. Prior to deployment, the team is briefed with 
the details of the mission. The details mainly consist of the last known threat 
level on the route, the expected packet count on the next hop and the snapshot 
id used to query the local surveillance agent, for the actual packet count on the 
hosting node.
M ovem ent to  co n tac t
Once deployed, the tactical team follows the operating procedure described here­
under:
T ac tica l te a m  tak es  up  th e  in itia l p o s itio n s  - Each operator begins their 
advance, taking up positions along the route, also known as a travelling formation. 
In Figure 5.7, OP-2 relocates to the next hop Node 1, whilst both OP-Lead and 
OP-1 remain positioned on Node S.
O P-1 an d  O P-2  m ake th e ir  observ a tio n s  - Both operators query the surveil­
lance agent on the hosting node for a specific snapshot, using the given snapshot 
id. In the example scenario, OP-2 queries the surveillance agent executing on 
Node 1 and performs an analysis and detection function on the collected data
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against the given expected packet count. A true evaluation of the detection func­
tion indicates a suspected sinkhole threat, whilst a false evaluation indicates that 
there is no threat. In the case of a suspected threat, the operator raises the 
threat level by reporting to OP-Lead and broadcasting a threat warning to the 
neighbouring nodes (one hop away). If there is no suspected threat, then the 
operators proceed to the next hop (OP-1 to Node 1 and OP-2 to Node 2). The 
next hop is determined from the queried surveillance snapshot itself.
O P -L ead  assesses th e  th r e a t  level - After OP-Lead receives the findings 
from the operators, it performs a threat level assessment. If the threat level 
reaches DEFCON 1, then OP-Lead confirms the threat and broadcasts a threat 
confirmation to the neighbouring nodes (one hop away). A DEFCON level of 
3 indicates no threat present, a level of 2 indicates suspected potential threat 
lying ahead and a level of 1 indicates a confirmed threat. The DEFCON level 
is initialized to the last known threat level briefed on deployment as part of the 
mission variables, and is updated with every finding from the tactical team at it 
proceeds along the route. In the example scenario, the briefed DEFCON level 
is 3 and the observation report from OP-2 traversing Node 1 evaluates to false, 
hence DEFCON level remains the same.
T actical
te a m
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Figure 5.8: Mission in progress
T h e  te a m  is in  line fo rm atio n  - In Figure 5.8, all 3 operators are now travelling 
in line formation, with OP-2 being one hop in front of OP-1, and similarly OP-1 is 
one hop in front of OP-Lead. OP-2 and OP-1 report their observations of Node 2 
and Node 1 respectively to OP-Lead, which performs the threat-level assessment. 
The result of the assessment is again false, therefore the DEFCON level remains 
3 and the team advances one position as shown in Figure 5.9a.
A ctio n  on co n tac t w ith  a  s inkhole node
OP-2 has landed itself on Node X - the sinkhole node. According to the assump­
tions on the sinkhole node behaviour, Node X can have the following behaviour:
1. B lack-hole - drop all data packets and disable the agents. The illustrated
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Figure 5.9: Sinkhole engagement
example scenario in Figure 5.9 depicts the behaviour of a sinkhole node as a 
black-hole. In this case, OP-2 is disabled by the sinkhole and does not report 
its findings to OP-Lead. OP-Lead waits for a response for specific time 
period, and then assumes that the connection to OP-2 has been interrupted. 
It proceeds to a threat level assessment, factoring in possible notifications of 
route interruptions, from the AODV protocol. If the outcome indicates tha t 
the route is still valid, then OP-Lead updates the threat level to DEFCON 
2 for suspicious activity and proceeds to the next hop. OP-1 is also disabled 
when it lands on the sinkhole node and does not report to OP-Lead, who 
waits for a response in vain. OP-Lead then carries out another threat level 
assessment. In this example, OP-Lead updates the threat level to DEFCON 
1 for confirmed suspicious activity and carries out a response accordingly.
2. G rey  hole - selective forward the data packets and agents, of which:
• The C2-IDS on the sinkhole node is compromised and lies about the 
collected data. In this case, OP-2 lands on the sinkhole node and per­
forms its analysis and detection function. The IDS is compromised, so 
the data indicates that there is no anomaly. OP-2 reports its findings 
and proceeds to the next hop. On the next hop, OP-2 repeats the 
same procedure and detects a discrepancy in the traffic flow, updating 
the threat level and reporting accordingly to OP-Lead and neighbour-
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ing checkpoint agents. The same sequence of events can potentially 
happen to OP-1, or it could be dropped by the sinkhole. In either 
case, OP-Lead would be warned of the threat in order to carry out 
its assessment, and the necessary response.
• The 02-IDS on the sinkhole node is not compromised. In this case, 
OP-2 lands on the sinkhole node and performs its analysis and detec­
tion function. The IDS is not compromised yet, so the data indicates 
an anomaly. OP-2 updates the threat level and reports accordingly 
to OP-Lead and neighbouring checkpoint agents. The same sequence 
of events can potentially happen to OP-1, or the IDS could have been 
compromised, or it could be dropped by the sinkhole. In either case, 
OP-Lead would be warned of the threat in order to carry out its 
assessment, and the necessary response.
T actical
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Figure 5.10: Setting up checkpoints
E ngag ing  an d  n e u tra lis in g  th e  s inkhole no d e  - It has already been es­
tablished that the observation reports from the operators to both OP-Lead and 
the neighbouring checkpoint agents are used to conduct a threat level assess­
ment. Each checkpoint agent assesses the threat from their perspective, and on 
the threat reaching DEFCON 1, the checkpoint agent will temporarily blacklist 
the reported suspected node from communications. When OP-Lead corroborates 
the confirmation of the threat, then the checkpoint agents proceed to mark the 
sinkhole node for permanent eviction. If OP-Lead does not provide any corrob­
oration, due to interrupted links or possibly falling into the sinkhole node, the 
checkpoint agents can refer to the operations component, on the hosting node, 
the need for a mission to be carried out to the suspected node. If the threat level 
is not corroborated or updated within a specific time period, then the threat level 
is progressively reduced. This would not affect permanent exclusions; however 
any temporary blacklisted nodes will be reinstated. The temporary blacklisting 
is a measure to mitigate the risk of classifying a node as a false positive.
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M ission  O u tco m e - A mission outcome can be either: completed, intrusion 
detected or aborted. A mission is deemed complete when OP-Lead reaches the 
destination node, in the example Node D. In tha t case it notifies the command 
post with the outcome indicating that the route is clear from sinkholes. On the 
other hand, when a sinkhole node is detected, OP-Lead notifies the command 
post accordingly. Finally, a mission is aborted when the team cannot proceed 
due to a broken link along the route. In tha t case, OP-Lead notifies command 
post and a new mission for the new route would have to be scheduled and planned.
T h e  C am p aig n
CH2
CH11 - K +
Figure 5.11: The Whole Campaign
A typical theatre of operations is partly depicted in Figure 5.11, where various 
C2-IDS, or military bases, are deploying tactical teams to search and attack 
sinkhole nodes tha t are present on different routes around the network. Hence, 
checkpoint agents are continuously receiving intelligence data on neighbouring 
nodes from the various tactical teams that are carrying out their mission. As 
a consequence, new routes from Nodes SI, S2 and S3 to Node D might instead 
transit data packets through CH 1, CH 2 and CH 3 as indicated in the figure.
5.3 E v a lu a tio n
The same simulations executed for the Generic-IDS were also conducted to evalu­
ate the performance of the C2-IDS framework. Similarly, the simulations provided 
(1) an understanding of the excess energy consumption due to the operations of 
the IDS, (2) a quantisation of the communication overheads incurred due to the 
presence of agent migration and communication packets in the data stream, which 
is flowing through the network and (3) focus on the effectiveness of the IDS, in 
terms of detection accuracy, ensuring that a presence of a sinkhole node is de­
tected, and neutralised, within reasonable time. The same assumption was made
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th a t defines a reasonable detection and response time as sufficient to ensure that 
the overall percentage packet data loss incurred is less than 10%.
5.3.1 Experiment plan
The same experiment plan followed for the Generic-IDS was used and any dif­
ference in the result of the C2-IDS was then compared against the established 
baseline profile of the network and the performance of the Generic-IDS.
In addition, other supporting simulations were executed to determine:
1. The minimum data packet loss allowed, minimum data  throughput and 
maximum number of next-hop changes (stability) for each route. These 
values determines the feasibility and duration of the mission, affecting the 
overall performance of the IDS with respect to the network. The respective 
values of 50 packets, 1 packet per second and 4 next-hop changes were 
chosen following experimentation and calculations factoring in the traffic 
frequencies. The values were kept constant throughout all the experiments. 
In practice, these values would be specified according to the importance of 
the data being communicated, the role of the device node in the network 
and the expected stability conditions of the network (e.g. device nodes 
could be mobile following a Brownian motion pattern).
2. A value for the threshold value used in the detection function tha t would 
provide a detection accuracy greater than 80%. The same threshold value 
of 0.7 tha t was used in the simulations for the Generic-IDS, was also used 
for the C2-IDS.
C a lib ra tio n
A similar calibration approach followed for the other simulations was used for the 
C2-IDS. In particular, tests were carried out with incremental amounts of nodes 
and commander agents evaluating the operational and mission variables (in­
cluding energy levels, route utilisation, data throughput and next-hop changes), 
whilst deploying operator agents and quantity of agents deployed. The actual 
results were than evaluated against manual calculations of the expected results. 
This provided enough confidence in the precision of the C2-IDS framework in the 
simulated environment.
5.3.2 Results
The highlights of the results of the simulations within the categories defined in 
the experiment plan, are discussed in the following sections.
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Figure 5.12: Traffic frequency - comparison of CPU energy consumption
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Figure 5.13: Traffic frequency - comparison of radio energy consumption
Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13 illustrate the average CPU and radio energy con­
sumption respectively for a 270-node network with 0.2 one-hop ratio. The C2- 
IDS consumes less energy in each traffic frequency scenario when compared to the 
Generic-IDS with significant savings, in particular for radio energy consumption. 
The C2-IDS factors in the data throughput of a route when planning a mission to 
deploy operator agents for cooperative analysis and detection. This is reflected in 
a relatively higher consumption (approx. 48%) for the node in the high frequency 
scenario for C2-IDS, when compared to the rest of the scenarios. In the partial 
traffic scenario, where nodes are transm itting with a medium frequency and some 
other the nodes are not transm itting at all, the C2-IDS monitors route utilisation 
to decide whether to deploy agents on the route or not. This is accounted during 
mission planning, hence the consumed energy (approx. 8%) lies in between the 
medium and low frequency scenarios.
Figure 5.14 depicts the agent communication overheads for the device node in 
terms of agents and agent messages transm itted. The immediate realisation is 
that both graphs are exactly the same in the results. This is because an operator 
agent in the C2-IDS only transmits one message to the agent in pursuit, which
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Figure 5.14: Traffic frequency - agent overheads
is always one hop away. Therefore the messages are only transm itted once to the 
neighbouring node, equating to one agent migration and one message on every 
hop. The exception is OP-Lead agent which only transm its messages during 
limited contact with the command post at decisive points during the mission, e.g. 
detected intrusion or mission accomplishment. In this case, OP-Lead sent only 
a mission complete message, since there was no intrusion detected. The message 
travels the same number of hops away that the OP-Lead agent has travelled so far, 
hence still maintaining a one agent migration and one agent message relation per 
node. In contrast, in the Generic-IDS, the mobile agent transm its one message 
to the route monitor agent on every hop towards the destination, which can be a 
number of hops away. The message is forwarded by each intermediate node back 
to the route monitor agent, each time the mobile agent distances itself. This 
results in a relatively higher number of agent messages transm itted per node.
Traffic frequency TP TN FP FN Detection accuracy
High 0 270 0 0 100%
Medium 0 269 1 0 99%
Low 0 270 0 0 100%
Partial 0 270 0 0 100%
Table 5.1: Traffic frequency - detection accuracy
The detection accuracy for the various types of traffic frequency scenarios is 
shown in Table 5.1. The false positive in the medium traffic scenario was caused 
by a miscommunication between the operator agents along a data route that took 
more than path to reach the destination. Both OP-1 and OP-2 reported different 
findings to OP-Lead, thus confirming a threat.
Figure 5.15 shows the workings of the average energy cost for operating the C2-
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S ensor n ode w ith o u t IDS Sensor n o d e  w ith  Generic-IDS S ensor n ode w ith  C2-IDS
Category
Total n ode energy  
consum ed  (J)
Total n o d e  energy  
consum ed  (J)
Energy Cost 
IDS (J)
RM
M obile
agen ts
Energy cost 
p e r ag e n t (J)
Total n o d e energy  
consum ed  (J)
Energy Cost 
IDS (J)
CO O perato rs
Energy cost 
p e r  ag e n t (J)
H -tr a ffic 40233.27 50030.81 9797.54 7.60 83.52 107.52 41312.67 1079.40 0.99 19.03 53.91
M -tr a f f ic 13571.03 23094.56 9523.53 7.60 83.52 104.52 14074.92 503.89 0.99 9.65 47.36
L -tra ffic 3673.91 13353.35 9679.44 7.69 82.80 106.97 3741.08 67.17 0.99 0.69 39.95
P -tr a ff ic 7306.72 37317.76 30011.04 7.10 75.14 364.93 7623.90 317.18 0.52 5.14 55.97
Legend: J =  Joules, R M  =  Route monitor agent, C O  =  Commander agent
Figure 5.15: Traffic frequency - C2-IDS energy cost
IDS in the various traffic frequency scenarios. The costs represent the same sub­
costs mentioned for the Generic-IDS, with the exception that a commander agent 
is used in the C2-IDS as opposed to a route monitor agent. Whilst the energy 
cost for the Generic-IDS is fixed throughout all scenarios, the cost for the C2-IDS 
depends on the traffic frequency. In each scenario, there was 1 command post 
set up for a utilised route, as opposed to approximately 7.6 route monitor agents 
for all discovered routes in the Generic-IDS. In addition, the number of operator 
agents deployed varied according to the mission planning rules defined earlier. 
The salient points of the rules are: the commander plans a mission by defining 
the minimum data throughput and maximum next-hop changes thresholds ac­
cording to the energy levels available and the outcome of the previous mission. 
Following which, the latest values of the current operation environment variables 
are acquired through surveillance, specifically, the threat level, the data through­
put and next-hop changes. If the values satisfy the thresholds, then the tactical 
team is deployed; otherwise the surveillance is retried with reassessed thresholds. 
The net result is less frequent deployments, as the energy levels decrease, whilst 
maintaining feedback continuity on the mission assessment to ensure tha t urgent 
missions are still carried out promptly. This approach reduces the energy cost 
per agent to defend the network.
Packet loss - low traffic frequency
1.00% t
% loss 6.00%
Figure 5.16: Traffic frequency - packet loss
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In the low traffic scenario, there were only an average of 0.69 operator agents 
deployed due to the minimum throughput requirement not always being satisfied, 
which might not be ideal in the presence of an attack. However this is dependent 
on the importance of the node and the data flowing through, represented by 
the operational environment thresholds. Figure 5.16 shows the performance of 
the C2-IDS in terms of packet loss incurred due the presence of one black-hole 
for a 270-node network with low traffic frequency. The C2-IDS still detected the 
sinkhole in a network with low frequency traffic, although the detection happened 
at 315 seconds into the simulation allowing for up to 10.8% packet loss. This does 
not fall within the assumed definition of a reasonable detection time by 0.8%; 
however it is possible to improve this detection time by lowering the minimum 
throughput threshold to allow for more agents to be deployed. The question to 
pose here is whether the network can afford to incur 10.8% packet loss in order for 
the nodes to conserve energy. In the partial traffic scenario, there was an average 
of 0.52 commander agents set up, reflecting tha t not all nodes were transmitting, 
hence not utilising a route.
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Figure 5.17: Network size - comparison of CPU energy consumption
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Figure 5.18: Network size - comparison of radio energy consumption
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Figures 5.17 and 5.18 illustrate the average CPU and radio energy consumption 
respectively for various network sizes with 0.2 one-hop ratio and medium traffic 
frequency. As expected, the observed trend, in both graphs, is an increase in 
consumption due to more Sensor nodes present in the network. This translates 
to more nodes involved in a broadcast transmission to the neighbouring nodes. 
However, the C2-IDS still consumes relatively less energy when compared to the 
consumption of the Generic-IDS, with a difference of approximately 7% and 40% 
in the 540 nodes scenario for CPU and radio energy consumption respectively. 
The better consumption in the C2-IDS can also be accounted for by the less 
number of false positives detected, hence not bearing the additional energy cost 
of an intrusion response.
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Figure 5.19: Network size - agent overheads
The percentage agent overheads depicted in Figure 5.19 follow the same pat­
tern exhibited by the Generic-IDS; however with less overheads incurred. The 
overheads for C2-IDS are also slightly higher for smaller sized networks due to 
routes being discovered quicker and agent deployment starting earlier in the sim­
ulation. The same pattern is also observed between the percentage agents and 
agent message transm itted for the reasons explained earlier.
Network size TP TN FP FN Detection accuracy
180 0 180 0 0 100%
270 0 270 0 0 100%
360 0 358 2 0 99%
450 0 449 1 0 99%
540 0 538 2 0 99%
Table 5.2: Network size - detection accuracy
Table 5.2 shows the detection accuracy achieved for the various network sizes.
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The accuracy is considerably higher than th a t of the Generic-IDS due to the 
better cooperation and tighter communication of the operator agents in the tac­
tical team, when determining anomalies in the network traffic flow. A detection 
only occurs if OP-Lead corroborates the findings of both OP-1 and OP-2, which 
are always one hop away from each other. This is in contrast to the mobile 
agent in the Generic-IDS, which solely determines the presence of an anomaly 
and then communicates it to the route monitor agent. Nonetheless, the C2-IDS 
still yielded some false positives in larger networks due to the sensitivity of the 
detection function on routes with multiple paths to the destination.
Sensor node w ithout IDS Sensor node with Generic-IDS Sensor node with C2-IDS
Size
Total node energy 
consumed (J)
Total node energy 
consumed (J)
Energy Cost 
IDS (J)
RM
Mobile
agents
Energy cost 
per agent (J)
Total node energy 
consumed (J)
Energy Cost 
IDS (J)
CO Operators
Energy cost 
per agent (J)
180 9468.90 17661.85 8192.95 8.08 101.91 74.49 9772.35 303.45 0.98 10.52 26.37
270 13556.80 35783.10 22226.30 7.66 86.45 236.17 13991.74 434.94 0.99 9.60 41.06
360 16780.68 26926.11 10145.43 7.06 67.39 136.27 17420.68 640.00 0.99 8.67 66.24
450 19994.23 29963.46 9969.23 6.60 56.85 157.11 20765.31 771.08 0.99 7.71 88.61
540 22589.55 43884.18 21294.62 6.00 48.31 392.09 23197.71 608.15 0.99 6.66 79.42
Legend: J =  Joules, RM =  Route monitor agent, CO =  Commander agent
Figure 5.20: Network size - C2-IDS energy cost
The average energy cost of a Sensor node with the C2-IDS is depicted in Figure 
5.20. The number of operator agents deployed decreases with the size of the 
network due to longer latency time in discovering routes to the destination. The 
cost also includes the intrusion response for the false positives detected; hence 
incurring a higher cost in the larger networks. The C2-IDS managed to  achieve 
a better overall energy cost for the IDS operations than the Generic-IDS for all 
network sizes.
O ne-hop  ra tio
The average CPU and radio energy consumption for various one-hop ratios is 
shown in figures 5.21 and Figure 5.22 respectively, for a 270-node network with 
medium traffic frequency. The consumption increases as the hop ratio increases 
due to the higher density of nodes within one hop signal coverage, hence more 
nodes participating in a route request broadcast transmission. The C2-IDS still 
manages to achieve better results in both CPU and radio energy consumption.
Figure 5.23 illustrates the agent overheads in terms of average percentage amount 
of agents and agent messages from all transm itted packets. The overheads are 
considerably low when compared to the Generic-IDS. In addition, the higher 
detection accuracy achieved meant tha t fewer false positives were detected and
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CPU energy  consum ption
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Figure 5.21: One-hop ratio - comparison of CPU energy consumption
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Figure 5.22: One-hop ratio - comparison of radio energy consumption
A gents tra n sm itte d
—••-0 .1  hop ratio 
—  0.4 hop ratio
% packets
(a )  A g e n ts
A gent m essag es tra n sm itte d
-0 .1  hop ratio 
-0 .2  hop ratio 
-0 .3  hop ratio
-0 .5  hop ratio
0 90 180 270 360 450 540 630 720 810 900
seconds
(b )  A g e n t  m e s s a g e s  
Figure 5.23: One-hop ratio - agent overheads
the cost associated with the intrusion response was reduced. This resulted in 
a less number of overall packets transm itted, especially in the simulations with 
a lower one-hop ratio, which indicate a relatively higher percentage of agent 
overheads than the others. The simulations with a higher one-hop ratio (e.g. 
0.5) had a lower propagation of transm itted packets and latency in discovering a 
route, as can be seen in the graphs, which meant that relatively less agents were 
transm itted within the simulation time. In addition, since the number of hops
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between a source node and destination is potentially less in higher one-hop ratio 
networks, some of the agents were still located at the military base (C2-IDS) 
platform when OP-2 reached its destination. This also contributed to less agents 
transm itted.
One-hop ratio TP TN FP FN Detection accuracy
0.1 hop ratio 0 265 5 0 98%
0.2 hop ratio 0 270 0 0 100%
0.3 hop ratio 0 270 0 0 100%
0.4 hop ratio 0 270 0 0 100%
0.5 hop ratio 0 270 0 0 100%
Table 5.3: One-hop ratio - detection accuracy
The detection accuracy for the simulations is shown in Table 5.3, where the 02- 
IDS has achieved more accurate results tha t the Generic-IDS. The only false 
positives detected where those for the 0.1 one-hop ratio attributed to the same 
cause of false detections in the previous simulations. A network with a 0.1 one-hop 
ratio implies more hops to reach a destination, hence the data flow can take more 
than one path on the route to the destination, resulting in slight discrepancies in 
the traffic flow and causing the detection function to incorrectly classify a node.
Sensor node w ithout IDS Sensor node with Generic-IDS Sensor node with C2-IDS
One-hop
Total node energy 
consumed (J)
Total node energy 
consumed (J)
Energy Cost 
IDS (J)
RM
Mobile
agents
Energy cost 
per agent (J)
Total node energy 
consumed (J)
Energy Cost 
IDS (J)
CO Operators
Energy cost 
per agent (J)
0.1 12592.03 21217.50 8625.48 7.71 77.66 101.03 13246.58 654.55 0.99 9.64 61.60
0.2 13617.69 23364.92 9747.23 7.65 83.73 106.67 14071.91 454.22 0.99 9.65 42.70
0.3 14712.73 25841.36 11128.63 7.68 83.11 122.57 15170.98 458.25 0.99 9.68 42.95
0.4 15365.86 28202.78 12836.93 7.66 82.92 141.72 15750.55 384.69 0.99 9.62 36.28
0.5 16272.32 30333.02 14060.69 7.71 82.75 155.44 16638.63 366.31 0.99 9.69 34.29
Legend: J =  Joules, RM =  Route monitor agent, CO =  Commander agent
Figure 5.24: One-hop ratio - C2-IDS energy cost
The energy cost of the C2-IDS is depicted in Figure 5.24. The overall cost of the 
IDS for the 0.1 one-hop ratio bears the toll of detecting 5 false positives, resulting 
in a relatively higher cost per agent. Generally, the cost of the IDS decreases as 
the one-hop ratio increases due to the latency of discovering routes, which means 
tha t the operator agents take longer to be deployed within the simulation, when a 
minimum throughput has been established. This is in contrast to the energy cost
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achieved for the Generic-IDS, which was much higher than that of the C2-IDS. 
B lack-holes
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Figure 5.25: Black-holes present - comparison of CPU energy consumption
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Figure 5.26: Black-holes present - comparison of radio energy consumption
Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.26 illustrate the average CPU and radio energy con­
sumption for the C2-IDS in the presence of different number of black-holes in 
the network, consisting of 270 nodes with a 0.2 one-hop ratio. The resulting 
consumption is higher with more black-holes present due to the number of true 
and false positives detected, and the actions associated with the corresponding 
intrusion response. Overall, the C2-IDS achieves better efficiency when compared 
to the Generic-IDS. The latter yielded more false positives; hence resulting in a 
higher cost.
There is a slight difference between the trend observed in the average percentage 
of agents and agent messages transm itted, as illustrated in Figure 5.27. This 
break in pattern is caused by a number of cyclic routes forming from the collateral 
effect of the black-holes. These cyclic routes caught some of the advanced guard 
and covering force agents (OP-1 and OP-2) and ended up being on the same node, 
instead of one hop away from each other. Therefore messages sent by the agents 
were on the loop-back circuit of the node, in other words, the message never left
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packets 1.0%
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Figure 5.27: Black-holes present - agent overheads
the node but were re-routed internally to the destination agent residing on the 
same node. This resulted in slightly less agent messages tha t were transm itted 
over wireless. Overall, the C2-IDS exhibits less overheads when compared to the 
Generic-IDS.
Packet loss
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Figure 5.28: Black-holes present - packet loss incurred
Figure 5.28 shows the average percentage packet loss incurred in the presence of 
multiple black-holes. The C2-IDS takes longer than the Generic-IDS to detect the 
black-hole nodes; however it still maintains a reasonable detection time incurring 
just under 2.1% packet loss with 3 black-holes detected at 135 seconds within the 
simulation. The difference in detection time, when compared to the Generic-IDS, 
is a result of the C2-IDS tailoring its resources according to the throughput and 
stability of the network. A noticeable difference in the pattern observed is that 
the C2-IDS incurred more loss from the 3-black-holes scenario, whilst the Generic- 
IDS incurred more loss from the 1-black-hole scenario. This is because, in the 
C2-IDS, all the black-holes have managed to complete their set-up stage and have 
engaged in a full blown attack with the 3 black-holes dropping more data packets 
over time. In contrast, the Generic-IDS detected the sinkholes before reaching 
full attack status, and as explained in the previous chapter, one black-hole is 
quicker in completing the set-up stage.
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Similarly to the Generic-IDS, there were multiple detections of the same sinkhole 
by more than one tactical team of operator agents and multiple sinkholes were 
detected almost concurrently, neutralising their attack in a short period of time.
Black-holes TP TN FP FN Detection accuracy
1 1 267 2 0 99%
2 2 262 6 0 97%
3 3 250 17 0 93%
Table 5.4: Black-holes present - detection accuracy
Sensor node 
without IDS
Sensor node with Generic-IDS Sensor node with C2-IDS
BH
Node energy 
consumed (J)
Node energy 
consumed (J)
Energy Cost 
IDS (J)
RM Mobileagents
Energy cost for 
response (J)
Energy cost 
per agent (J)
Node energy 
consumed (J)
Energy Cost 
IDS (J) CO Operators
Energy cost for 
response (J)
Energy cost 
per agent (J)
1 13581.84 50832.55 37250.71 7.66 86.22 29615.05 81.33 16261.35 2679.51 0.99 9.52 2189.44 46.66
2 13581.84 49336.50 35754.66 7.62 85.16 28119.00 82.29 17480.84 3899.00 0.98 9.38 3408.93 47.27
3 13581.84 47433.63 33851.79 7.58 82.10 26216.13 85.14 19171.49 5589.65 0.98 9.30 5099.58 47.70
Legend: J =  Joules, RM =  Route monitor agent, CO =  Commander agent
Figure 5.29: Black-holes present - C2-IDS energy cost
The detection accuracy for the simulations is shown in Table 5.4 , where it is 
noticeable tha t there were more false positives with more black-holes present. 
These were caused by the cyclic routes formed as a collateral effect of the black- 
hole. The routes ended up affecting the data collection process whereby data 
packets got caught circling these routes. The end result is tha t the operator 
agents found a discrepancy in the expected traffic flow and classified it as a 
sinkhole. Although it was not the actual sinkhole, the traffic behaviour is still an 
anomaly and revealed the presence of selfish nodes. In a future implementation, 
it is possible to carry out route repairs on such nodes through the use of the 
agents themselves.
Figure 5.29 depicts the overall energy cost of the C2-IDS operation in the presence 
of the black-holes. The energy cost for the intrusion response is also extracted 
and highlighted as a column on its own, since these simulations were expected 
to produce a response to the black-holes. The cost for the response increases 
with the number of black-holes present and false positives detected, due to  more 
nodes reinitialising their routing to exclude the detected nodes. This results in 
the nodes broadcasting route request messages accordingly. In the case of the 
Generic-IDS, a similar number of false positives was detected in all 3 scenarios, 
therefore bearing a similar and higher cost of intrusion response.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are a fundamental component in the arsenal of 
network defences against determined intruders. The proliferation of Wireless Ad 
Hoc Networks (WAHN) in critical, and sensitive, application areas demanded a 
suitable distributed and cooperative design for an IDS, which can operate within 
the challenging environment tha t WAHN have to offer. Researchers have re­
sorted to the use of mobile agents to take advantage of their properties, in order 
to overcome these challenges. Various approaches have been proposed for the 
organisation and cooperation model underlying the design of multi-agent IDS, to 
achieve better efficiency and effectiveness in detecting and neutralising an intru­
sion.
This work proposed the Command and Control (C2) IDS framework, which ap­
plies military tactics to the organisation and cooperation model of a multi-agent 
IDS with the intention of improving the efficiency, whilst ensuring an appropri­
ate level of effectiveness such tha t intrusions are detected correctly in a timely 
manner. It focused specifically on Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), which are a 
particular resource constrained type of WAHN, and on the Sinkhole attack tha t 
can have a catastrophic effect on the integrity of the sensor network.
The efficiency and effectiveness of the C2-IDS framework was assessed and com­
pared, using simulations, against the following scenarios: (1) a bare bones wire­
less sensor network without an IDS and (2) a Generic-IDS framework, which 
is a multi-agent IDS tha t uses simple heuristics for the underlying organisation 
and cooperation multi-agent model. A simulator API was developed to conduct 
these simulations capable of supporting wireless ad hoc properties and multi­
agent IDS, with the desired granular level of reporting on the performance. The 
API also includes an implementation of a mobile agent designed to be role-based 
and event-driven within its environment, through the use of a dynamic rule-based 
engine.
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The simulations were carried out under different network conditions including 
various traffic frequencies, number of device nodes, one-hop ratio and node den­
sity, and multiple sinkhole nodes present. The performance of each simulation 
was then expressed in terms of:
• CPU and radio energy consumption
• Communication overheads
• Packet loss incurred due to the presence of a sinkhole node
• Detection accuracy of the IDS
• Overall energy cost of the IDS and the energy cost per software agent
The results and information learned from these simulations are summarised here­
under under their respective scenario.
D efenceless w ireless sensor network
The simulations for the bare bones wireless sensor network, without an IDS, pro­
vided a baseline profile of performance tha t was used to assess the performance 
of the Generic-IDS and C2-IDS framework. The results have demonstrated tha t 
the CPU consumes a significantly less amount of energy than the radio antenna; 
hence the IDS should balance the cost of its operation in favour of CPU process­
ing rather than radio communication exchange where possible. In addition, the 
communication overheads incurred during the route discovery phase of the AODV 
routing protocol are considerably high, and exercise a load on the network each 
time route request broadcast is initiated. Also, there is a higher average energy 
consumption and communication overheads per node as the traffic frequency, 
number of device nodes and one-hop ratio increases.
The sinkhole attack was also studied as part of these simulations. In particular, 
the results revealed that the position of a sinkhole node in a WSN causes dif­
ferent amounts of packet loss. A sinkhole node placed closer to the base station 
incurred up to slightly over 40% packet loss, whilst a sinkhole node positioned at 
an arbitrary number of hops away incurred much less. The nodes closer to the 
base station were located on primary routes tha t served a number of different 
nodes, hence having a higher data throughput causing major loss. Furthermore, 
more sinkhole nodes did not necessarily mean more damage. Two sinkhole node, 
acting as black-holes, were capable of partitioning the network, which affected 
other sinkhole nodes in the vicinity reducing significantly the number of data 
packets tha t were captured by those sinkholes. The simulations have shown tha t
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the first sinkhole node positioned at a strategic location causes the most dam­
age, following which additional sinkhole nodes cause relatively less incremental 
damage. The grey-hole variation of the sinkhole attack has a similar behavioural 
profile; however the packet loss incurred was less according to the packet loss 
probability used.
G eneric m ulti-agent ID S framework
Similar simulations were carried out to establish a performance profile for the 
Generic-IDS framework. The Generic-IDS implements the 3 main functional 
components of an IDS, using mobile agents to perform the analysis and detection 
function on the data collected by the IDS on other device nodes. The mobile 
agents were deployed periodically at a fixed interval on completion of a task. 
The results covering the different simulated network conditions have ultimately 
demonstrated tha t a Sensor node would generate an average of 87 agents in 900 
seconds of simulation time, with an associated average energy cost of 150 Joules 
per agent. This cost covers the life cycle of an agent including the intrusion 
response, if carried out.
The simulations have also revealed an interesting aspect on the energy cost of 
an automated intrusion response, which does not usually get as much deserved 
attention. In the case of the Generic-IDS, the response consisted of a reinitiali­
sation of the routing tables in the neighbouring nodes of the detected sinkhole. 
This triggered a route request broadcast transmission, which translated into more 
incurred energy costs. This cost is also affected by the rate of false positives de­
tected, since the same response is carried out causing the node to expend valuable 
resources without any real gained benefit. Hence, an IDS with low detection ac­
curacy can cause the energy cost of the overall IDS operation to rise considerably. 
In addition, the presence of the Generic-IDS in the simulations has also shed some 
light on the collateral damage of the sinkhole attack. The agents deployed after 
neutralising the attack have encountered cyclic routes tha t were residual from 
the attack itself. The routing protocol caters for such instances; however there 
is a latency in re-establishing the routing integrity. Meanwhile, the agents were 
caught up in these cyclic routes causing a number of false positives due to the 
network traffic anomalies found. A future implementation of an IDS could use 
the agents to also carry out repairs on the routing integrity when required.
C om m and and Control (C2) m ulti-agent ID S framework
A performance profile was also established for the C2-IDS framework using the 
same simulations and network conditions. The C2-IDS applies a military opera­
tions framework tha t implements a command and control process, which factors 
in operational environment and mission variables to tailor and organise resources,
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such as, the deployed mobile agents. In addition, the IDS framework has been 
modelled on the main combat functions found in the military operations frame­
work, namely, operations, sustainment, protection and intelligence. These im­
plement the functional components of a multi-agent IDS. Also, the hierarchical 
chain of command and modular structure found in a military organisation is ap­
plied to the resources, in particular, the mobile agents are clustered into tactical 
teams reporting to a commanding officer at the tactical command post located 
at the C2-IDS framework. The tactical team consists of a covering force agent, 
advanced guard agent and main body agent, which are responsible to carry out 
the analysis and detection function.
This controlled effort of these resources in the various simulated network condi­
tions resulted in a Sensor node generating an average of 10 agents in 900 seconds 
of simulation time, with an associated average energy cost of 51 Joules per agent. 
This energy cost was sufficient to provide an IDS effectiveness with reasonable 
packet loss incurred of less than approximately 2.1% with medium traffic fre­
quency. In low traffic frequency, the C2-IDS incurred a packet loss of 10.8% 
before detecting and neutralising the sinkhole node. This was achieved by fac­
toring in variables such as data throughput, route utilisation, route stability and 
current energy levels. These variables were evaluated against decisive thresh­
olds to determine the frequency of the mobile agents deployed. The thresholds 
were continually updated using the feedback from each mission. Ultimately, the 
C2-IDS framework managed to achieve overall improved performance over the 
Generic-IDS by gaining a better situational understanding before using expen­
sive resources, such as, radio transmission. Furthermore, the C2-IDS is capable 
of adapting its operations to the changing network environment in terms of data 
throughput and route stability.
The use of a tactical team of agents as opposed to one mobile agent has proven 
to be beneficial in managing the agent communication overheads. The overheads 
incurred were much less than the Generic-IDS due to the bulk of the commu­
nication being limited to the confines of the tactical team, which was always 
one node away from each other. This is in contrast with the Generic-IDS which 
maintained communication contact with the route monitor agent on the source 
node to notify the last position. Also, the arrangement of the tactical team  pro­
vides better robustness and resilience in the presence of an intruder node. Both 
the covering force and advanced guard agent gave ample warning of a suspected 
threat to the main body agent. This was also reflected in the higher detection 
accuracy achieved.
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6.1 Further Work
The proposed C2-IDS framework is a proof of concept illustrating the improved 
efficiency obtained by employing military doctrine, in tailoring and organising 
resources tha t are underlying the functionality of the multi-agent IDS. The hi­
erarchical and modular structure of the resources allows the C2-IDS framework 
to be potentially extended to cater for different types of WAHN and various 
attacks. Each tactical team  could carry out different analysis and detection func­
tions (e.g. neural network based) to detect specific attacks. The work on the 
C2-IDS framework can be broadened, as follows:
• The rule-based system tha t decides on the threshold values using data from 
the operational and mission variables can be improved through Decision or 
Game Theory. These different variables could be modelled accordingly us­
ing one of the theoretical models to determine the desired outcome, which 
would produce a balance between the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
IDS. Although the rule-based system delivered positive results, the use of 
Decision or Game Theory could provide additional flexibility and more pre­
cision in the control of the desired outcome. Other optimisation techniques 
based on Genetic Algorithms (GA) could also be used to determine the best 
threshold values.
• The instances of the C2-IDS on the device node work independently of each 
other; however better performance can be potentially achieved by cluster­
ing different C2-IDS into one area of operations commanded by a Regional- 
C2-IDS. This extends further the hierarchical structure of the command 
chain allowing for better management of the distributed and cooperative 
IDS functionality. The Regional-C2-IDS can plan operations with a bet­
ter understanding of the cluster area based on collected information from 
neighbouring Regional-C2-IDS and nodes within the cluster. After carrying 
out its own command and control process, the Regional-C2-IDS can pro­
vide mission orders for the individual C2-IDS in the cluster. These orders 
would contain the constraint parameters with which the C2-IDS can plan 
their own mission accordingly.
• The C2-IDS framework in its current format offers basic and restricted in­
trusion preventive measures to preserve its confidentiality, integrity and ser­
vice availability. However, improvements can be made tha t take advantage 
of the hierarchical structure of the command chain to establish reputation- 
based collaboration and efficient encryption key distribution mechanisms. 
This would facilitate secure collaboration between various C2-IDS (and 
their tactical teams) at different levels of the hierarchy.
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• The current implementation of the C2-IDS includes one type of course of 
action tha t a tactical team  can follow. Other military tactics can be used 
to deploy the operator agents accordingly, depending on the nature of the 
threat and stability of the network. Specifically, the operator agents cur­
rently use a travelling formation, where they traverse the route in a straight 
line. An alternative would be a travelling over-watch formation [87, 88], 
where the agents travel on separate routes in the same direction. This en­
sures tha t a malicious node will not capture the whole team in an attem pt 
to defeat the IDS operation. More offensive and defensive tactics can be 
sourced from [82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88].
• Military deception [74, 85, 87] is another subject th a t has been extensively 
studied. Deception can be used during the planning of a mission in an 
attem pt to lure the intruder out in the open. There are various military 
deceptive tactics tha t can be employed, such as, a false show of force or 
injecting false messages tha t a malicious node would react to. The right 
deceptive tactics are capable of saving energy costs by luring the intruder 
into action without expending constrained device node resources.
• Tactical observation posts (OP) are set up to monitor both friendly and 
enemy activities [40]. A similar approach to monitor device node behaviour 
(including mobility and communication patterns) can be used with a two­
fold objective: (1) identifying segments of the network tha t could be more 
at high risk than others, and (2) highlight potential covert enemy operations 
based on past behavioural patterns and adversarial reasoning techniques. 
This could be the foundation of establishing trust between various C2-IDS 
on different nodes.
• Evaluating the C2-IDS framework with different patterns of mobility ex­
hibited by the device nodes. This would provide information on the energy 
consumption incurred in the presence of a degree of route instability and 
the consequences on the efficiency and effectiveness of the C2-IDS.
• Evaluating the C2-IDS framework in the presence of other types of attacks, 
e.g. the Sybil attack [52], in order to understand further the performance 
impact.
Part of the work in this research has also raised other questions tha t affects gener­
ally the functioning of an IDS. Further work can be carried out in understanding 
and managing an automated intrusion response in an efficient manner, such th a t 
the energy cost associated can be borne by the network. In addition, the intru­
sion response could possibly consider any residual damage tha t an attack might
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leave on the integrity of the network and initiate feasible repairs to return the 
network back to it normal operations.
Ultimately, a multi-agent IDS modelled using military doctrine can potentially 
provide a framework to manage resources efficiently and effectively against attack­
ers, tha t are increasingly becoming more resilient, as Wireless Ad Hoc Networks 
are continuing to take up a key role in providing an ubiquitous service.
Appendices
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Appendix A
Experim ent plan
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CATEGORY VARIABLE TRAFFIC NETWORK_SIZE ON E_HOP_RATIO BLACKHOLES GREYHOLES
TRAFFIC H H 270 0.20 0 0
TRAFFIC M M 270 0.20 0 0
TRAFFIC L L 270 0.20 0 0
TRAFFIC P P 270 0.20 0 0
SIZE 180 M 180 0.20 0 0
SIZE 270 M 270 0.20 0 0
SIZE 360 M 360 0.20 0 0
SIZE 450 M 450 0.20 0 0
SIZE 540 M 540 0.20 0 0
ONE-HOP 0_1 M 270 0.10 0 0
ONE-HOP 0_2 M 270 0.20 0 0
ONE-HOP 0_3 M 270 0.30 0 0
ONE-HOP 0_4 M 270 0.40 0 0
ONE-HOP 0_5 M 270 0.50 0 0
BLACKHOLE 1 M 270 0.20 1 0
BLACKHOLE 2 M 270 0.20 2 0
BLACKHOLE 3 M 270 0.20 3 0
BLACKHOLE 5 M 270 0.20 5 0
BLACKHOLE 10 M 270 0.20 10 0
BLACKHOLE 50 M 270 0.20 50 0
BLACKHOLE 100 M - 270 0.20 100 0
BLACKHOLE 150 M 270 0.20 150 0
BLACKHOLE 200 M 270 0.20 200 0
BLACKHOLE 250 M 270 0.20 250 0
SELECTIVE 1 M 270 0.20 0 1
SELECTIVE 2 M 270 0.20 0 2
SELECTIVE 3 M 270 0.20 0 3
SELECTIVE 5 M 270 0.20 0 5
SELECTIVE 10 M 270 0.20 0 10
SELECTIVE 50 M 270 0.20 0 50
SELECTIVE 100 M 270 0.20 0 100
SELECTIVE 150 M 270 0.20 0 150
SELECTIVE 200 M 270 0.20 0 200
SELECTIVE 250 M 270 0.20 0 250
Figure A .l: Main simulation experiment plan
A p p e n d ix  B
Code analysis results
Class In terface (Contract) M ethod M ain Entity O bject CREATE READ UPDATE DELETE Blocks LOC LOC/Block
AODV forw ardR outeR equestM essage RREQ 0 0 1 0 3 18 6.00
g enerateR ou teR ep lyM essage RREP 1 0 0 0 4 28 7.00
receiveR outeE rrorM essage RERR 0 0 1 0 2 7 3.50
receive Route ReplyM essage RREP 0 0 1 0 5 39 7.80
receive Route R equest M essage RREQ 0 0 1 1 7 35 5.00
RREQtimeout RREQ 0 0 1 0 4 18 4.50
send(N etw orkPacket pkt) N etw orkPkt 0 0 1 0 4 26 6.50
send(N etw orkPacket packet, int N etw orkPkt 0 0 1 0 3 21 7.00
updateRouteT oO rigin RREQ 0 0 1 0 1 9 9.00
Total 1 0 8 1 33 201 6.09
Class In terface (Contract) M ethod M ain Entity O bject CREATE READ UPDATE DELETE Blocks LOC LOC/Block
DeviceN ode processSignal Signal 1 0 0 0 1 6 6.00
p rocesslnboundFram e Frame 0 0 1 0 1 6 6.00
Total 1 0 1 0 2 12 6.00
Class In terface (Contract) M ethod M ain Entity O bject CREATE READ UPDATE DELETE Blocks LOC LOC/Block
Sensor firstSignal Signal 1 0 0 0 1 7 7.00
nextSignal Signal 1 0 0 0 1 6 6.00
2 0 0 0 2 13 6.50
Figure B .l: W ithout IDS code analysis - part 1
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Appendix B. Code analysis results
Class In terface (Contract) M ethod M ain Entity O bject CREATE READ UPDATE DELETE Blocks LOC LOC/Block
SensorApp sendO utbound Signal Payload 0 1 1 0 1 11 11.00
findN earestB S Signal 0 0 1 0 3 16 5.33
createPayload Signal Payload 1 0 0 0 1 8 8.00
receivelnbound Signal Payload 0 0 1 0 1 14 14.00
Total 1 1 3 0 6 49 8.17
Class Interface (Contract) M ethod M ain Entity O bject CREATE READ UPDATE DELETE LOC LOC/Block
Netw orkLayer forw ardPacket N etw orkPkt 0 0 1 0 1 11 11.00
receivelnbound N etw orkPkt 0 0 1 0 1 23 23.00
encapsu la te N etw orkPkt 1 0 0 0 1 5 5.00
sendO utbound N etw orkPkt 0 0 1 0 1 11 11.00
Total 1 0 3 0 4 50 12.50
Figure B.2: W ithout IDS code analysis - part 2
Class Interface (Contract) M ethod M ain Entity O bject CREATE READ UPDATE DELETE Blocks LOC LOC/Block
N odeW ireless encapsulateD ata Frame 1 0 0 0 1 4 4.00
decapsu la te Frame 0 0 0 1 1 5 5.00
endTransm it Frame 0 0 1 0 1 14 14.00
receiveTransm ission Frame 1 0 0 0 1 18 18.00
sendO utbound Frame 0 0 1 0 1 15 15.00
tran sm it Frame 0 0 1 0 1 9 9.00
receive lnbound Frame 0 0 1 0 2 22 11.00
Total 2 0 4 1 8 87 10.88
G rand Total 8 1 19 2 55 412 7.49
Figure B.3: W ithout IDS code analysis - part 3
Class In terface (Contract) M ethod M ain Entity O bject CREATE READ UPDATE DELETE Blocks LOC LOC/Block
G ene rid  05 sendO utbound N etw orkPacket 0 0 1 0 1 12 12.00
G ene rid  05 receive lnbound N etw orkPacket 0 0 1 0 1 12 12.00
G atew ay allow lnboundA gentPacket A gentPacket 0 1 0 0 2 27 13.50
G atew ay allowlnboundAOD VPacket AODVPacket 0 1 0 0 1 6 6.00
G atew ay allow lnboundD ataPacket DataPacket 0 1 0 0 1 4 4.00
G atew ay allowOutboundAO DVPacket AODVPacket 0 1 0 0 1 6 6.00
G atew ay allow O utboundD ataPacket DataPacket 0 1 0 0 1 4 4.00
G atew ay dispatchRERRNotifcation RERRNotice 0 1 0 0 1 4 4.00
AgentFactory abortTask Task 0 0 0 1 1 8 8.00
AgentFactory analyzeO utboundD ata DataPacket 0 1 0 0 2 11 5.50
AgentFactory Task 1 0 0 0 2 11 5.50
AgentFactory con tactR outeM onitor(in t dst) R outeM onitor 0 0 1 0 3 14 4.67
AgentFactory contactR outeM onitor(N etPkt p) R outeM onitor 0 0 1 0 2 12 6.00
AgentFactory deployR oute M onitorjin t dst) R outeM onitor 1 0 0 0 1 8 8.00
AgentFactory dispatchRERRNotification RERRNotice 0 0 1 0 1 8 8.00
AgentFactory parseRoutingTable R outeM onitor 1 0 0 0 3 10 3.33
A gentFadory re trieveR ou teM onito r R outeM onitor 0 1 0 0 1 3 3.00
T ransport deployTeam A gentTeam 1 0 0 0 1 4 4.00
Total 4 8 5 1 26 164 6.31
Figure B.4: Generic-IDS code analysis - part 1
Class In terface (Contract) M eth o d M ain Entity O bject CREATE READ UPDATE DELETE Blocks LOC LOC/Block
D a ta C o ll e c t io n a n a ly z e D a ta P a c k e t D a ta P a c k e t 0 1 0 0 1 7 7 .0 0
D a ta C o ll e c t io n c o u n t P a c k e t D a ta P a c k e t 0 0 1 0 4 16 4 .0 0
D a ta C o ll e c t io n e s t i m a t e S iz e S n a p s h o t 0 1 0 0 1 8 8 .0 0
D a ta C o ll e c t io n p u r g e D a ta S n a p s h o t 0 0 0 1 3 16 5 .3 3
D a ta C o ll e c t io n q u e r y D a ta S n a p s h o t 0 1 0 0 3 16 5 .3 3
A g e n t D e p lo y e r n e w T a s k T ask 1 0 0 0 1 8 8 .0 0
A g e n t D e p lo y e r r e c e iv e  A g e n tC o m m s A g e n t M e s s a g e 0 0 1 0 4 2 5 6 .2 5
A g e n t D e p lo y e r t a g P a c k e t D a ta P a c k e t 0 0 1 0 1 3 3 .0 0
A g e n t D e p lo y e r d e p l o y A g e n t A g e n t 1 0 0 0 2 13 6 .5 0
A g e n t D e p lo y e r t e r m in a t e C u r r e n t T a s k T ask 0 0 0 1 2 14 7 .0 0
A g e n t D e p lo y e r d e b r ie fT a s k T ask 0 0 1 0 1 8 8 .0 0
A g e n t D e p lo y e r e n a b l e ln t r u s io n R e s p o n s e A g e n t M e s s a g e 1 0 0 0 1 5 5 .0 0
A g e n t D e p lo y e r g e t C o l l e c t e d D a t a S n a p s h o t 0 1 0 0 1 6 6 .0 0
A g e n tL e a d a c t io n E n g a g e S in k h o le A g e n t M e s s a g e 1 0 0 0 1 15 1 5 .0 0
A g e n tL e a d a c t io n E v a lu a t e O b s e r v a t io n s A g e n t 0 0 1 0 2 13 6 .5 0
A g e n tL e a d a c t io n M i s s io n C o m p l e t e d A g e n t 0 0 0 1 1 9 9 .0 0
A g e n tL e a d a c t io n M o v e O u tT o F ir s t H o p A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 5 5 .0 0
A g e n tL e a d a c t io n M o v e O u t T o N e x t H o p A g e n t 0 0 1 0 3 13 4 .3 3
A g e n tL e a d a c t io n R e p o r t O b s e r v a t i o n s A g e n t M e s s a g e 1 0 0 0 1 8 8 .0 0
A g e n tL e a d n o t i f y  M o v e m e n t A g e n t M e s s a g e 1 0 0 0 1 5 5 .0 0
A g e n tL e a d p a c k u p A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 9 9 .0 0
A g e n tL e a d q u e r y N e x t H o p A g e n t 0 1 0 0 3 13 4 .3 3
Total 6 5 8 3 39 235 6.03
Figure B.5: Generic-IDS code analysis - part 2
Class Interface (Contract) M ethod M ain Entity O bject CREATE READ UPDATE DELETE Blocks LOC LOC/Block
G e n e r ic A g e n tT a b o r t  M is s io n A g e n t 0 0 0 1 1 8 8 .0 0
G e n e r ic A g e n tT c e a s e A g e n t 0 0 0 1 1 21 2 1 .0 0
G e n e r ic A g e n tT d e p l o y A g e n t 1 0 0 0 3 2 0 6 .6 7
G e n e r ic A g e n tT m ig r a t e A g e n t 0 0 0 1 1 6 6 .0 0
G e n e r ic A g e n tT m o v e O u t A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 4 4 .0 0
G e n e r ic A g e n tT p a c k u p A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 14 1 4 .0 0
G e n e r ic A g e n tT q u e r y O b s e r v a t io n A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 7 7 .0 0
G e n e r ic A g e n tT s e n d M e s s a g e A g e n t M e s s a g e 1 0 0 0 1 7 7 .0 0
R o u t in g M o n ito r g e tR o u t in g E n tr y R o u t e M o n io r 0 0 1 0 1 4 4 .0 0
P o s t m a s t e r d e liv e r M a ilT o R M A g e n t M e s s a g e 0 0 1 0 4 18 4 .5 0
P o s t m a s t e r d e liv e r M a ilT o T r a n s p o r t A g e n tP a y lo a d 0 0 1 0 2 16 8 .0 0
P o s t m a s t e r p o s tR E R R N o tic e R E R R N otice 0 0 1 0 1 4 4 .0 0
Q u a r t e r m a s te r d e p lo y ( G e n e r ic A g e n t T ) A g e n t 1 0 0 0 1 6 6 .0 0
Q u a r t e r m a s te r d e p l o y ( T e a m  t e a m  J A g e n tT e a m 1 0 0 0 1 8 8 .0 0
Q u a r t e r m a s te r f in d R o o m T e a m R o o m 0 1 0 0 3 19 6 .3 3
Q u a r t e r m a s te r m o v e O u t A g e n t s A g e n t 0 0 0 1 3 13 4 .3 3
Q u a r t e r m a s te r r e c la im R o o m s T e a m R o o m 0 0 1 0 3 17 5 .6 7
Q u a r t e r m a s te r r e m o v e O l d N o t i c e s R E R R N otice 0 0 0 1 3 11 3 .6 7
T e a m R o o m c h e c k in ( G e n e r ic A g e n tT ) A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 7 7 .0 0
T e a m R o o m d e p o s i t M e s s a g e A g e n t M e s s a g e 0 0 1 0 1 8 8 .0 0
T e a m R o o m n o t i f y  A g e n t A g e n t M e s s a g e 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 5 .5 0
Total 4 1 11 5 36 229 6.36
G rand Total 14 14 24 9 101 628 6.22
Figure B.6: Generic-IDS code analysis - part 3
Appendix B. Code analysis results
Class Interface (Contract) M ethod M ain Entity O bject CREATE READ UPDATE DELETE Blocks LOC LOC/Block
M ilita r y B a se s e n d O u t b o u n d N e t w o r k P a c k e t 0 0 1 0 1 12 1 2 .0 0
M ilita r y  B a se r e c e iv e ln b o u n d N e t w o r k P a c k e t 0 0 1 0 1 12 1 2 .0 0
S e n t r y a l lo w ln b o u n d A O D V P a c k e t A O D V P a c k e t 0 1 0 0 1 6 6 .0 0
S e n t r y a l lo w ln b o u n d D a t a P a c k e t D a ta P a c k e t 0 1 0 0 1 4 4 .0 0
S e n t r y a l lo w ln b o u n d D e l t a P a c k e t A g e n t P a c k e t 0 1 0 0 3 2 4 8 .0 0
S e n t r y a l lo w O u t b o u n d A O D V P a c k e t A O D V P a c k e t 0 1 0 0 1 6 6 .0 0
S e n t r y a l lo w O u t b o u n d D a t a P a c k e t D a ta P a c k e t 0 1 0 0 1 4 4 .0 0
S e n t r y d is p a tc h R E R R N o t ifc a t io n R E R R N otice 0 1 0 0 1 4 4 .0 0
O p e r a t io n s a n a ly z e O u t b o u n d D a t a D a ta P a c k e t 0 1 0 0 2 11 5 .5 0
O p e r a t io n s c o m p le t e P h a s e O n e M is s io n 0 0 1 0 2 9 4 .5 0
O p e r a t io n s c o n t a c t C o m m a n d P o s t C o m m a n d P o s t 0 0 1 0 2 13 6 .5 0
O p e r a t io n s d e p l o y N e w C o m m a n d C o m m a n d P o s t 1 0 0 0 1 8 8 .0 0
O p e r a t io n s d is p a tc h R E R R N o t if ic a t io n R E R R N otice 0 0 1 0 1 8 8 .0 0
O p e r a t io n s la u n c h M is s io n 1 0 0 0 1 8 8 .0 0
O p e r a t io n s r e t r ie v e C o m m a n d P o s t C o m m a n d P o s t 0 1 0 0 1 3 3 .0 0
L o g is tic s d e p l o y T e a m A g e n tT e a m 1 0 0 0 1 4 4 .0 0
I n t e l l i g e n c e a n a ly z e D a ta P a c k e t D a ta P a c k e t 0 1 0 0 1 7 7 .0 0
I n t e l l i g e n c e c o u n t P a c k e t D a ta P a c k e t 0 0 1 0 4 19 4 .7 5
I n t e l l i g e n c e e s t i m a t e S iz e S n a p s h o t 0 1 0 0 1 8 8 .0 0
I n t e l l i g e n c e p u r g e ln t e l S n a p s h o t 0 0 0 1 3 2 0 6 .6 7
I n t e l l i g e n c e q u e r y O b s e r v a t io n S n a p s h o t 0 1 0 0 3 1 4 4 .6 7
Total 3 11 6 1 33 204 6.41
Figure B.7: C2-IDS code analysis - part 1
Class In terface (Contract) M ethod M ain Entity O bject CREATE READ UPDATE DELETE Blocks LOC LOC/Block
C o m m a n d e r b r ie f ( M is s io n  m is s io n ) M is s io n 0 0 0 0 1 9 9 .0 0
C o m m a n d e r r e c e iv e T e a m C o m m s A g e n t M e s s a g e 0 0 1 0 4 2 5 6 .2 5
C o m m a n d e r a n a ly z e P a c k e t D a ta P a c k e t 0 1 0 0 1 7 7 .0 0
C o m m a n d e r d e p lo y A s s a u l t T e a m A g e n tT e a m 1 0 0 0 1 6 6 .0 0
C o m m a n d e r d e b r ie f A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 9 9 .0 0
C o m m a n d e r b e g in A c t iv e R e c o n M is s io n 0 0 1 0 3 1 7 5 .6 7
C o m m a n d e r c o m p le t e P h a s e O n e M is s io n 0 0 1 0 1 5 5 .0 0
C o m m a n d e r c r e a t e M is s io n M is s io n 1 0 0 2 13 6 .5 0
C o m m a n d e r e n d A c t i v e R e c o n M is s io n 0 0 1 0 1 5 5 .0 0
C o m m a n d e r e v a lu a t e P h a s e O n e M is s io n 0 0 1 0 3 18 6 .0 0
C o m m a n d e r e v a lu a t e R e c o n S n a p s h o t S n a p s h o t 0 0 1 0 4 2 2 5 .5 0
C o m m a n d e r p la n M is s io n 0 0 1 0 2 16 8 .0 0
R e c o n O p e r a t o r a n a ly z e P a c k e t D a ta P a c k e t 0 1 0 1 3 3 .0 0
R e c o n O p e r a t o r b e g in A c t iv e S n a p s h o t 0 0 1 0 1 5 5 .0 0
R e c o n O p e r a t o r b e g in P a s s iv e S n a p s h o t 0 0 1 0 1 4 4 .0 0
R e c o n O p e r a t o r e n d A c t i v e S n a p s h o t 0 0 1 0 1 7 7 .0 0
R e c o n O p e r a t o r e n d P a s s iv e S n a p s h o t 0 0 1 0 1 6 6 .0 0
R e c o n O p e r a t o r s n a p A c t iv e S h o t S n a p s h o t 0 0 1 0 1 7 7 .0 0
R e c o n O p e r a t o r s n a p P a s s iv e S h o t S n a p s h o t 0 0 1 0 1 7 7 .0 0
Total 2 2 14 0 31 191 6.21
Figure B.8: C2-IDS code analysis - part 2
Class In terface (Contract) M ethod Main Entity O bject CREATE READ UPDATE DELETE Blocks LOC LOC/Block
P o s t m a s t e r d e liv e r M a ilT o T O C A g e n t M e s s a g e 0 0 1 0 3 12 4 .0 0
P o s t m a s t e r d e liv e r M a ilT o L o g is t ic s A g e n tP a y lo a d 0 0 1 0 2 16 8 .0 0
P o s t m a s t e r p o s tR E R R N o tic e R E R R N otice 0 0 1 0 1 4 4 .0 0
Q u a r t e r m a s te r d e p lo y f T e a m O p e r a t o r T e m p la A g e n t 1 0 0 0 1 6 6 .0 0
Q u a r t e r m a s te r d e p l o y ( T e a m  t e a m j A g e n tT e a m 1 0 0 0 1 8 8 .0 0
Q u a r t e r m a s te r f in d R o o m T e a m R o o m 0 1 0 0 3 19 6 .3 3
Q u a r t e r m a s te r m o v e O u t O p e r a t o r s A g e n t 0 0 0 1 3 13 4 .3 3
Q u a r t e r m a s te r r e c la im R o o m s T e a m R o o m 0 0 1 0 3 13 4 .3 3
Q u a r t e r m a s te r r e m o v e O l d N o t i c e s R E R R N otice 0 0 0 1 3 11 3 .6 7
T e a m R o o m c h e c k in ( T e a m O p e r a t o r T e m p l; A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 7 7 .0 0
T e a m R o o m d e p o s i t M e s s a g e A g e n t M e s s a g e 0 0 1 0 1 8 8 .0 0
T e a m R o o m n o t i f y O p e r a t o r A g e n t M e s s a g e 0 0 1 0 11 5 .5 0
O P A s s a u lt a c t io n M i s s io n C o m p l e t e d A g e n t 0 0 0 1 1 9 9 .0 0
O P A s s a u lt a c t io n M o v e O u tT o F ir s t H o p A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 4 4 .0 0
O P A s s a u lt a c t io n M o v e O u t T o N e x t H o p A g e n t 0 0 1 0 11 3 .6 7
O P A s s a u lt a c t io n R e p o r t D o w n t r e a m O b s e A g e n t M e s s a g e 1 0 0 0 1 5 5 .0 0
O P A s s a u lt a c t io n R e p o r t O b s e r v a t i o n s A g e n t M e s s a g e 1 0 0 0 1 6 6 .0 0
O P A s s a u lt e v e n t N o R e s p o n s e R e c e i v e d A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 5 5 .0 0
Total 4 1 10 3 32 168 5.66
Figure B.9: C2-IDS code analysis - part 3
Class In terface (Contract) M ethod M ain Entity O bject CREATE READ UPDATE DELETE Blocks LOC LOC/Block
O P L ead a c t io n E n g a g e S in k h o le A g e n t M e s s a g e 0 0 0 0 1 15 1 5 .0 0
O P L e a d a c t io n M i s s io n C o m p l e t e d A g e n t 0 0 0 1 1 9 9 .0 0
O P L e a d a c t io n M o v e O u tT o F ir s t H o p A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 3 3 .0 0
O P L e a d a c t io n M o v e O u tT o N e x t H o p A g e n t 0 0 1 0 3 12 4 .0 0
O P L e a d a c t io n R e c e iv e O b s e r v a t i o n A g e n t M e s s a g e 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 5 .0 0
O P L e a d e v e n t N o R e s p o n s e R e c e i v e d A g e n t 0 0 1 0 4 1 4 3 .5 0
O P L e a d p a c k u p A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 9 9 .0 0
O P L e a d q u e r y N e x t H o p A g e n t 0 1 0 0 1 6 6 .0 0
O P R e c c e a c t io n M i s s io n C o m p l e t e d A g e n t 0 0 0 1 1 9 9 .0 0
O P R e c c e a c t io n M o v e O u tT o F ir s t H o p A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 5 5 .0 0
O P R e c c e a c t io n M o v e O u tT o N e x t H o p A g e n t 0 0 1 0 10 5 .0 0
O P R e c c e a c t io n R e p o r t D o w n t r e a m O b s e A g e n t M e s s a g e 1 0 0 0 1 5 5 .0 0
O P R e c c e a c t io n R e p o r t O b s e r v a t io n s A g e n t M e s s a g e 1 0 0 0 1 8 8 .0 0
T e a m O p e r a t o r a b o r t M is s io n A g e n t 0 0 0 0 1 8 8 .0 0
T e a m O p e r a t o r c e a s e A g e n t 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 2 1 .0 0
T e a m O p e r a t o r d e p l o y A g e n t 1 0 0 0 2 0 6 .6 7
T e a m O p e r a t o r m ig r a t e A g e n t 0 0 0 1 1 6 6 .0 0
T e a m O p e r a t o r m o v e O u t A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 4 4 .0 0
T e a m O p e r a t o r p a c k u p A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 14 1 4 .0 0
T e a m O p e r a t o r q u e r y O b s e r v a t io n A g e n t 0 0 1 0 1 7 7 .0 0
T e a m O p e r a t o r s e n d M e s s a g e A g e n t M e s s a g e 1 0 0 0 1 7 7 .0 0
T e a m O p e r a t o r s e n d O b s e r v a t io n A g e n t M e s s a g e 1 0 0 0 1 6 6 .0 0
Total 5 1 10 4 31 208 7.55
Grand Total 14 15 40 8 127 771 6.07
Figure B.10: C2-IDS code analysis - part 4
A p p e n d ix  C
Support calculations
Network Size 180 270
l_HOP_RATIO
Density 
(m in: 1)
NodeslnR ange Zones
Density 
(m in: 1)
N odeslnR ange Zones
Expected Actual Rounding Error Expected Actual Rounding Error
0.1 2 1 8 1 7 0 .56% 90 3 2 7 2 6 0 .3 7 % 90
0.2 4 3 6 3 5 0 .56% 45 6 5 4 5 3 0 .37% 45
0.3 6 5 4 5 3 0 .56% 30 9 8 1 8 0 0 .3 7 % 30
0.4 8 7 2 7 1 0 .56% 23 12 1 0 8 1 0 7 0 .37% 23
0.5 1 0 9 0 8 9 0 .56% 18 15 1 3 5 1 3 4 0 .37% 18
A verage 0 .56% 0.37%
Figure C .l: Network size and one-hop ratio calculations - part 1
Network Size 360 450 540
l_HOP_RATIO
Density 
(m in: 1)
N odeslnR ange Zones
Density 
(m in: 1)
N odeslnR ange D ensity 
(m in: 1)
N odeslnR ange Zones
Expected Rounding Error Expected Actual Rounding Error Expected R ounding Error
0.1 4 3 6 3 5 0 .2 8 % 90 5 4 5 4 4 0 .2 2 % 90 6 5 4 5 3 0 .1 9 % 90
0.2 8 7 2 7 1 0 .2 8 % 45 10 9 0 8 9 0 .2 2 % 45 12 1 0 8 1 0 7 0 .1 9 % 45
0.3 12 1 0 8 1 0 7 0 .2 8 % 30 15 1 3 5 1 3 4 0 .22% 30 18 1 6 2 1 6 1 0 .1 9 % 30
0.4 16 1 4 4 1 43 0 .2 8 % 23 2 0 1 8 0 1 7 9 0 .2 2 % 23 2 4 2 1 6 2 1 5 0 .1 9 % 23
0.5 2 0 1 8 0 1 7 9 0 .2 8 % 18 2 5 2 2 5 2 2 4 0 .22% 18 3 0 2 7 0 2 6 9 0 .1 9 % 18
Average 0 .2 8 % 0 .22% 0.1 9 %
Figure C.2: Network size and one-hop ratio calculations - part 2
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